Is such a long answer suitable in OT? If not, where should I move it?

tl;dr Naive ultrafinitism is based on real observations, but its proposals are a bit absurd. Modern ultrafinitism has close ties with computation. Paradoxically, taking ultrafinitism seriously has led to non-trivial developments in classical (usual) mathematics. Finally: ultrafinitism would probably be able to interpret all of classical mathematics in some way, but the details would be rather messy.

1 Naive ultrafinitism

1.1. There are many different ways of representing (writing down) mathematical objects.

The naive ultrafinitist chooses a representation, calls it explicit, and says that a number is "truly" written down only when its explicit representation is known. The prototypical choice of explicit representation is the tallying system, where 6 is written as ||||||. This choice is not arbitrary either: the foundations of mathematics (e. g. Peano arithmetic) use these tally marks by necessity.

However, the integers are a special^1 case, and in the general case, the naive ultrafinitist insistance on fixing a representation starts looking a bit absurd. Take Linear Algebra: should you choose an explicit basis of R3 that you use indiscriminately for every problem; or should you use a basis (sometimes an arbitary one) that is most appropriate for the problem at hand?

1.2. Not all representations are equally good for all purposes.

For example, enumerating the prime factors of 2*3*5 is way easier than doing the same for ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, even though both represent the same number.

1.3. Converting between representations is difficult, and in some cases outright impossible.

Lenstra earned $14,527 by converting the number known as RSA-100 from "positional" to "list of prime factors" representation.

Converting 3\^\^\^3 from up-arrow representation to the binary positional representation is not possible for obvious reasons.

As usual, up-arrow notation is overkill. Just writing the decimal number 100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 would take more tally-marks than the number of atoms in the observable universe. Nonetheless, we can deduce a lot of things about this number: it is an even number, and its larger than RSA-100. Nonetheless, I can manually convert it to "list of prime factors" representation: 2\^80 * 5\^80.

2 Constructivism

The constructivists were the first to insist that algorithmic matters be taken seriously. Constructivism separates concepts that are not computably equivalent. Proofs with algorithmic content are distinguished from proofs without such content, and algorithmically inequivalent objects are separated.

For example, there is no algorithm for converting Dedekind cuts to equivalence classes of rational Cauchy sequences. Therefore, the concept of real number falls apart: constructively speaking, the set of Cauchy-real numbers is very different from the set of Dedekind-real numbers.

This is a tendency in non-classical mathematics: concepts that we think are the same (and are equivalent classically) fall apart into many subtly different concepts.

Constructivism separates concepts that are not computably equivalent. Computability is a qualitative notion, and even most constructivists stop here (or even backtrack, to regain some classicality, as in the foundational program known as Homotopy Type Theory).

3. Modern ultra/finitism

The same way constructivism distinguished qualitatively different but classically equivalent objects, one could starts distinguishing things that are constructively equivalent, but quantitatively different.

One path leads to the explicit approach to representation-awareness. For example, LNST^4 explicitly distinguishes between the set of binary natural numbers B and the set of tally natural numbers N. Since these sets have quantitatively different properties, it is not possible to define a bijection between B and N inside LNST.

Another path leads to ultrafinitism.

The most important thinker in modern ultra/finitism was probably Edward Nelson. He observed that the "set of effectively representable numbers" is not downward-closed: even though we have a very short notation for 3\^\^\^3, there are lots of numbers between 0 and 3^^^3 that have no such short representation. In fact, by elementary considerations, the overwhelming majority of them cannot ever have a short representation.

What's more, if our system of notation allows for expressing big enough numbers, then the "set of effectively representable numbers" is not even inductive because of the Berry paradox. In a sense, the growth of 'bad enough' functions can only be expressed in terms of themselves. Nelson's hope was to prove the inconsistency of arithmetic itself using a similar trick. His attempt was unsuccessful: Terry Tao pointed out why Nelson's approach could not work.

However, Nelson found a way to relate unexpressibly huge numbers to non-standard models of arithmetic^(2).

This correspondence turned out to be very powerful, leading to many paradoxical developments: including finitistic^3 extension of Set Theory; a radically elementary treatment of Probability Theory and a new ways of formalising the Infinitesimal Calculus.

4. Answering your question

What kind of mathematics would we still be able do (cryptography, analysis, linear algebra …)?

All of it; modulo translating the classical results to the subtler, ultra/finitistic language. This holds even for the silliest versions of ultrafinitism. Imagine a naive ultrafinitist mathematician, who declares that the largest number is m. She can't state the proposition R(n,2^(m)), but she can still state its translation R(log_2 n,m), which is just as good.

Translating is very difficult even for the qualitative case, as seen in this introductory video about constructive mathematics. Some theorems hold for Dedekind-reals, others for Cauchy-reals, et c. Similarly, in LNST, some theorems hold only for "binary naturals", others only for "tally naturals". It would be even harder for true ultrafinitism: the set of representable numbers is not downward-closed.

This was a very high-level overview. Feel free to ask for more details (or clarification).

^1 The integers are absolute. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what this means.

^2 coincidentally, the latter notion prompted my very first contribution to LW

^3 in this so-called Internal Set Theory, all the usual mathematical constructions are still possible, but every set of standard numbers is finite.

^4 Light Naive Set Theory. Based on Linear Logic. Consistent with unrestricted comprehension.

Draco has been well trained enough (by his father and by General Chaos) to know that you don't say stuff to people you are murdering.

On /r/HPMOR, some have been speculating that Dumbledore coated the Philosopher's Stone with Bahl's Stupefaction, which you might remember from chapter 63:

"Bahl's Stupefaction," Moody said, naming an extremely addictive narcotic with interesting side effects on people with Slytherin tendencies; Moody had once seen an addicted Dark Wizard go to ridiculous lengths to get a victim to lay hands on a certain exact portkey, instead of just having someone toss the target a trapped Knut on their next visit to town; and after going to all that work, the addict had gone to the further effort to lay a second Portus, on the same portkey, which had, on a second touch, transported the victim back to safety. To this day, even taking the drug into account, Moody could not imagine what could have possibly been going through the man's mind at the time he had cast the second Portus.

This would explain why Voldemort let Harry keep his wand after swearing the Unbreakable Vow, and now also might explain Harry's recent actions.

I thought it was bleeding because of the magical resonance that was actually happening at that time when other Harry hit LV with the stuporfy.

"No, what you remembered was how you considered lining up all the blood purists and guillotining them. And now you are telling yourself you were not serious, but you were. If you could do it this very moment and no one would ever know, you would. "

The Sorting Hat sees the future! Tom lined up the blood purists and guillotined them, and no one will ever know.

I agree with your assessment of how powerful Perenelle/Flamel (side note: need a good portmanteau a la Quirrellmort) should be, having been able to outwit Baba Yaga in her sixth year and then having six hundred years of excellent leverage to accumulate lore and also maybe play with what the stone can do.

That objection notwithstanding, the most plausible non-Voldemort killer would be Bellatrix, using her superpower of very strict obedience to orders like "Just use AK and do not hesitate for any reason".

I would much rather make phone calls and schedule events than fight Orcs. The latter sounds scary.

...That being said, I do like the aspects of my current job where I get to defibrillate people once in a while. I'm going to miss that.

S1 relates to a topic on which many have strong normative feelings; S2 does not.

OK, so the issue is the social expectations about whether the issue is controversial and whether one is expected to have a normative attitude towards it? And in such a case, all statements will be interpreted as normative unless there are explicit disclaimers to the contrary?

I'd expect you to know that the assumption in my first paragraph exists

No, not really. I rarely speak normatively and in such cases I'm explicit about it. Typically I make descriptive observations, possibly with a variety of connotations and implications, but they are almost never of the "so you should believe/do X" kind. Normally they are of the "this is complicated, are you aware of this trade-off and that internal inconsistency?" kind.

I do set gotcha traps on occasion, but the sense of fair play usually makes me point them out beforehand. People still fall into them, anyway :-D

I think this should still happen.

I've actually tried this before, under the notion that I'd get a higher chance of landing the job relative to other applicants. I wouldn't do it again - I'm pretty sure the real outcome is that I lowered my perceived value. Signalling!

Now that I phrase it in light of game theory though - if it had worked, it would be a neat demonstration of how two super-rational players win out over game-theoretically rational players. What I describe is also how the free market is supposed to work - my benefit in "cooperating" derives from cutting the competition out of the trade by offering a better deal.