Maybe we can perform the "Mary's Room" thought experiment

5 DavidPlumpton 14 April 2015 09:19AM

It seems possible that soon there may be a cure for colourblindness. The Mary's Room thought experiment attempts to pin down something about the nature of qualia in a contrived but similar situation, but my feeling is that the actual result of such an experiment would not be obvious. Would we consider the experiment valid if it was performed on somebody familiar with blue and green, but not red?

SciAm article about rationality corresponding only weakly with IQ

5 DavidPlumpton 27 December 2014 08:56PM

Thoughts on How Consciousness Can Affect the World

1 DavidPlumpton 20 March 2014 08:32AM

Overview

In "The Generalized Anti-Zombie Principle" Eliezer mentioned that one aspect of consciousness is that it can affect the world, e.g. by making us say out loud "I feel conscious", or deciding to read (or write) this article. However my current working hypothesis is that consciousness is a feature of information and computation. So how can pure information affect the world? It is this aspect of consciousness that I intend to explore.
Assumptions

A1: Let's go all in on Reductionism. Nothing else is involved other than the laws of physics (even if we haven't discovered them all yet).

A2: Consciousness exists (or at least some illusion of experiencing it exists).


Tentative Lemmas

TL1: A simulation of the brain (if necessary down to quantum fields) would seem to itself to experience consciousness in whatever way it is that we seem to ourselves to experience consciousness

TL2: If an electronic (or even pen and paper) simulation of a brain is conscious, then consciousness is "substrate independent", i.e. not requiring a squishy brain at least in principle.

TL3: If consciousness is substrate independent, then the best candidate for the underlying mechanism of consciousness is computation and information.

TL4: "You" and "I" are information and algorithms, implemented by our brain tissue. By this I mean that somehow information and computation can be made to seem to experience consciousness. So somehow the information can be computed into a state where it contains information relating to the experience of consciousness.

Likely Complications

LC1: State transitions may involve some random component.

LC2: It seems likely that a static state is insufficient to experience consciousness, requiring change of state (i.e. processing). Could a single unchanging state experience consciousness forever? Hmmmm....
Main Argument

What does is mean for matter such as neurons to "implement" consciousness? For information to be stored the neurons need to be in some state that can be discriminated from other states. The act of computation is changing the state of information to a new state, based on the current state. Let's say we start in state S0 and then neurons fire in some way that we label state S1, ignoring LC1 for now. So we have "computed" state S1 from a previous state S0, so let's just write that as:

S0 -> S1

From our previous set of assumptions we can conclude that S0 -> S1 may involve some sensation of consciousness to the system represented by the neurons, i.e. that the consciousness would be present regardless of whether a physical set of neurons was firing or a computer simulation was running or we if we writing it slowly down on paper. So we can consider the physical state S0 to be "implementing" a conscious sensation that we can label as C0. Let's describe that as:

S0 (C0) -> S1 (C1)

Note that the parens do note indicate function calls, but just describe correlations between the two state flavours. As for LC1, if we instead get S0 -> S(random other) then it would simply seem that a conscious decision had been made to not take the action. Now let's consider some computation that follows on from S1:

S1 (C1) -> S2* (C2)

I label S2* with a star to indicate that it is slightly special because it happens to fire some motor neurons that are connected to muscles and we notice some effect on the world. So a conscious being experiences the chain of computation S0 (C0) -> S1 (C1) -> S2* (C2) as feeling like they have made a decision to take some real world action, and then they performed that action. From TL2 we see that in a simulation the same feeling of making a decision and acting on it will be experienced.

And now the key point... each information state change occurs in lockstep with patterns of neurons firing. The real or simulated state transitions S0 -> S1 -> S2* correspond to the perceived C0 -> C1 -> C2. But of course C2 can be considered to be C2*; the conscious being will soon have sensory feedback to indicate that C2 seemed to cause a change in the world.

So S0 (C0) -> S1 (C1) -> S2* (C2)  is equivalent to S0 (C0) -> S1 (C1) -> S2* (C2*)

The result is another one of those "dissolve the question" situations. Consciousness affects the real world because "real actions" and information changes occur in lockstep together, such that some conscious feeling of the causality of a decision in C0 -> C1 -> C2* is really a perfect correlation to neurons firing in the specific sequence S0 -> S1 -> S2*. In fact it now seems like a philosophical point as to whether there is any difference between causation and correlation for this specific situation.

Can LC2 change the conclusion at all? I suspect not; perhaps S0 may consist of a set of changing sub-states (even if C0 does not), until a new state occurs that is within a set S1 intead of S0.

The argument concerning consciousness would also seem to apply to qualia (I suspect many smaller brained animals experience qualia but no consciousness).

Consciousness affecting the world

-3 DavidPlumpton 06 December 2013 07:37PM

In Zombies! Zombies? Eliezer mentions that one aspect of consciousness is that it can causally affect the real world, e.g. cause you to say "I feel conscious right now", or result in me typing out these words.

Even if a generally accepted mechanism of consciousness has not been found yet are there any tentative explanations for this "can change world" property? Googling around I was unable to find anything (although Zombies are certainly popular).

I had an idea of how this might work, but just wanted to see if it was worth the effort of writing.

Why the singularity is hard and won't be happening on schedule

1 DavidPlumpton 13 October 2011 07:51PM

Here's a great article by Paul Allen about why the singularity won't happen anytime soon. Basically a lot of the things we do are just not amenable to awesome looking exponential graphs.

 

Private Manned Moonbase in the 1990s, Yet Another Planning Fallacy

7 DavidPlumpton 05 October 2011 12:09AM

Back in the 1990s I came across a site describing a plan for returning to the moon via privately funded enterprise. They presented a Reference Mission, a timeline (raise some money now, design the hardware, build the hardware, hire a launch vehicle, get to the moon, sell the movie rights) which had them starting to build hardware in a few years and touching down on the moon only a few years later. I even met one of the enthusiasts.

What I found interesting at the time was a presentation of the "Frequently Raised Objections" and their counter arguments. Their viewpoint was "we've got this completely solved--we're going!" The primary issue seemed to be raising the money, and this was covered by a business plan at least to some degree of detail. Of particular relevance was "It's all on paper, nothing is real". Wow, take that Mr Frequently Raised Objection.

Most of their points looked fairly reasonable in isolation, but of course the idea has failed completely. No launch, no hardware, and very little money. High confidence in the business plan despite little supporting evidence seems to have been the major problem.

I can't help thinking of these guys every now and then, with their nifty ideas like ascending from the moon with the astronaut sitting on a rocket motor in his spacesuit with no spacecraft needed. I guess the detail made the Planning Fallacy seem less likely at the time.

The parallels with some other ventures are striking.

What is the most rational view of Peak Oil and its near term consequences?

-2 DavidPlumpton 04 September 2011 01:51AM

To me the following points seem hard to argue against:

 

  1. Oil is harder and harder to find every year (we already took the easy stuff, nobody finds super-giant fields anymore)
  2. The peak production year was 2005 with 73.7 million barrels produced
  3. The amount of oil produced each year is declining
  4. The price of oil (and therefore energy) rises
  5. All the alternatives that were supposed to fill the gap are failing to deliver
  6. Even oil that's harder to get (e.g. in deep water) doesn't help much as it is generally produced at a slow rate
  7. Available energy production rate (i.e. power) drops
  8. Since nearly everything needs power to create/mine/produce prices rise
  9. Food for example becomes more expensive as fertilizer prices rise
  10. The average person is mystified as the price of everything seems to rise at once
  11. Business and whole national economies are squeezed by rising prices
  12. As businesses fail unemployment increases
  13. Politicians are powerless, so promise general feel-good nonsense like "energy independence". Nobody even tries to tackle the problem.
  14. Everything continues to get worse, and at an increasing rate
  15. Within the near future the lights start to go out.
Sure there's a possibility that a form of nuclear fusion/thorium/cold fusion/zero point energy that is safe and cheap to build and operate might be invented tomorrow, but given that such things usually take a decade or so from inception to delivery it looks like there's no practical alternative on the horizon. Thermodynamics is a harsh mistress. Work out the energy in 73 million barrels of oil, and figure out how many wind farms are needed to offset a 5% decline. And then another decline the next year. Even uranium prices are rising as demand outstrips supply for just the current set of reactors.
The more we examing the situation the worse it seems to be. Some early wells had a enormous energy return on investment, e.g. for the energy of burning one barrel of oil we could pump 100 barrels from the ground. Now we are pumping wells that produce only about 5 barrels. This is known as EROEI (energy return on energy investment). EROEI is falling everywhere as all the low hanging fruit was plucking decades before, and only the difficult stuff is left. The net result is that it is ever harder to increase production rates.
Civilization runs on the constant supply of power. If that power declines 5% every year we are back to the middle ages before very long, and it's hard to develop a Friendly AI on an abacus.
One thing I've noticed a lot is reports about "Oil Sands", "Oil Shale", "Vast new possibilities of X barrels from biodiesel/microbes/algae/thermal depolymerization" etc. and none of these reports *ever* mention the *rate* of production that is expected (and years later they seem to have delivered nothing). The production rate is far more important than anything else; if the entire Earth was made of oil but we could only pump a million barrels a year for technical reasons then the total amount is pointless.
Please read at least the  Peak Oil Wikipedia article  before commenting. I'd rather not see a bunch of comments about "they don't even look for oil when there's 30 years of supply waiting in the ground".
So... what are my cognitive biases?

That cat: not dead and alive

3 DavidPlumpton 30 August 2011 08:23AM

I've read through the Quantum Physics sequence and feel that I managed to understand most of it. But now it seems to me that the Double Slit and Schrodinger's cat experiments are not described quite correctly. So I'd like to try to re-state them and see if anybody can correct any misunderstandings I likely have.

With the Double Slit experiment we usually hear it said the particle travels through both slits and then we see interference bands. The more precise explanation is that there is an complex valued amplitude flow corresponding to the particle moving through the left slit and another for the right slit. But if we could manage to magically "freeze time" then we would find ourselves in one position in configuration space where the particle is unambiguously in one position (let's say the left slit). Now any observer will have no way of knowing this at the time, and if they did detect the particle's position in any way it would change the configuration and there would be no interference banding.

But the particle really is going through the left slit right now (as far as we are concerned), simply because that is what it means to be at some point in configuration space. The particle is going through the right slit for other versions of ourselves nearby in configuration space.

The amplitude flow then continues to the point in configuration space where it arrives at the back screen, and it is joined by the amplitude flow via the right slit to the same region of configuration space, causing an interference pattern. So this present moment in time now has more than one past, now we can genuinely say that it did go through both. Both pasts are equally valid. The branching tree of amplitude flow has turned into a graph.

So far so good I hope (or perhaps I'm about to find out I'm completely wrong). Now for the cat.

I read recently that experimenters have managed to keep two clouds of caesium atoms in a coherent state for a hour. So what would this look like if we could scale it up to a cat?

The problem with this experiment is that a cat is a very complex system and the two particular types of states we are interested in (i.e. dead or alive) are very far apart in configuration space. It may help to imagine that we could rearrange configuration space a little to put all the points labelled "alive" on the left and all the dead points on the right of some line. If we want to make the gross simplification that we can treat the cat as a very simple system then this means that "alive" points are very close to the "dead" points in configuration space. In particular it means that there are significant amplitude flows between the two sets of points, that is significant flows across the line in both directions. Of course such flows happen all the time, but the key point is here the direction of the complex flow vectors would be aligned so as to cause a significant change in the magnitude of the final values in configuration space instead of tending to cancel out.

This means that as time proceeds the cat can move from alive to dead to alive to dead again, in the sense that in any point of configuration space that we find ourselves will contain an amplitude contribution both from alive states and from dead states. In other words two different pasts are contributing to the present.

So sometime after the experiment starts we magically stop the clock on the wall of the universe. Since we are at a particular point the cat is either alive or dead, let's say dead. So the cat is not alive and dead at the same time because we find ourselves at a single point in configuration space. There are also other points in the configuration space containing another instance of ourselves along with an alive cat. But since we have not entangled anything else in the universe with the cat/box system as time ticks along the cat would be buzzing around from dead to alive and back to dead again. When we open the box things entangle and we diverge far apart in configuration space, and now the cat remains completely dead or alive, at least for the point in configuration space we find ourselves in.

How to sum up? Cats and photons are never dead or alive or going left or right at the same moment from the point of view of one observer somewhere in configuration space, but the present has an amplitude contribution from multiple pasts.

If you're still reading this then thanks for hanging in there. I know there's some more detail about observations only being from a set of eigenvalues and so forth, but can I get some comments about whether I'm on the right track or way off base?