However, I still think that it is an argument about semantics
You mean the original distinction, or your computationalist reconstruction? (Which is not at all accurate in my view)
However, I still think that it is an argument about semantics
You mean the original distinction, or your computationalist reconstruction? (Which is not at all accurate in my view)
The original distinction. My reconstruction is what I came up with in an attempt to interpret meaning into it.
I agree that my reconstruction is not at all accurate. It's just something that occurred to me while reading it and I found it fascinating enough to write about it. In fact, I even said that in my original post.
I probably should have written "presentism" and "eternalism" instead of "A-theory" and "B-theory". Does the dispute between presentism and eternalism also seem to you to have no real meaning?
The meanings are much clearer now.
However, I still think that it is an argument about semantics and calef's argument still holds.
I feel like this is just a really obnoxious argument about definitions.
I especially feel like this is a really obnoxious argument about definitions when the wiki article quotes things like:
"Take the supposed illusion of change. This must mean that something, X, appears to change when in fact it does not change at all. That may be true about X; but how could the illusion occur unless there were change somewhere? If there is no change in X, there must be a change in the deluded mind that contemplates X. The illusion of change is actually a changing illusion. Thus the illusion of change implies the reality of some change. Change, therefore, is invincible in its stubbornness; for no one can deny the appearance of change."
So, to taboo a bunch of words, and to try and state my take on the actual issue as I understand it (including some snark):
B theory: Let there be this thing called spacetime which encodes all moments of time (past,present, future) and space (i.e., the universe). The phenomenal experience of existence is akin to tracking a very particular slice of spacetime move along at the speed that time inches forward, as observed by me.
A theory: My mind is the fundamental metaphysical object, and moments of "time" can only be oriented with respect to my immediate phenomenal experience of reality. Trying to say something about a grand catalog of time (including the future) robs me of this phenomenal experience because I know what I'm feeling, and I'm feeling the phenomenal experience of existing right now, dammit! Point to that on your fancy spacetime chart!
Read this way, I suppose the most succinct objection of the A-theorist is: "If all of spacetime exists, all reference frames are equivalent, etc. etc., why am I, in this moment, existing right now?" To which, I imagine, a B-theorist would respond by saying, "Because you're right here," and would then point to their location on the spacetime chart.
But this isn't actually an argument about what time is like. It's an argument about how whether or not we should privilege the phenomenal experience of existing--of experiencing the now. That is, does me experiencing life right at this moment mean that this moment is special?
I suppose I can see why people that aren't computationalists would be bothered by the B theory, because it does rob you of that special-ness.
After reading your comment, I agree that this is probably just a semantic question with no real meaning. This is interesting, because I completely failed to realize this myself and instead constructed an elaborate rationalization for why the distinction exists.
While reading the wikipedia page, I found myself interpreting meaning into these two viewpoints that were probably never intended to be there. I am mentioning this both because I find it interesting that I reinterpreted both theories to be consistent with my own believes without realizing it, and because I would like to see what others have to say about those reinterpretations. I should point out that I am currently really tired and only skimmed the article, so that probably wouldn't have happened under ordinary circumstances, but I still think that this is interesting because it shows the inferential gap at work:
I am a computationalist, and as such the distinction between the two theories was pretty meaningless to me at first. However, I reinterpreted the two theories in ways that were almost certainly never intended, so that they did make sense to me as a reasonable distinction:
the A theory corresponds to living in a universe where the laws of physics progress like in a simple physical simulation, with a global variable to measure time and rules for how to incrementally get from one state to the next. I assume for the purpose of this theory that quantum-mechanical and relativistic effects that view time non-linearly can be abstracted in some way so that a single, universal time value suffices regardless. I interpreted it like this because I thought the crux of the theory was having a central anchor point for past and future.
the B theory corresponds to living in a highly abstracted simulation where many things are only computed when they become relevant for whatever the focus of the simulation is on. For instance, say the focus is on accurately modelling sapient life, then the exact atomic composition of a random rock is largely irrelevant and is not computed at first. However, when the rock is analyzed by a scientist, this information does become relevant. The simulation now checks what level of detail is required (i.e. how precise the measuring is) and backpropagates causal chains on how the rock came to be, in order to update the information about the rock's structure. In this way, unnecessary computations are avoided. I interpreted it like this because I thought the crux of the theory was the causal structure between events.
In essence, the A theory would correspond to a mindless, brute-force computation, while the B theory implies a deliberate, efficient computation that follows some explicit goal. This is nowhere near what the A and B theory actually seem to say now that I have read the article in more detail. In fact, the philosophical/moral implications are almost reversed under some viewpoints. I find it very interesting that this is the first thing that came to mind when I read it.
I work at Google, and I work ~40 hours a week. And that includes breakfast and lunch every day. As far as I can tell, this is typical (for Google).
I think you can get more done by working longer hours...up to a point, and for limited amounts of time. Loss in productivity still means the total work output is going up. I think the break-even point is 60h / week.
I find it surprising to hear this, but it cleans up some confusion for me if it turns out that the major, successful companies in silicon valley do follow the 40 hour week.
But that's why I emphasised that Silicon Valley is full of startups, where there aren't risk-averse middle-managers trying to signal conformance to the prevailing attitude. Note too that there have been a wide variety of idiosyncratic founders. And because of the high turnover and survivorship bias, the startups we see today are biased towards the most long-term productive compared to all of those set up. Yet those companies behave in the exact opposite way to what your theory would predict.
If shorter work-weeks really are more productive, why don't we see successful companies using them? Your explanation makes sense in terms of a government bureaucracy; much less so in a startup hub.
That's what I'm asking you!
This isn't my theory. This is a theory that has been around for a hundred years and that practically every industry follows, apparently with great success. From what I have read, the 40 hour work week was not invented by the workers, but by the companies themselves, who realized that working people too hard drives down their output and that 40 hours per week is the sweet spot, according to productivity studies.
Then along comes silicon valley, with a completely different philosophy, and somehow that also works. I have no idea why, and that's what I made this thread to ask.
If you mean stuff like this:
http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/content/169/5/596.full#ack-1
that does not say what you probably think it says (because of the "healthy worker survivor effect.")
No, that's not what I mean. The studies I am talking about measure the productivity of the company and are not concerned with what happens to the workers.
I suspect that being young and having a high IQ (which is correlated with good health) raises the number of hours you should work if your goal is to maximize output. Plus, Modafinil, Adderall, and caffeine probably play a role here.
I also think that is a possibility, especially the first part, but so far I couldn't find any data to back this up.
As for drugs, I am not certain if boosting performance directly, as these drugs do, also affects the speed with which the brain recuperates from stress, which is the limiting factor in why 40 hour weeks are supposed to be good. I suspect that it will be difficult to find an unbiased study on this.
Two words: Interindividual differences.
They also recommend 8-9 hours sleep. Some people need more, some people need less. The same point applies to many different phenomena.
True, and I suspect that this is the most likely explanation.
However, there is the problem that unless need-for-rest is actually negatively correlated with the type of intelligence that is needed in tech companies, they should still have the same averages over all their workers and therefore also have the same optimum of 40 hours per work, at least on average. Otherwise we would see the same trends in other kinds of industry.
Actually I just noticed that maybe this does happen in other industries as well and is just overreported in tech companies. Does anyone know something about this?
Do you know of any studies that address these issues?
In a sense, Silicon Valley is an ongoing study. Here you have a very large number of firms in a competitive environment, with low cost of entry, each firm looking for a productivity edge over their rivals. If holding the work-week down to 40 hours really made their employees more productive, don't you think you'd see lots of successful firms that have tried it?
And yes, I'm aware that there's signalling going on, but you'd still expect to see some successful firms that worked like that. Moreover, Silicon Valley firms go just the other way, doing everything they can to keep employees in the office by making it "fun" - that's the opposite of what a signalling explanation would predict, but strongly predicted by an "extra time in the office really is productive" theory.
The problem is that during the industrial revolution it also took a long time because people caught on that 40 hours per week were more effective. It is really hard to reliably measure performance in the long term. Managers are discouraged from advocating a 40 hour work week since this flies in the face of the prevailing attitude. If they fail, they will almost definitely be fired since 'more work'->'more productivity' is the common sense answer, whether or not it is true. It would not be worth the risk for any individual manager to try this unless the order came from the top. Of course, this is not an argument in favor of the 40 hour week, it just shows that this could just as well be explained by a viral meme as by reasonable decisions.
This is part of the reason why I find it so hard to find any objective information on this.
Does the argument over interpretations of QM also seem like just semantics to you?
For example, when Eliezer advocates for MWI over Copenhagen, is he mistaken in thinking that he is engaged in a substantive argument rather than a merely semantic one?
No, the distinction between MWI and Copenhagen would have actual physical consequences. For instance, if you die in the Copenhagen interpretation, you die in real life. If you die in MWI, there is still a copy of you elsewhere that didn't die. MWI allows for quantum immortality.
The distinction between presentism and eternalism, as far as I can tell, does not imply any difference in the way the world works.