Ok. I naively thought I could trip up this system by altering the probability of being a simulation or the payout, but I can't.

SCDT successfully 1 boxes on any box 2 payout larger than $1000. SCDT successfully 1 boxes even if a single simulation is used to predict any number of actual Alices. (The scenario I worked through involved 10,000 duplicate Alices being predicted by a single Alice simulation.)

I'm thoroughly impressed by this decision theory.

That still seems to leave room for (1) one or more broad cycles where most of the watchdog industry grows rich off lies & bias before imploding (as happens with bubbles) or (2) a steadily growing industry with a continually replenished proportion of fraudulent watchdogs that pop into existence, make money from lies, then get swooped on (as happens with consumer fraud).

Is this correct? Have you communicated the correct ideas to me?

From my experience, yes.

And, In what ways have business credentialing systems handled this kind of demand historically, and are similar methods applicable here?

In my experience (which is by no means exhaustive), the "recommended" solution has been to ensure that the data entry and transmission processes are performed by humans, rather than fully automated, and that no automated data integrity checks are performed.

Also in my experience, this 'solution' does far more harm to the system than the nepotism itself. :(

I don't see how nepotism effects the system too horribly. Businesses are still entirely allowed to hire close friends and family despite less credentials, and any other nepotistic behavior that's counter to the purpose of profit.

Well, I was speaking from the perspective of someone who has actual experience in writing business credentialing systems. The effect is small enough to come out in the wash most of the time, but is important enough to require implementation (or at the very least, to prevent robustness in the implementation of goal 1.) The problem is that profit-maximization is ultimately less important than status-maintenance, in many cases - but the environment requires that profit-maximization appears to be the primary motive.

Businesses wan't an accurate idea of who is employable.

This is only partially true. Businesses want two things:

1. An accurate metric of who is employable
2. The ability to co-opt that metric for specific people, in order to promo te nepotism without producing the appearance of nepotism.

'2' is a rare exception, but it is a VITALLY important one - important enough that any system you design will be doomed to failure if it fails to provide for case 2, or makes its process of providing for case 2 too obvious to outsiders.

EDIT: Okay. I'm going to go ahead and take whatever further karma hit I have to to point this out. I lost FOURTY EIGHT karma over the course of five minutes, after posting this. Seriously, LW. Fix your goddamn karma system.

Who knows what amazing research teams might be borne of the intellectual equivalent of OK!Cupid.

This sounds like an awesome idea. Does anyone know if such a thing already exists? If not, I would be willing to commit $500 to someone who wants to make it (assuming they already have the appropriate skill set, of course).

So the reason employers wouldn't make the mistake with testers that banks made with moneylenders is... that there isn't a secondary market of diplomas/graduates? That educational entities with a vested interest in getting evaluated well would be a much smaller part of the market of employers than banks with a vested interest in selling bad debt were in respect to the market of debt buyers?

Am I getting this right, or am I just making a spectacle of my ignorance?

Absolutely love this idea, just one little comment on the watchdogs.

It occurs to me now that, if one wished to be really nitpicky about who watches the watchmen, I suspect that there would be institutions testing the reliability of those meta-institutions, and so on and so forth... When does it stop? How to avoid vested interests and little cheats and manipulations pulling an academic equivalent of the AAA certification of sub-prime junk debt in 2008?

Why do the watchdogs exist? Because business produce demand for accurate measurements of employability, and are willing to pay for a service that offers that information. I'm sure if a significant number of watchdog companies exist a business will need to employ a meta-watchdog to determine which watchdog to employ, but it does eventually terminate at the employer themselves, who has to personally be the watchdog for which meta-watchdog company to employ.

And that information is easily available (albeit after some lag). Which company reliably recommends the tests that actually produce better employees?

How big is the chain of information when you're deciding which restaurant to eat at? That's perfectly analogous scenario, as far as I can tell.

Music Thread

Harry could disassemble the world and the stars into computronium - in fact star-lifting crossed his mind when he heard the first part of the prophecy. EY stated that there would be no AI analogy, and magical intelligence amplification seems more plausible anyway.

A different route to a mini-foom is that one can make luck potions. Then gamble, get money, recruit people who know how to make potions. Now you have huge amounts of luck potion, and provided your thought process is fairly random, you will always find the right answer (e.g. opening a random book at a random page happens to provide exactly the right insight). Routes to magical IA:

Luck potions.

A thinking hat - like the sorting hat, only it uses your brainpower to help you solve problems.

Efficient use of memory charms to spread insights rapidly through a group of researchers.

Use of telepathy to create a group mind.

Potion of thinking, made of e.g. ground-up crossword puzzles.