Draco and Lucius, Snape, Bellatrix, Amelia Bones. Maybe the Weasley parents or Nicholas Flamel. I haven't given up on Minerva. Grindelwald is still alive and undemented.

Robin often displays unusual confusions. I think that stems from a reliance on his explicit memory over implicit memory. If he doesn't have a theory to account for why society fails to distinguish songs by whether their lyrics are fictional, as we do with literature, then he considers that a puzzle to solve, even if he's never wanted society to draw that category to aid him in selecting songs.

So when Robin asks, "Why do we appear to value X more than Y", he's not making any claim about how he feels about X and Y. He disregards his feelings and intuitions, because they would mask opportunities to improve his explicit, formal, verbal, theoretical understanding.

This distinction between questions as a tool to point out when the audience is wrong and as a tool of apolitical inquiry closely mirrors the difference between questions as requests for favors and questions as inquiries. It's also similar to questions as argumentative challenges vs questions as inquiries.

Getting people to stop existing might not be the right thing to do, but there are many people who should not be created. All else equal, I feel people whose children would be at a high risk for horrible diseases like depression should avoid procreating until the state of genetic engineering or embryo selection is much advanced (in both reliability and generality of factors identified).

Well, not at all for the literal complexity of agents, because we don't estimate the complexity of our peers. Aristotle thought the heart was the seat of intelligence, Shannon thought AGI could be built in a year, everyone and their mother anthropomorphizes inanimate objects like smoke alarms and printers.

I suspect perceived character traits that engender distrust, the Dark Triad traits, make the trait-possessor seem complex not because their brain must be described in more bits absolutely, but conditionally given the brain of the character judge. That is, we require a larger encoding diff to predict the behavior of people who display unfamiliar desires and intents, or to predict them with comparable accuracy as one does for one's warm, honest, emotionally stable peer group. For example, someone who appears paranoid is displaying extreme caution in situations the character judge finds forthright and nonthreatening, an extra piece of situational context to the other person's decision making.

This is a poor explanation overall because we're much less likely to distrust atypically nice humane people than Machiavellian, sub-psychopath people, even if they're both less conditionally compressible. It takes a lot of niceness (Stepford Wives) before the uncanny-differential-encoding-valley reaction trips.

Edit: This might have been uncharitable. People who are more prone to lying may be more absolutely complex, because lying skillfully requires keeping track of ones lies and building further lies to support them, while honest beliefs can simply be verified against reality. People who decide by a few fixed, stable criteria (e.g. always voting for the nominated candidate of their political party) might be called trustworthy in the sense of being reliable (if not reliably pro-social). Fulfilling promises and following contracts also make one more trustworthy, in both the weak sense of predictability and the stronger sense of moral behavior. Yudkowsky makes the argument that moral progress tends to produce simplified values.

No. Elsewhere he has said "I believe that consciousness is the way information feels when being processed", but in this talk he seems to make a little bit of a retreat. He describes a positive singularity with p-zombie AI/robots that have perception and appear conscious, but aren't "aware" of the world around them. He makes no clarification of how perception differs from awareness and doesn't mention introspection at all.

What? Rock climbing demonstrates depth? Circus skills are virtuous?

Which hobbies are especially shallow and narcissistic? Arts, crafts, gardening, cooking? Team sport, extreme sport, cycling, karate, yoga? Romance novels, short films, video games? Genealogy, collecting, puzzle solving? Card games, brewing, stage magic, lock picking? Sailing, camping, fishing, geocaching, trainspotting?

You are right that a cluster exists, and not everyone will be a con-langing, rocket building, capoeira fighter, but the attributes you're naming don't select for that group (or any group really).