Where will the Jul 3. Meetup be? (Same place?) Is there contact information available for when I try to show up?

Any further meetups planned?

A link to Tooby and Cosmides' pape cited in the intro; http://www.cep.ucsb.edu/papers/pfc92.pdf (Very long, but enlightening.)

It is not clearly the case that all probability is epistemic uncertainty. There is no valid argument that establishes that. There can be no armchair argument that establishes that, since the existence or otherwise of objective probability is a property of the universe, and has to be established by looking.

Which is?

Just a nitpick: not all interpretations treat quantum uncertainty as ontological. Many Worlds indeed say that it's just indexical (and so, epistemical) uncertainty.

This is in contrast to Eliezer's point that "Uncertainty exists in the map, not in the territory" - not that he's wrong, just that it's usually not a useful argument to have.

I don't know whether he is wrong in the sense that irreducible uncertainty exists in the territory, but the reasoning he uses to reach the conclusion is invalid.

I am not convinced that there exists anything like aleatory uncertainty - even QM uncertainty lies in the map. Having said that I agree with your point: that this doesn't matter, and value of information is the relevant measure (which is clearly not binary).

Having read your response to Dagon I am now confused - you state that:

This is in contrast to Eliezer's point that "Uncertainty exists in the map, not in the territory"

but above you only show the orthogonal point that allowing for irresolvable uncertainty can provide useful models, regardless of the existence of such uncertainty. If this is your main point (along with introducing the standard notation used in these models), how is this a contrast with uncertainty being in the map? Lots of good models have elements that can not be found in real life, for example smooth surfaces, right angles or irreducible macroscopic building blocks.

I'd argue that there's a continuum of uncertainty from "already known" to "easily resolved" to "theoretically resolvable using current technology" to "theoretically resolvable with massive resources" to "theoretically resolvable by advanced civilizations".

There may or may not be an endpoint at "theoretically unknowable", but it doesn't matter. The point is that this isn't a binary distinction, and that categorizing by theory doesn't help us. The question for any decision theory is "what is the cost and precision that I can get with further modeling or measurements". Once the cost of information gathering is higher than the remaining risk due to uncertainty, you have to make the choice, and it's completely irrelevant how much of that remaining uncertainty is embedded in quantum unmeasurables and how much in simple failure to gather facts.