I see... cleverly, it also takes advantage of how many people are afraid to ask for high salaries out of modesty or something.
I kind of view this as defecting and it seems like I have to defect in turn, to counter it (conveniently, I get to move second)... I guess this means I must start quoting highball figures and generally concealing my previous salary if it is lower than I expect the opponent to estimate, and displaying it loudly when it is higher than the opponent would estimate. Is that an effective thing to do?
(When I say it's defecting, I'm not attaching moral value to it or anything. I do want organizations which I want to see succeed do whatever is most rational, even if it is defecting, if that's what all the other agents are doing. Still, I feel like mutual cooperation would be generally more pleasant. I wonder if there is a mechanism to determine a person's true-market-value (as in, taking into account the opportunity costs on both sides) so as to avoid this sort of thing.)
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I think it basically comes to, if the rational agent recognizes that the rational thing to do is to NOT buckle under blackmail, regardless of what the rational agent simulating them threatens, then the blackmailer's simulation of the blackmailee will also not respond to that pressure, and so it's pointless to go to the effort of pressuring them in the first place. However, if the blackmailer is irrational, their simulation of the blackmailee will be irrational, and thus they will carry through with the threat. This means that the blackmailee's simulation of the blackmailer as rational is itself inaccurate, as the simulation does not correspond to reality. If the blackmailee is irrational, their simulation of the blackmailer will be irrational, and thus they will concede to their demands. Yet, each party acts as if their simulation of the other was correct, until actual, photon-transmitted information about the world can impress itself into their cognitive function. So, no-one gets what they want. The best choice for a rational agent here is just to ignore the good professor. On the other hand, you can't argue with results. And there's a simulation of Quirrel s-quirreled away in your brain, whispering.
It looks like you are saying that both rational and irrational agents model competitors as behaving in the same way they do.
Is that why you think that an irrational simulation of a rational agent must be wrong, and why a rational simulation of an irrational agent must be wrong? I suggest that an irrational agent can correctly model even a perfectly rational one.