Not sure if serious. Just in case you are, however: 'them' is referring to the people doing financially unrecompensed work in the home. 'it' is the financially unrecompensed work in the home. 'Who' and 'Whose' are up to you to define - that's why they're phrased as questions, dontcha know.
I am trying to be clear about the fact that the ONLY part of this thread I care about was the use of the word 'innocuous'. All these other questions are good questions that people are asking, and answering, for themselves, and for other people, every day. Which I have no quarrel with.
I do not want to answer these questions for other people. This question:
Who would compensate them? Whose benefit is it for?
is an excellent question that I actually do not want to answer, because noone has acknowledged that my point about the word innocuous is valid or valuable criticism. All the feedback I have seen so far dodges this small point to ask me much tougher questions about how individuals should be making these choices.
Why me? I make no assertions other than that the word 'innocuous' in that specific argument suggests that the reasons their is gender pay inequity is harmless. Because I am not sure that it is harmless.
I do not want to quantify the harm, but if you want me to take a stab at it, how about this:
Do some pay inequities cause stress? Does stress aggravate some mental disorders? (for the record, I am not trying to suggest that this harm is greater to either gender!)
financially unrecompensed work in the home
Who would compensate them? Whose benefit is it for?
I do not really understand your questions. Can you define 'who' 'them' 'whose' and 'it'? Would, compensate, benefit, is, and for I get.
Ok: let's suppose he intended the primary definition of innocuous, "not harmful." If a choice is made voluntarily, then by the assumption of revealed preferences it is the least 'harmful.' If we forced women to choose with the same distribution that men do, then on net women would be worse off- i.e. harmed by our force.
It seems incontestable to me that distributions of values are different for men and women. If values are different, choices will be different, and that is optimal.
I do not have any objection to your use of the word innocuous, here.
I think that calling the choice to spend more or less time doing financially unrecompensed work in the home an innocuous gender difference, is careless. The harms of the various choices have not been evaluated that well. And it may be impossible to evaluate that harm without bias.
Sexual dimorphism?
(One specific example: women have ovaries, men have testes. Both organs release mind-affecting hormones, in different distributions.)
you do not address my point of the word choice 'innocuous'.
What would be the context of the comment, and what sense of "equal" is implied?
For instance, I probably wouldn't object to someone saying "men and women are equal" if it was clear from the context that they meant "men and women should have equal rights". On the other hand, there are a variety of well-documented statistical differences between men and women, and trying to deny some of those might be harmful.
E.g. I've often heard it claimed that the difference in average pay between women and men is mostly attributable to differences in ambition and time voluntarily spent at home with children. I haven't looked at the matter enough to know if this is true. But if it is, then denying any population-level differences between men and women seems harmful, because it implies that something that actually has an innocuous explanation is because of discrimination.
I don't think I'd use the word innocuous with the example of this reason for this gender difference. If it is a rational choice, why don't both genders make similar choices?
I'd really like to know some basic, repeatable exercises that build empathy and social skills. Changing your everyday behavior to incorporate little bits of training here and there is not very effective. It's like wanting to get fit and deciding to walk a little faster whenever you need to get somewhere, instead of joining the gym. Or wanting to be a musician and deciding to hum along to songs more often, instead of getting a tutor.
I like to watch movies and decide who is the smartest person, who is the most compassionate person, and who is the meanest person. And then ask myself: Why? Some mean behavior is actually an irrational self-protective response, for example.
While most rationalists would happily and quickly plan [...], anecdotally many seem hesitant or even hostile to the idea of using fashion as a tool to achieve their objectives.
This point is essentially the point of having your article here on LW, but it is not emphasized strongly enough, in my opinion.
Additionally, I think the point that "the tool of fashion is one you are using to convey some information, whether you intend a message or not" is an essential point that I did not see in your text.
I'm not sure what you're getting at here by binding "feelings" and "response"; I think our terminology is getting confused.
I'll clarify my earlier comment by saying that when it comes to figuring out if something is an entity which I should behave morally towards, I'm only really interested in conscious feelings. Response to stimuli alone, without conscious experience, shouldn't have any moral weight. And inversely, if something can consciously experience pain but is unable to respond to it, it is immoral to hurt it.
Ah. I see consciousness as the ability to interrupt 'instinctive' response with a measured or planned response. And feelings as the middle stage between action and reaction, conscious or no.
I do not privilege conscious experience, just because I absolutely enjoy it. It sounds like you do.
And some of these feelings (like bio-communication in plants), while measurable, we usually don't care that much about[...]
I'd argue that bio-communication in plants is probably not any actual kind of feeling or qualia. This is what I meant when I referred to neurologists; currently science has a fair (though vague) idea as to what sort of structure enables human feelings and experiences. When we don't detect this structure or anything analogous to it, we can be pretty confident that there's no consciousness/qualia/nameless-redness/etc. going on. Not extremely confident, as we don't understand consciousness well enough yet to be able to eliminate possible alternate implementations which don't resemble the known ones, but still fairly confident.
I think it is an important point to distinguish between feelings (aka response) and consciousness. I am not sure how to distinguish these two things. And elevation of 'consciousness' does not dismiss 'feelings'.
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If I had downvoted it, it would be because I can't really imagine reading "Who would compensate them?" and responding "Can you define 'who'?" as a serious attempt at communication.
And you call yourself pedantic? There were a number of referents in my comment which could have applied, and while I usually feel at no disadvantage in a battle of wits, I have a mental problem that either renders me easily confused, or fully aware that I am not a mind reader.
This comment is supposed to be serious and funny. Can you guess which parts I think are funny, and why?