This runs into the "experiencing self" vs "remembering self" distinction. Conceptually it seems very troublesome to perform expected utility calculations on behalf of the experiencing self - the one who would suffer the pains in the above scenario.
From the perspective of the remembering self, pain only matters if it leaves a trace: if you can remember it, or if (unconsciously) it changes the choices you'd make in similar situations in future.
(Think of Sammy Jenkis in the movie Memento who was shown to not be a "true" amnesiac - he avoided picking up toys that had been previously rigged to give him electric shock, even though he behaved as though he had no memory of the past shocks. Yes, this is a fictional example - but despite being fictional it validly highlights a distinction lurking below the surface of the word "memory".)
From this perspective the disutility of the "hell" scenario consists only of the opportunity cost, i.e. while suffering hell you could instead have been doing something pleasant that you'd have remembered afterwards. But deleting the memories, and deleting any dispositions you may have acquired as a result of experiencing the pain, and so on - essentially restoring you to a previous backup - the deleted pain will not count from the perspective of the remembering self.
(Noting the "backup" analogy in the previous paragraph, I have to acknowledge that my intuitions in this may be shaped in part by my experiences playing video games...)
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Hello,
Not sure if any SLCers have seen this thread:
http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/e9t/the_wandering_rationalist/
...but I'll be travelling through SLC sometime in December and it would be great to meet some of you if you're planning another meetup around that time. Offers of hanging out and accommodation gratefully received!