I'm in the process of writing up an Internet Draft for a file-format, part of which involves assigning logarithmic confidence values measured in decibans. There's still a good ways to go before it'll be in good enough shape to even have a chance at being considered for an RFC; part of that is describing "decibans", and how to use them, to people who've never heard of the things before. I'd like to get a good introductory text for that nailed down before submitting the next revision; and since LW is where I first learned of decibans, I'd like to evoke as much constructive criticism as I can get here.

A passing thought: "... it's beneath my dignity as a human being to be scared of anything that isn't smarter than I am" (-- HJPEV) likely applies equally well to superintelligences. Similarly, "It really made you appreciate what millions of years of hominids trying to outwit each other - an evolutionary arms race without limit - had led to in the way of increased mental capacity." (-- ditto) suggests that one of the stronger spurs for superintelligences becoming as super-intelligent as possible could very well be the competition as they try to outwit each other.

Thus, instead of ancestor simulations being implemented simply out of historical curiosity, a larger portion of such simulations may arise as one super-intelligence tries to figure out another by working out how its competitor arose in the first place. This casts a somewhat different light on how such simulations would be built and treated, then the usual suggestion of university researchers or over-powered child-gods playing Civilization-3^^^3.

* Assume for a moment that you're in the original, real (to whatever degree that word has meaning) universe, and you're considering the vast numbers of copies of yourself that are going to be instantiated over future eons. Is there anything that the original you can do, think, or be which could improve your future copies' lives? Eg, is there some pre-commitment you could make, privately or publicly?

* Assume for a moment that you're in one of the simulated universes. Is there anything you can do that would make your subjective experience any different from what your original experienced?

* Assume for a moment that you're a super-intelligence, or at least a proto-super-intelligence, considering running something that includes an ancestor simulation. Is there anything which the original people, or the simulated versions, could do or have done, which would change your mind about how to treat the simulated people?

* Assume for a moment that you're in one of the simulated universes... and due to battle damage to a super-intelligence, you accidentally are given root access and control over your whole universe. Taking into account Reedspacer's Lower Bound, and assuming an upper bound of not being able to noticeably affect the super-battle, what would you do with your universe?

As part of a small project I'm working on, I need to have at least a rough description of how a given number of decibans translates into a subjective level of confidence, described in a way that can be understood by people who've never come across the idea before.

Some previous discussion has involved the practical maximum number of decibans, that imaginary and complex decibans aren't relevant here, a quick reference table, and another reference table.

It's well-established that 0 decibans means 1:1 odds or 50% confidence; that 10 decibans means 10:1 odds; that -10 decibans means 1:10 odds; and that fractional numbers of decibans have similar meaning.

Does it make sense to talk about "i decibans", or "10 + 20i decibans"? If so, what does that actually mean?

Thought experiment:

Through whatever accident of history underlies these philosophical dilemmas, you are faced with a choice between two, and only two, mutually exclusive options:

* Choose A, and all life and sapience in the solar system (and presumably the universe), save for a sapient paperclipping AI, dies.

* Choose B, and all life and sapience in the solar system, including the paperclipping AI, dies.

Phrased another way: does the existence of any intelligence at all, even a paperclipper, have even the smallest amount of utility above no intelligence at all?

If anyone responds positively, subsequent questions would be which would be preferred, a paperclipper or a single bacteria; a paperclipper or a self-sustaining population of trilobites and their supporting ecology; a paperclipper or a self-sustaining population of australopithecines; and so forth, until the equivalent value is determined.

A few ideas I've recently read (including this one) have sparked the following line of reasoning; and I'm curious what the general LW opinion on the idea chain might be.

I have just received a message from my lawyer, regarding the preparations of my cryo-based will, power of attorney, and related papers. The most significant quote reads as follows:


Due to the complex nature of your wishes and the undeveloped area of the law surrounding cryogenics and the transportation of a human body out of the country, your file has required and will require further extensive time and research to prepare and draft the necessary documents to ensure that your wishes are correctly stated and that they will be carried out upon your death. As such, in order to complete any further work on your behalf we will require a retainer from you in the amount of $2,500.00. Please contact our office to arrange the payment of the retainer. This can be paid by cheque, cash, credit or debit. Upon receipt of this retainer we will proceed to draft the documents in a manner that best ensures that your wishes regarding cryogenics are carried out.

I'm not as smart as I like to think I am. Knowing that, I've gotten into a habit of trying to work out as many general principles as I can ahead of time, so that when I actually need to think of something, I've already done as much of the work as I can.

What are your most useful cached thoughts?

One plot-thread in my pet SF setting, 'New Attica', has ended up with Our Heroes in possession of the data, software, and suchlike which comprise a non-sapient, but conversation-capable, AI. There are bunches of those floating around the solar system, programmed for various tasks; what makes this one special is that it's evil with a capital ugh - it's captured people inside VR, put them through violent and degrading scenarios to get them to despair, and tried keeping them in there, for extended periods, until they died of exhaustion.

Through a few clever strategies, Our Heroes recognized they weren't in reality, engineered their escape, and shut down the AI, with no permanent physical harm done to them (though the same can't be said for the late crew of the previous ship it was on). And now they get to debate amongst themselves - what should they do with the thing? What use or purpose could they put such a thing to, that would provide a greater benefit than the risk of it getting free of whatever fetters they place upon it?

I'm about a third of the way through "Debt: The First 5,000 Years" by David Graeber, and am enjoying the feeling of ideas shifting around in my head, arranging themselves into more useful patterns. (The last book I read that put together ideas of similar breadth was "Economix: How and Why Our Economy Works" by Goodwin.) "Debt" goes into the origins of debts, as compared to obligations; and related topics, such as exchanges considered beneath economic notice ("Please pass me the salt"), debts too big or unique to be repaid, peaceful versus violent interactions, the endless minor obligations that form the network of social connections, and even the basis of whole societies.

The reason I'm posting about this book here... is that it's giving me some new perspectives from which to consider the whole cryonics subculture, and, for instance, why it remains just a subculture of a couple of thousand people or so. For example, a standard LessWrong thought experiment is "Is That Your True Rejection?"; and most of the objections people raise to cryonics seem to be off enough that, even if those objections were solved, those particular people still wouldn't sign up - that is, they feel some fundamental antipathy to the whole idea of cryonics, and unconsciously pick some rationalization that happens to sound reasonable to them to explain it.