Comment author: Benedict 22 July 2012 07:52:49PM 16 points [-]

Hey, I'm -name withheld-, going by Benedict, 18 years old in North Carolina. I was introduced to Less Wrong through HPMoR (which is fantastic) and have recently been reading through the Sequences (still wading through the hard science of the Quantum Physics sequence).

I'm here because I have a real problem- dealing with the consequences of coming out as atheist to a Christian family. For about a year leading up to recent events, I had been trying to reconcile Christian belief with the principles of rationalism, with little success. At one point I settled into an unstable equilibrium of "believing in believing in belief" and "betting" on the truth of religious doctrine to cover the perceived small-but-noteworthy probability of its veracity and the proposed consequences thereof. I'd kept this all secret from my family, putting on a long and convincing act.

This recently fell apart in my mind, and I confronted my dad with a shambling confession and expression of confusion and outrage against Christianity. I'm... kinda really friggin' bad at communicating clearly through spoken dialogue, and although I managed to comport myself well enough in the conversation, my dad is unconvinced that the source of my frustrations is a conflicting belief system so much as a struggle with juvenile doubts. This is almost certainly why I haven't yet faced social repercussions, as my dad is convinced he can "fix" my thinking. He's a paid pastor and theologian, and has connections to all the really big names in contemporary theology- having an apostate son would damage both his pride and social status, and as such he's powerfully motivated to attempt to "correct" me.

After I told him about this, he handed me a book (The Reason for God by Timothy Keller) and signed himself up as a counselor for something called The Clash, described as a Christian "worldview conference". Next week, from July 30 to August 3, he's going to take me to this big huge realignment thing, and I'm worried I won't be able to defend myself. I've been reading through the book I mentioned, and found its arguments spectacularly unconvincing- but I'm having trouble articulating why. I haven't had enough experience with rationalism and debate to provide a strong defense, and I fear I'll be pressured into recanting if I fail.

That's why I'm here- in the upcoming week, I need intensive training in the defense of rationality against very specific, weak but troubling religious excuses. I really need to talk to people better trained than me about these specific arguments, so that I can survive the upcoming conference and assert my intellectual independence. Are there people I can be put in touch with, or online meetups where I can talk to people and arm myself? Should I start a discussion post, or what? I'm unfamiliar with the site structure here, so I could use some help.

Oh but dang if there aren't like over a thousand comments here, jeez i don't want to sound like i'm crying for attention but i'm TOTALLY CRYING FOR ATTENTION, srsly i need help you dudes

Comment author: Ezekiel 23 July 2012 12:57:44AM -1 points [-]

I agree (in general) with Xenophon's advice: Calm down, do whatever you're comfortable with spiritually, and in the worst case scenario call it "God" to keep the peace with whoever you want to keep the peace with.

With that said, if you still want advice, I deconverted myself a year ago and have since successfully corrupted others, and I've been wanting to codify the fallacies I saw anyway. Before I start: bear in mind that you might be wrong. I find it very unlikely that any form of Abrahamic theism is true, but if you care about the truth you have to keep an open mind.

Here are some common fallacious arguments and argumentative techniques I've seen used by religion (and other ideologies, of course). They include exercises which I think you'd benefit from practising; if you get stuck on any of 'em, send me a PM and I'll be glad to help out.

  1. Abuse and Neglect of Definitions

Whenever anyone tries to convince you of the truth or falsehood of some claim, make sure to ask them exactly what that means - and repeat the question until it's totally clear. You'd be amazed how many of the central theological tenets of Abrahamism are literally meaningless, since almost no-one can define them, and among those who can no two will give the same definition.

For example: God created the Universe. Pretty important part of the theology, right? So what does it mean, exactly?

A smart theist will say: God caused the Universe to exist.

Okay, great. What does "cause" mean?

Seriously? You know what "cause" means; it's a word you use all the time.

(This is a classic part of this fallacy. In our own minds we have definitions that work in everyday life, but not for talking about something as abstract as God. In this specific case, the distinction is as follows:)

When I say "X caused Y" (where X and Y are events) I mean: within the laws of nature as I know them Y wouldn't have happened if X hadn't. But God created the Universe outside (or "before") any laws of nature, so what does "cause" mean?

... and I've got no idea what an Abrahamist theist would answer, since I've yet to hear one who could. Although of course I'd love to.

For homework: Play the same game, in your head (I assume your old religious self is still knocking around up there) or with a smart religious friend, on some of the other basic tenets of Abrahamism: God is all-powerful, God is all-knowing, God is (all-)good, God is formless. Similarly with any statement of the form "God loves X", "God wants X", or even "God did X" or "God said X" (how can the Cause of Everything be said to have "said" any statement more than any other?)

  1. Intellectual Package Deals

Most religious doctrines are comprised of a huge number of logically independent statements. In Abrahamic theism, we have the various qualities of God mentioned above, as well as a bunch of moral axioms, beliefs regarding the afterlife, and so on. "Proofs" of the doctrines as a whole will often treat the whole collection as a unit, so they only need to bother proving a small fraction.

For instance: A proof of Judaism one of my teachers was fond of was based on proving the Revelation at Mt Sinai - God made a thundering announcement to six hundred thousand families, announcing Its existence and several commandments (there's a dispute as to how many).

Okay, let's say I accept the proof that the Revelation happened. This points to a very powerful speaker, but does it indicate that the speaker is all-powerful? That it is good? That it is telling the truth when it claims to be the being that brought us out of Egypt? That I am morally obligated to do what it wants?

For homework: Write down as many of the axioms of Christianity as you can think of. Once you have a list, look at the behaviour of practising Christians you know, and try to see if it actually follows from the axioms you've got. Add axioms and repeat. (I did this with a religious friend of mine about Orthodox Judaism, and we got to at least fifteen before we got bored.)

Query your memory, Google, your books, and whichever humans you feel comfortable for proofs of Christianity. Check off which of the axioms on your list they actually address - before you even bother to check the proofs for coherence.

  1. X is not satisfactorily explained by modern science... therefore God/soul/etc.

(Including the specific cases where X=the existence of the universe, complex life, or consciousness.)

Aside from almost always falling under #2 (and sometimes #1 as well), arguments of this form are mathematically fallacious. To understand why, though, you have to do the maths. You can find it on this site as “Bayes's Rule” and it's well worth reading the full-length articles about it, but the short version is as follows:

We have two competing models, A and B, and an observation E. Then E will constitute evidence for A over B if and only if A predicts E with higher probability than B predicts E – that is, if I were to query an A-believer and a B-believer before I ran the experiment, the former would be more likely to get it right than than the latter.

This is easiest to see in cases where the models predict outcomes with very high or low probability. For example: If I ask a believer in Newtonian mechanics whether a rock will keep moving after I throw it (in a vacuum), he'll say “yes” (probability 1). If I ask an Aristotelian physicist, he'll say “no” (probability 0). And lo, the rock did keep moving. Therefore, the Newtonian assigned a higher probability to (what we now know is) the correct outcome than the Aristotelian, so this experiment is evidence for Newtonianism over Aristotelianism.

Got that? Then let's take a specifically religious example: as far as I know, modern science does not have a good explanation for the origin of life. We have a vague idea, but our best explanation is based on some pretty astounding coincidences. Religion, on the other hand, has: God created life. There's your explanation.

But translating into maths we get: if atheist science were true, the probability of life arising would be low, since it would take some unlikely coincidences. If theist science (normal laws of physics + God) were true, the probability of life arising would be...

Wait a second. What's the probability of God deciding to create life? We might say we have no idea, since God is inscrutable, in which case the argument obviously can't continue. But the clever apologist might say: God is good, which is to say It wants happiness. Therefore, it must create minds. So the probability of it creating life is actually quite high.

Except that God, being all-powerful, is perfectly capable of making happiness without life – a bunch of super-happy abstract beings like Itself, for example. So what's the probability of It “bothering” to create life? It has no reason not too, having infinite time and energy, but It has an infinite number of courses of action – what's the probability of It picking the specific one we observed happening?

I'm tempted to say that 1/(infinity) = 0, but that's not mathematically sound, so we'll leave it at “I don't know”. Regardless, the point is that arguments of this form fail once you actually look for numbers.

This answer is already long enough to qualify as a post in itself, so I'll leave off here (although there's lots more to talk about). Feel free to ask if I wasn't clear, or once you've finished all the exercises.

Comment author: bryjnar 20 July 2012 08:44:03AM 28 points [-]

I think people often dismiss systems like STV/IRV by essentially saying "Arrow's theorem implies you can still vote tactically, so it's just as bad". But there's a big difference: in STV it's much harder to figure out how to vote tactically.

In First Past The Post systems, tactical voting is blindingly obvious: if there are two candidates you like, but you don't think that your favourite has enough popularity to win outright, then you should vote for the other one, to avoid splitting the vote. This is easy to understand, and it's also easy to detect circumstances where it would be beneficial for you to vote other than your preferences.

OTOH, even though there are times where you can vote tactically in STV, they're harder to understand, and crucially, it's much harder to recognise such opportunities: you need a lot more information.

This means that, in general, STV would cut down on tactical voting a great deal, simply because it makes it harder.

Comment author: Ezekiel 20 July 2012 10:56:08AM 1 point [-]

OTOOH, the people who do figure it out effectively get more power over choosing the result than people who don't. In most democracies, this would be considered a negative. Not that real-life elections are totally fair either, of course.

Comment author: pjeby 15 July 2012 07:28:09PM 12 points [-]

Somebody (possibly an LWer?) proposed showing up to the car dealership without any cash or credit cards, just a check made out for the agreed-upon amount; the dealer now has no choice but to either take the money or forget about the whole deal.

While I don't remember this specific example anywhere on LessWrong, I actually did this last February. I vaguely recall some of the inspiration being discussions of strategy on LW, specifically the one about removing your car's steering wheel in order to win at the game of "Chicken".

(The rest of the inspiration was that I didn't trust the dealer not to screw with something once I got there, and a strong lack of desire to get into any sort of argument about it.)

Comment author: Ezekiel 15 July 2012 09:31:43PM 9 points [-]

How'd they react? Did it work?

Comment author: DjangoCorte 10 July 2012 07:17:56PM 1 point [-]

I'm not sure that it's the corporate structure that makes negative selection more useful in the data entry case. It's not the fact that the data-entry clerk is part of a large organisation that means that a slightly incompetent data-entry clerk is more disruptive than a genius-level one is helpful. Rather it's the fact that data-entry is a relatively low skill job and with relatively little room for excelling above mere competence. Leaving the corporation wholly out of it, and imagining a person doing data entry in complete isolation, the most helpful data-entry clerk would still be selected by making sure they weren't terrible, but weren't necessarily brilliant, at typing and remaining attentive etc. I think this idea is supported by the fact that for higher level/skill positions, one probably would want to employ more positive selection.

If your point was specifically that insubordination (and not just slight incompetence in general) is more harmful than genius-level work is helpful, then I guess that, in an obvious sense, the harm of insubordination is due to the corporate nature of work (since you can't be insubordinate outside of a group hierarchy). But then I'm not sure that insubordination-worries requires negative selection, or at least not a wide range of negative selection tests. Sure, you might want to include a negative selection test along the lines of 'are they likely to do the opposite of what they're told on a whim occasionally?', but it's an open question whether the rest of your criteria would be negative or positive.

Comment author: Ezekiel 10 July 2012 09:45:37PM 0 points [-]

The point I should have made clear was that data-entry clerks don't exist outside of corporations, because in isolation they're useless. More generally, mass production has been made possible by the production-line paradigm: break down the undertaking into tiny discrete jobs and assign a bunch of people to doing each one over and over again.

Once you get that kind of framework, exceptionally good workers aren't very helpful, because the people to either side of them in the production line aren't necessarily going to keep up. You just need to shut up and do your job, the same as everyone else.

At the high levels - the people wielding their collective underlings as a tool, rather than the people who are part of that tool - this obviously no longer works.

Important note: all of the above, including my original comment, is 100% psuedo-intellectual wank, since I've never been part of a corporation, never taken a business management course or seminar, and never conducted or read a study on the efficacy of various business practices.

Comment author: Ezekiel 05 July 2012 06:42:04PM 17 points [-]

One of the most important social structures of modern society is the corporation - a framework for large groups of people to band together and get absolutely huge projects done. In this framework, the structure itself is more important than individual excellence at most levels. To a lesser extent, the same applies to academia and even "society as a whole".

In that context, I think preferring negative selection to positive makes sense: a genius data-entry clerk is less helpful than an insubordinate data-entry clerk is disruptive.

And remember that we have side routes so real geniuses (of some kinds) can still make it: set up their own company, start their own political party, start publishing their work online, design games in their basement, and so on.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 05 July 2012 06:18:26PM 5 points [-]

If you can find a way to settle the bet, I bet they don't do that. Universities would look extremely different if they optimized for learning in even the most basic ways. This is the should-universe you're talking about, not the is-universe.

Comment author: Ezekiel 05 July 2012 06:29:01PM 3 points [-]

Out of genuine curiosity, how do you know that? I thought you never went to university.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 05 July 2012 02:13:26AM 4 points [-]

What my externally observable percentiles look like:

  • Writing: 99+%
  • Math: 99+%
  • Conceptual originality: 99+%
  • Programming: 95%
  • Conformity / ability to obey incorrect orders: 20%

What my educational credentials look like:

  • Highest level of education completed: 8th grade
Comment author: Ezekiel 05 July 2012 06:26:47PM 9 points [-]

Are these your own estimates, or have you found some objective, accurate test for ranking "Conceptual originality"?

Comment author: Fyrius 04 July 2012 10:13:27AM 1 point [-]

Hm, I thought that reasoning argued against your own non-serious first paragraph rather than what Bill said. If the idea is "if God is real (and won't let snakes bite me), then they won't bite me", then being bitten shows that the first part is false, but not being bitten doesn't say anything about the first part being true or false.

Or if you don't want to get hung up on formal logic, then it's valid but very weak evidence, like a hypothesis not being falsified in a test.

Comment author: Ezekiel 04 July 2012 06:45:01PM 2 points [-]

What Bill Maher said was that if a person claims that ~Bite is significant evidence for God, they must admit that Bite is significant evidence for ~God. I'm saying I don't think that's accurate.

The sentiment that one should update on the evidence is obviously great, but I think we should keep an eye on the maths.

Comment author: baiter 02 July 2012 11:27:14PM *  15 points [-]

"New rule: If you handle snakes to prove they won't bite you because God is real, and then they bite you -- do the math."

– Bill Maher, Real Time with Bill Maher, 6/8/2012

video article

Comment author: Ezekiel 03 July 2012 12:57:58PM *  10 points [-]

Sure. But if I handle snakes to prove they won't bite me because God is real, and they don't bite me -- you do the math.

More seriously, though: the sentiment expressed in the quote is flawed, IMHO. Evidence isn't always symmetrical. Any particular transitional fossil is reasonable evidence for evolution; not finding a particular transitional fossil isn't strong evidence against it. A person perjuring themselves once is strong evidence against their honesty; a person once declining to perjure themselves is not strong evidence in favour of their honesty; et cetera.

I think this might have something to do with the prior, actually: The stronger your prior probability, the less evidence it should take to drastically reduce it.

Edit: Nope, that last conclusion is wrong. Never mind.

Comment author: RobertLumley 02 July 2012 03:17:43PM *  7 points [-]

Scientific theories are judged by the coherence they lend to our natural experience and the simplicity with which they do so.”

– Commissioner Pravin Lal in Alpha Centauri

Comment author: Ezekiel 02 July 2012 06:13:22PM *  1 point [-]

Scientific theories are judged by the coherence they lend to our natural experience and the simplicity with which they do so.

Eloquent!

The grand principle of the heavens balances on the razor's edge of truth.

What.

View more: Prev | Next