Comment author: TheAncientGeek 19 July 2015 02:08:00PM 0 points [-]

You know Bostrom is arguing against unification, right?

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 20 July 2015 09:01:25AM 0 points [-]

Yes, where did I give the impression that I didn't?

Comment author: turchin 18 July 2015 10:07:29PM *  1 point [-]

I was planning to write a post about one day...

Basically the idea is that between ordinary BB and real brains exist third class of objects. These objects temporary appear from fluctuation but are able to create very large number of minds during its short existence. These objects are more complex than ordinary brain and thus more rare, but as they are able to creates many minds, the minds inside these objects will dominate. At first I named these objects "Bolzmann typewriters" but later I understood that it could be just a computer with a program which is able to create minds. (And as simulated mind is simpler than biological brain, which include all neurons and atoms, such simple simulated minds must dominate.)

Another type of Bolzamnn typewriter are universes fine tuned to create as many minds as possible (and even our universe is a type of it.)

If we are in Bolzmann typewriter or Bolzmann supercomputer it may have observable consequences, like small "mistakes in the matrix". It also may have abrupt end.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 20 July 2015 08:42:51AM *  0 points [-]

You're operating under the assumption that only humans count as observers, which is almost certainly not true and breaks the whole theory down.

(Btw, if such complicated things can exist in high-entropy environments, than why aren't we able to survive there after heat death? Unless we're talking about quantum permutations?)

Comment author: turchin 18 July 2015 09:27:07PM 0 points [-]

yes, it is obvious patch it Bostrom's logic. If you continue it, you may conclude that cheap simulation are more numerous. "Cheap" means this that physics detalisation is poor and probably it is simulation of just one person - you.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 20 July 2015 08:33:25AM *  0 points [-]

yes, it is obvious patch it Bostrom's logic. If you continue it, you may conclude that cheap simulation are more numerous. "Cheap" means this that physics detalisation is poor and probably it is simulation of just one person - you.

You haven't properly read my argument. That's exactly what I say- but also that the simulation is designed around a real experience.

Comment author: Manfred 18 July 2015 07:59:08PM 3 points [-]

Seeing a coherent, justified universe is just a restriction on what kind of Boltzmann brain you are. There is a very simple calculation here (if you've ever taken introductory thermodynamics) and it goes like this:

In an infinite universe, the likelihood of existing in some "macroscopic state of the world" like "your brain is inside your body on the earth in the solar system" or "your exact brain is floating inside a cloud of disordered gas the mass of the solar system" is proportional to how many "microscopic states of the world" correspond that that macroscopic state, where a microscopic state means writing down the states of all the subatomic particles and what they're doing. (This is the assumption that the universe reaches thermal equilibrium).

And because the solar system is so orderly (it's not at maximum entropy), there are many, many, many, MANY more possible microscopic states corresponding to a macroscopic state like "your brain is floating inside a cloud of disordered gas" than there are to the actual states corresponding to a real solar system.

Thus, if Boltzmann brains exist, you probably are one. And if you have an infinite universe that reaches thermal equilibrium, they exist.

Conversely, if I'm not a Boltzmann brain, then it's because the universe happens to not reach thermal equilibrium (e.g. the universe ends, or expands so fast that everything cools to the ground state eventually, or there exists some method of violating the second law of thermodynamics).

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 20 July 2015 08:26:20AM *  0 points [-]

In an infinite universe, the likelihood of existing in some "macroscopic state of the world" like "your brain is inside your body on the earth in the solar system" or "your exact brain is floating inside a cloud of disordered gas the mass of the solar system" is proportional to how many "microscopic states of the world" correspond that that macroscopic state, where a microscopic state means writing down the states of all the subatomic particles and what they're doing. (This is the assumption that the universe reaches thermal equilibrium).

And because the solar system is so orderly (it's not at maximum entropy), there are many, many, many, MANY more possible microscopic states corresponding to a macroscopic state like "your brain is floating inside a cloud of disordered gas" than there are to the actual states corresponding to a real solar system.

I don't understand much of this. My argument is that Boltzmann brains would almost certainly experience chaos. So I would have to be in the 0.000000000000000000001% of Boltzmann brains to observe a rational universe (not to mention one that actually predicts the existence of Boltzmann brains). Yes, the rational Boltzmann Brains actually would outnumber their regular counterparts, but that's talking past the problem. The odds are astronomically higher that something is wrong with your science. Maybe FAI figures out how to create negentropy, or breaks out into another universe, or finds a way to have infinite computing power. You suggested some options yourself. All of these have a probability considerably higher than 0.000000000000000000001%.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 07:15:14PM *  1 point [-]

If there are two identical experiences, there is no problem of jumping, .or waking up as someone else. Identical twins don't randomly swap identities. Jumping is a dynamical, causal process. You can make it happen by transplanting a brain,or copying a neural pattern, but there is no reason it should happen because of pure logic,

While we're on the subject, if there is a single experience threaded through multiple worlds, there is also no jumping. You can't jump from one version your self another, because there is only one version. You can't jump from one world to another, in the sense of leaving one and ariving at another, because you are always in all of them.

That disposes of jumping, but you seem to have some further concern about simulation.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 20 July 2015 07:23:20AM *  0 points [-]

If there are two identical experiences, there is no problem of jumping, .or waking up as someone else. Identical twins don't randomly swap identities. Jumping is a dynamical, causal process. You can make it happen by transplanting a brain,or copying a neural pattern, but there is no reason it should happen because of pure logic,

Sure, but haven't I just said I don't take Duplication seriously?

While we're on the subject, if there is a single experience threaded through multiple worlds, there is also no jumping. You can't jump from one version your self another, because there is only one version.

The whole point is about what happens when my self becomes less detailed. If it resumes its former detail (waking up), all may not be as it was. If a memory is completely extracted from my brain, than my brain ceases to anchor me predominantly in worlds where that memory happened. Other options could fill in the hole.

You can't jump from one world to another, in the sense of leaving one and ariving at another, because you are always in all of them.

This has never been about 'jumping' wholesale! I just used the word because there is no other.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 06:48:52PM 0 points [-]

Why should it disobey every observed law of physics? Are you arguing that conscious observers would almost certainly experience chaos? If so I agree with you. I don't accept 'pure' Dust Theory.

Observing chaos is the same thing as having no discernible physical laws.

ETA If you jump, but don't notice you are jumping, what is the problem.

The problem is that I prefer for my subjective consciousness to stay in one world.

Why?

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 06:55:47PM *  -2 points [-]

Why should it disobey every observed law of physics? Are you arguing that conscious observers would almost certainly experience chaos? If so I agree with you. I don't accept 'pure' Dust Theory.

Observing chaos is the same thing as having no discernible physical laws.

I took your use of the word 'worried' to say that I was afraid this was true.

Why?

Because I subjectively value my universe and do not wish to go to another one.

Comment author: James_Miller 18 July 2015 06:34:51PM 1 point [-]

Why are you in a simulation and not a Boltzmann brain? If the universe goes on forever after heat death, then there will be an infinite number of Boltzmann brain yous.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 06:48:59PM *  2 points [-]

I see a coherent, justified universe around me with apparently sound perceptions. Therefore, I conclude that it is overwhelmingly more likely that something is wrong with your reasoning/assumptions than I am a Boltzmann brain.

Seriously, Boltzmann brains are never ever the answer. Why do people keep using them?

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 05:37:16PM *  1 point [-]

But is it rational to entertain theories about differences in external reality that could never make any difference to subjective or objective experience?

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 06:40:10PM *  -2 points [-]

I value other minds existing to interact with me, even if I can't perceive them directly. And I value waking up tomorrow in the same universe (more or less) that I'm in now.

Is this rational? Eliezer defines rationality as systematized winning; I'm pointing out what.

Comment author: turchin 18 July 2015 05:29:25PM 1 point [-]

Now you just repeating Bostrom simulation argument. But why you rewrite early post is not clear as it will be misleading for commenters.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 06:38:30PM -2 points [-]

Now you just repeating Bostrom simulation argument.

Certainly not. The simulation argument just talks about one universe. I'm taking the multiverse into account.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 05:19:03PM *  0 points [-]

Basically, all that is required is for two minds in the same conscious state to have only one phenomenological experience.

If you mean that there is literally one experience (numerical identity), not two identical experiences (qualitative identity), that would need support.

And you still need further assumptions to say something interesting about measure, expected experience, personal history etc.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 06:36:13PM *  -1 points [-]

If there are two identical experiences, it doesn't actually affect the argument. Except that you would be wholly in a simulation (or not), and there would be less incentive for future FAIs to simulate you. Grim, if I took it seriously.

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