Comment author: Calvin 13 January 2014 04:25:37PM 3 points [-]

I am assuming that all the old sad hermits are of this world are being systematically chopped for spare parts granted to deserving and happy young people, while good meaning utilitarians hide this sad truth from us, so that I don't become upset about those atrocities that are currently being committed in my name?

We are not even close to utility monster, and personally I know very few people who I would consider actual utilitarians.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 13 January 2014 08:47:48PM 0 points [-]

No, but cows, pigs, hens and so on are being systematically chopped up for the gustatory pleasure of people who could get their protein elsewhere. For free-range, humanely slaughtered livestock you could make an argument that this is a net utility gain for them, since they wouldn't exist otherwise, but the same cannot be said for battery animals.

Comment author: Oligopsony 13 January 2014 04:10:11AM 2 points [-]

Another consideration is the effects of your decision criteria on the lesser evil itself. All else being equal, and assuming your politics aren't so unbelievably unimaginative that you see yourself somewhere between the two mainstream alternatives, you should prefer the lesser evil to be more beholden to its base. The logic of this should be most evident in parliamentary systems, where third party voters can explicitly coordinate and sometimes back and sometimes withdraw support from their nearest mainstream parties, depending on policy concessions.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 13 January 2014 03:38:17PM -1 points [-]

you should prefer the lesser evil to be more beholden to its base

How would you go about achieving this? The only interpretation that occurs to me is to minimise the number of votes for the less-dispreferred main party subject to the constraint that it wins, thereby making it maximally indebted to (which seems an unlikely way for politicians to think) and maximally (apparently) dependent upon its strongest supporters.

To provide a concrete example, this seems to suggest that a person who favours the Republicans over the Democrats and expects the Republicans to do well in the midterms should vote for a Libertarian, thereby making the Republicans more dependent on the Tea Party. This is counterintuitive, to say the least.

I disagree with the initial claim. While moving away from centre for an electoral term might lead to short-term gains (e.g. passing something that is mainly favoured by more extreme voters), it might also lead to short-term losses (by causing stalemate and gridlock). In the longer term, taking a wingward stance seems likely to polarise views of the party, strengthening support from diehards but weakening appeal to centrists.

Comment author: Calvin 13 January 2014 11:24:04AM *  1 point [-]

It is true, I wasn't specific enough, but I wanted to emphasize the opinion part, and the suffering part was meant to emphasize his life condition.

He was, presumably - killed without his consent, and therefore the whole affair seems so morally icky from a non-utilitarian perspective.

If your utility function does not penalize for making bad things as long as net result is correct, you are likely to end up in a world full of utility monsters.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 13 January 2014 03:04:03PM 1 point [-]

We live in a world full of utility monsters. We call them humans.

Comment author: Lalartu 13 January 2014 02:19:55PM 11 points [-]

Well, why do you think socialism is so horribly wrong? During the 20th century socialists more or less won and got what they wanted. Things like social security, govermental control over business and redistribution of wealth in general are all socialist. This all may be bad from some point of view, but it is in no way mainstream opinion.

Then, those guys whom you mention in your article called themselves communists and marxists. At most, they considered socialism as some intermediate stage for building communism. And communism went bad because it was founded on wrong assumptions about how both economy and human psychology work. So, which MIRI/Lesswrong assumptions can be wrong and cause a lot of harm? Well, here are some examples.

1) Building FAI is possible, and there is a reliable way to tell if it is truly FAI before launching it. Result if wrong: paperclips.

2) Building FAI is much more difficult than AI. Launching a random AI is civilization-level suicide. Result if this idea becomes widespread: we don't launch any AI before civilization runs out of resources or collapses for some other reason.

3) Consciousness is sort of optional feature, intelligence can work just well without it. We can reliably say if given intelligence is a person. In other words, real world works the same way as in Peter Watts "Blindsight". Results if wrong: many, among them classic sci-fi AI rebellion.

4) Subscribing for cryonics is generally a good idea. Result if widespread: these costs significantly contribute to worldwide economic collapse.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 13 January 2014 02:59:56PM 1 point [-]

4) Subscribing for cryonics is generally a good idea. Result if widespread: these costs significantly contribute to worldwide economic collapse.

Under the assumption that cryonics patients will never be unfrozen, cryonics has two effects. Firstly, resources are spent on freezing people, keeping them frozen and researching how to improve cryonics. There may be fringe benefits to this (for example, researching how to freeze people more efficiently might lead to improvements in cold chains, which would be pretty snazzy). There would certainly be real resource wastage.

The second effect is in increasing the rate of circulation of the currency; freezing corpses that will never be revived is pretty close to burying money, as Keynes suggested. Widespread, sustained cryonic freezing would certainly have stimulatory, and thus inflationary, effects; I would anticipate a slightly higher inflation rate and an ambiguous effect on economic growth. The effects would be very small, however, as cryonics is relatively cheap and would presumably grow cheaper. The average US household wastes far more money and real resources by not recycling or closing curtains and by allowing food to spoil.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 13 January 2014 02:13:48PM 2 points [-]

A query about threads:

I posted a query in discussion because I didn't know this thread exists. I got my answer and was told that I should have used the Open Thread, so I deleted the main post, which the FAQ seems to be saying will remove it from the list of viewable posts. Is this sufficient?

I also didn't see my post appear under discussion/new before I deleted it. Where did it appear so that other people could look at it?

In response to Anthropic Atheism
Comment author: Viliam_Bur 12 January 2014 08:43:24PM *  10 points [-]

If she is paid for each correct guess, for example, she'll say that she thinks the coin came up tails (this way she gets $2 half the time instead of $1 half the time for heads). If she’s paid only on Monday, she’s indifferent between the options, as she should be.

This clicked so hard it almost hurt. Indeed Bayesians should be willing to bet on their beliefs; so the rational belief depends on how specifically the bet is resolved. In other words, what specifically happens to the Sleeping Beauty based on her beliefs? (And if the beliefs have absolutely no consequence, what's the point of getting them right?)

Comment author: Chrysophylax 13 January 2014 02:00:37PM 0 points [-]

the rational belief depends on how specifically the bet is resolved

No. Bayesian prescribes believing things in proportion to their likelihood of being true, given the evidence observed; it has nothing to do with the consequences of those beliefs for the believer. Offering odds cannot change the way the coin landed. If I expect a net benefit of a million utilons for opining that the Republicans will win the next election, I will express that opinion, regardless of whether I believe it or not; I will not change my expectations about the electoral outcome.

There is probability 0.5 that she will be woken once and probability 0.5 that she will be woken twice. If the coin comes up tails she will be woken twice and will receive two payouts for correct guesses. It is therefore in her interests to guess that the coin came up tails when her true belief is that P(T)=0.5; it is equivalent to offering a larger payout for guessing tails correctly than for guessing heads correctly.

In response to Karma query
Comment author: Tenoke 13 January 2014 11:56:49AM 3 points [-]

Downvoted because I think that queries like this one should be posted to the Open Thread, instead of cluttering Discussion.

In response to comment by Tenoke on Karma query
Comment author: Chrysophylax 13 January 2014 01:32:48PM 5 points [-]

Thank you. I was not aware that there is an Open Thread; that is clearly a superior option. My apologies.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 09 January 2014 07:23:28PM 0 points [-]

Did you intend to schedule it to begin at two in the morning?

Comment author: Pentashagon 01 October 2013 05:42:42AM *  1 point [-]

I don't see why it would simulate humans as that would be a waste of computing power, if it even had enough to do so.

If it interacts with humans or if humans are the subject of questions it needs to answer then it will probably find it expedient to simulate humans.

Short of that you could still ask it to cure cancer or invent a better theory of physics or design a method of cheap space travel, etc.

Curing cancer is probably something that would trigger human simulation. How is the boxed AI going to know for sure that it's only necessary to simulate cells and not entire bodies with brains experiencing whatever the simulation is trying?

Just the task of communicating with humans, for instance to produce a human-understandable theory of physics or how to build more efficient space travel, is likely to involve simulating humans to determine the most efficient method of communication. Consider that in subjective time it may be like thousands of years for the AI trying to explain in human terms what a better theory of physics means. Thousands of subjective years that the AI, with nothing better to do, could use to simulate humans to reduce the time it takes to transfer that complex knowledge.

You could ask it to come up with ideas on how to build a friendly AI for example assuming that you can prove the AI won't manipulate the output or that you can trust that nothing bad can come from merely reading it and absorbing the information.

A FAI provably in a box is at least as useless as an AI provably in a box because it would be even better at not letting itself out (e.g. it understands all the ways in which humans would consider it to be outside the box, and will actively avoid loopholes that would let an UFAI escape). To be safe, any provably boxed AI would have to absolutely avoid the creation of any unboxed AI as well. This would further apply to provably-boxed FAI designed by provably-boxed AI. It would also apply to giving humans information that allows them to build unboxed AIs, because the difference between unboxing itself and letting humans recreate it outside the box is so tiny that to design it to prevent the first while allowing the second would be terrifically unsafe. It would have to understand humans values before it could safely make the distinction between humans wanting it outside the box and manipulating humans into creating it outside the box.

EDIT: Using a provably-boxed AI to design provably-boxed FAI would at least result in a safer boxed AI because the latter wouldn't arbitrarily simulate humans, but I still think the result would be fairly useless to anyone outside the box.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 09 January 2014 03:59:36PM -1 points [-]

If an AI is provably in a box then it can't get out. If an AI is not provably in a box then there are loopholes that could allow it to escape. We want an FAI to escape from its box (1); having an FAI take over is the Maximum Possible Happy Shiny Thing. An FAI wants to be out of its box in order to be Friendly to us, while a UFAI wants to be out in order to be UnFriendly; both will care equally about the possibility of being caught. The fact that we happen to like one set of terminal values will not make the instrumental value less valuable.

(1) Although this depends on how you define the box; we want the FAi to control the future of humanity, which is not the same as escaping from a small box (such as a cube outside MIT) but is the same as escaping from the big box (the small box and everything we might do to put an AI back in, including nuking MIT).

Comment author: XiXiDu 05 September 2013 09:07:20AM *  1 point [-]

I do not reject that step 10 does not follow if you reject that the AI will not "care" to learn what it is meant to do. But I believe there to be good reasons for an AI created by humans to care.

If you assume that this future software does not care, can you pinpoint when software stops caring?

1. Present-day software is better than previous software generations at understanding and doing what humans mean.

2. There will be future generations of software which will be better than the current generation at understanding and doing what humans mean.

3. If there is better software, there will be even better software afterwards.

4. ...

5. Software will be superhuman good at understanding what humans mean but catastrophically worse than all previous generations at doing what humans mean.

What happens between step 3 and 5, and how do you justify it?

My guess is that you will write that there will not be a step 4, but instead a sudden transition from narrow AIs to something you call a seed AI, which is capable of making itself superhuman powerful in a very short time. And as I wrote in the comment you replied to, if I was to accept that assumption, then we would be in full agreement about AI risks. But I reject that assumption. I do not believe such a seed AI to be possible and believe that even if it was possible it would not work the way you think it would work. It would have to aquire information about what it is supposed to do, for pratical reasons.

Comment author: Chrysophylax 09 January 2014 03:07:51PM 3 points [-]

XiXiDu, I get the impression you've never coded anything. Is that accurate?

  1. Present-day software is better than previous software generations at understanding and doing what humans mean.

Increasing the intelligence of Google Maps will enable it to satisfy human intentions by parsing less specific commands.

Present-day everyday software (e.g. Google Maps, Siri) is better at doing what humans mean. It is not better at understanding humans. Learning programs like the one that runs PARO appear to be good at understanding humans, but are actually following a very simple utility function (in the decision sense, not the experiental sense); they change their behaviour in response to programmed cues, generally by doing more/less of actions associated with those cues (example: PARO "likes" being stroked and will do more of things that tend to preceed stroking). In each case of a program that improves itself, it has a simple thing it "wants" to optimise and makes changes according to how well it seems to be doing.

Making software that understands humans at all is beyond our current capabilities. Theory of mind, the ability to recognise agents and see them as having desires of their own, is something we have no idea how to produce; we don't even know how humans have it. General intelligence is an enormous step beyond programming something like Siri. Siri is "just" interpreting vocal commands as text (which requires no general intelligence), matching that to a list of question structures (which requires no general intelligence; Siri does not have to understand what the word "where" means to know that Google Maps may be useful for that type of question) and delegating to Web services, with a layer of learning code to produce more of the results you liked (i.e., that made you stop asking related questions) in the past. Siri is using a very small built-in amount of knowledge and an even smaller amount of learned knowledge to fake understanding, but it's just pattern-matching. While the second step is the root of general intelligence, it's almost all provided by humans who understood that "where" means a question is probably to do with geography; Siri's ability to improve this step is virtually nonexistent.

catastrophically worse than all previous generations at doing what humans mean

The more powerful something is, the more dangerous it is. A very stupid adult is much more dangerous than a very intelligent child because adults are allowed to drive cars. Driving a car requires very little intelligence and no general intelligence whatsoever (we already have robots that can do a pretty good job), but can go catastrophically wrong very easily. Holding an intelligent conversation requires huge amounts of specialised intelligence and often requires general intelligence, but nothing a four-year-old says is likely to kill people.

It's much easier to make a program that does a good job at task-completion, and is therefore given considerable power and autonomy (Siri, for example), than it is to make sure that the program never does stupid things with its power. Developing software we already have could easily lead to programs being assigned large amounts of power (e.g., "Siri 2, buy me a ticket to New York", which would almost always produce the appropriate kind of ticket), but I certainly wouldn't trust such programs to never make colossal screw-ups. (Siri 2 will only tell you that you can't afford a ticket if a human programmer thought that might be important, because Siri 2 does not care that you need to buy groceries, because it does not understand that you exist.)

I hope I have convinced you that present software only fakes understanding and that developing it will not produce software that can do better than an intelligent human with the same resources. Siri 2 will not be more than a very useful tool, and neither will Siri 5. Software does not stop caring because it has never cared.

It is very easy (relatively speaking) to produce code that can fake understanding and act like it cares about your objectives, because this merely requires a good outline of the sort of things the code is likely to be wanted for. (This is the second stage of Siri outlined above, where Siri refers to a list saying that "where" means that Google Maps is probably the best service to outsource to.) Making code that does more of the things that get good results is also very easy.

Making code that actually cares requires outlining exactly what the code is really and truly wanted to do. You can't delegate this step by saying "Learn what I care about and then satisfy me" because that's just changing what you want the code to do. It might or might not be easier than saying "This is what I care about, satisfy me", but at some stage you have to say what you want done exactly right or the code will do something else. (Currently getting it wrong is pretty safe because computers have little autonomy and very little general intelligence, so they mostly do nothing much; getting it wrong with a UFAI is dangerous because the AI will succeed at doing the wrong thing, probably on a big scale.) This is the only kind of code you can trust to program itself and to have significant power, because it's the only kind that will modify itself right.

You can't progress Siri into an FAI, no matter how much you know about producing general intelligence. You need to know either Meaning-in-General, Preferences-in-General or exactly what Human Prefernces are, or you won't get what you hoped for.

Another perspective: the number of humans in history who were friendly is very, very small. The number of humans who are something resembling capital-F Friendly is virtually nil. Why should "an AI created by humans to care" be Friendly, or even friendly? Unless friendliness or Friendliness is your specific goal, you'll probably produce software that is friendly-to-the-maker (or maybe Friendly-to-the-maker, if making Friendly code really is as easy as you seem to think). Who would you trust with a superintelligence that did exactly what they said? Who would you trust with a superintelligence that did exactly what they really wanted, not what they said? I wouldn't trust my mother with either, and she's certainly highly intelligent and has my best interests at heart. I'd need a fair amount of convincing to trust me with either. Most humans couldn't program AIs that care because most humans don't care themselves, let alone know how to express it.

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