If it was easy to summarize, it wouldn't have required a three parter sequence. :-)

However, perhaps one relevant point from it is:

For the purposes of Newcomb's problem, and the rationality of Fred's decisions, it doesn't matter how close to that level of power Omega actually is. What matters, in terms of rationality, is the evidence available to Fred about how close Omega is to having to that level of power; or, more precisely, the evidence available to Fred relevant to Fred making predictions about Omega's performance in this particular game.

Since this is a key factor in Fred's decision, we ought to be cautious. Rather than specify when setting up the problem that Fred knows with a certainty of 1 that Omega does have that power, it is better to specify a concrete level of evidence that would lead Fred to assign a probability of (1 - δ) to Omega having that power, then examine the effect upon which option to the box problem it is rational for Fred to pick, as δ tends towards 0.

I would say Newcomb is all about how you view personal identity.

See the sequence:

• A solvable Newcomb-like problem - part 1 of 3
• A solvable Newcomb-like problem - part 2 of 3
• A solvable Newcomb-like problem - part 3 of 3

1. Anti-Naturalists
2. Objectivists
3. Rationalists
4. Anti-Realists
5. Externalists
6. Star Trek Haters
7. Logical Conventionalists

Finally, an objective way of deciding the division into character classes for the roleplaying game Dungeons & Discourse

I think any program designed to maximise some quantity within a simulated situation will have the potential to solve some problems. It is interesting that, when the quantity you choose to try to maximise is the entropy of the situation, then some of the problems this solves are useful ones, but I don't think it is particularly significant, with respect to understanding the nature of and reason for intelligence in a universe with our particular set of physical laws, as some are claiming.

Take, for example, Wissner-Gross' explanation of "tool use" in his video.

relevant still image illustrating tool use

Set a simulation going. See where the disks end up, under the rules you set for the simulation. THEN label the disks as being things (a hand, a tool and a piece of food) that would provide a plausible explanation for why an intelligent creature would want the disks to finish up at that particular end configuration.

If a creature were actually doing it, the intelligence would lie at least as much in selecting in advance which quantity to maximise in order to achieve a desired result, as in carrying out such an algorithm (and, also, there's no evidence that this is actually how we implement the algorithm in our heads).

There's also the matter that the universe isn't particularly efficient at maximising entropy. Through the statistical properties underlying thermodynamics there's a ratchet effect that entropy will tend to increase rather than decrease which, eventually, will lead to the universe ending up at maximum entropy; but that's rather different from localised seeking behaviour intended to find a situation with maximum entropy in order to solve a problem.

I note that perfectly legal bookmakers in Ireland already accept bets that President Obama will be assassinated while in office. link

It isn't precisely an assassination market, because people other than the assassin can join in the bet, diluting the odds.

But, yes, I take your point. With a single central authority, such bets could be rejected as invalid. With multiple authorities, it would require all of them to reject it. On the other hand, authorities that don't reject such bets as invalid might end up with a poor reputation for reliability.

A quick search shows that there are lots of websites providing a ticker of sports results in XML form. Rather than doing a google search which, as you say, would need interpretation, I think it would be more reliable to pick in advance a basket of such XML feeds, where you know in advance the precise format they'll use to announce the result.

You'd have to pay a percentage of proceeds to the authorities in order to monetize staying an authority over selling your reputation for a guaranteed win in bitcoins.

Depends on the authority type. The pre-agreed format type of authority shouldn't need paying; nor one that relies upon mass voting to make decisions. Because in neither case is there a small group of controllers with the power to 'fix' the result.

One that uses a panel of experts will need some way to prevent a cabal of experts colluding together, and some form of reward for their time. The reward might be the reputation they gain from being seen as an expert (like with WikiPedia). The anti-collusion measure might be by having quite a large panel and selecting 7 members from it at random for each decision (preferably, selected only after the bets have been laid). However, yes, the system ought to be set up in a sufficiently flexible manner to allow each authority to be able to set in advance a rate of 'cut' for bets using them as the decider (with competition between authorities keeping such rates low).

Another way would be to have different 'authorities'. Each authority can pick which proposed questions are valid for that authority. If someone wishes to place a bet on a question that's been validated by at least one authority, then they get a list of authorities available for that question, and choose which one to use (which may be influenced by whether there are others betting via that authority in the other direction).

Different authorities could use different systems. So one might required the pre-agreed format style, another might use voting to resolve and allow any question, a third might use a panel of experts and allow free text questions by only in one domain (eg sports).

A reputation system could keep track of how popular different authorities are for different domains of question.

One way to deal with Validating Questions would be to automatically allow questions that match an approved list of formats. To add to or amend the list of formats you'd circulate a proposed definition and allow other proposals to be added, then let people meeting some criteria (eg users with more than X bitcoins in escrow on currently outstanding bets) to vote the different definitions up or down over a 7 day period.

So, for example, one format might be: {DOWJONES} on {FUTUREDAY} will match {PRICE_RANGE}

Where, for example, {DOWJONES} for a particular {FUTUREDAY} is defined as the closing price of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, as retrieved at noon on the day after {FUTURE_DAY} by looking at a list of 5 URLs such as:

https://www.google.com/finance/historical?cid=983582&startdate=Dec+25%2C+2012&enddate=Dec+26%2C+2012

parsing each one via a supplied perl regexp or similar to get just a single number, and then taking the median value of that number.

In effect, the bet would be actually about values on a number of different web pages, rather than about the Dow Jones index itself, and the people placing the bets would be assuming the risk that the web pages on the resolution day didn't reflect the actual stockmarket price they expected it to.

sighs Yes, you're right.

I once wrote an open source cryptographic system that would let casinos prove to their customers that the casinos weren't fixing the random generation behind the wheel spins, dice and card deals.

There was no interest in it. Not from the casinos OR from the customers who were betting their money.

There's probably an interesting bias behind whether people properly take into account threats that are low frequency but high penalty.