Apart from Occams Razor (multiplying entities beyond necessity) and Bayesianism (arguably low prior and no observation possible), how about the identity of indiscernibles: Anything inconsequential is indiscernible from anything that does not exist at all, therefore inconsequental equals nonexistent.

Admittedly, zombiism is not really irresistibly falsifiable... but that's only yet another reason to be sceptical about it! There are gazillions of that kind of theory floating around in the observational vacuum. You can pick any one of those, if you want to indulge your need to believe that kind of stuff, and watch those silly rationalists try to disprove you. A great pastime for boring parties!

Also, the concept of identity is twisted beyond recognition by zombiism: The psysical me causes the existence of something outside of the psysical me, which I define to be the single most important part of me. Huh?

Also, anyone to answer my earlier question? I asked: Can epiphenomenal things cause nothing at all, or can they (too, as can physical things can,) cause other epiphenomenal things? Maybe Richard, as our expert zombiist, might want to relieve me of my ignorance?

[Sorry for double posting in "Zombies! Zombies?" and here, but I didn't realise discussion had already moved on.]

Apart from Occams Razor (multiplying entities beyond necessity) and Bayesianism (arguably low prior and no observation possible), how about the identity of indiscernibles:
Anything inconsequential is indiscernible from anything that does not exist at all, therefore inconsequental equals nonexistent.

Admittedly, zombiism is not really irresistibly falsifiable... but that's only yet another reason to be sceptical about it! There are gazillions of that kind of theory floating around in the observational vacuum. You can pick any one of those, if you want to indulge your need to believe that kind of stuff, and watch those silly rationalists try to disprove you. A great pastime for boring parties!

Also, the concept of identity is twisted beyond recognition by zombiism:
The psysical me causes the existence of something outside of the psysical me, which I define to be the single most important part of me. Huh?

Btw, anyone to answer my question further above?
I asked: Can epiphenomenal things cause nothing at all, or can they (too, as can physical things can,) cause other epiphenomenal things?
Maybe Richard, as our expert zombiist, might want to relieve me of my ignorance?

I must say I found this rather convincing (but I might just be confirmation biased). Also, I have a question on the topic: The zombiists assume that the universe U of existing things is split into two exclusive parts, physical things P and epiphenomenal things E. The physical things P probably develop something like P(t+1)=f(P(t),noise), as we have defined that E does not influence P. But what does E develop like? Is it E(t+1)=f(P(t)[,noise]), or is it E(t+1)=f(P(t),E(t)[,noise])? I have somehow always assumed the first, but I do not remember having read it spellt out so unmistakeably.

Richard: Yes, there is a reality beyond reality! Sure, it's not real in the sense that it is measurable or measurably interacts with our drab scientific reductionist reality, but it's... real! Really! I can feel it! So speak the Searle-addled...

Caledonian: "Since we can't extrapolate our physics that far, we don't know whether they're truly compatible with our understanding of physics or not." For the sake for argument, I'll let that stand (as a conflict of minor importance). Still, why should we go and assume a non-reductionist model? That's multiplying entities beyond necessity.

Caledonian: Sure you do. That's why we have biology and chemistry and neuroscience instead of having only one field: physics.

That's just a matter of efficiency (as I have tried to illuminate). There is nothing about those high level descriptions that is not compatible with physics. They are often more convenient and practical, but they do not add one iota of explanatory power.

PK: I don't see the ++ in your nice example, it's perfectly valid C... =)

Caledonian, Ian C.: I know of no models of reality that have superior explanatory power than the standard reductionist one-level-to-bind-them-all position (apologies for the pun). So why add more? In a certain way "our maps [are] part of reality too", but not in any fundamental sense. To simulate a microchip doing a FFT, it's quite sufficient to simulate the physical processes in it's logic gates. You need not even know what the chip is actually supposed to do. You just need a very precise description of the chip. If you do know what it's doing, it's of course much more efficient to directly use the same algorithm it is also using. That will also dramatically cut down on the length of it's description. But that does not make the FFT algorithm fundamental in any way. It is just a way to look at what is happening. I mean, really, this shouldn't be so hard to grasp...

• Sarah is hypnotized and told to take off her shoes when a book drops on the floor. Fifteen minutes later a book drops, and Sarah quietly slips out of her loafers. “Sarah,”, asks the hypnotist, “why did you take off your shoes?” “Well . . . my feet are hot and tired.”, Sarah replies. “It has been a long day”. • George has electrodes temporarily implanted in the brain region that controls his head movements. When neurosurgeon José Delgado (1973) stimulates the electrode by remote control, George always turns his head. Unaware of the remote stimulation, he offers a reasonable explanation for it: “I’m looking for my slipper.” “I heard a noise.” “I’m restless.” “I was looking under the bed.”

The point is: That's how the brain works, always. It is only in special circumstances, like the ones described, that the fallaciousness of these "explanations from hindsight" becomes obvious.

Frank Hirsch: How do you propose to lend credibility to your central tenet "If you seem to have free will, then you have free will"?

Ian C.: I'm not deducing (potentially wrongly) from some internal observation that I have free will. The knowledge that I chose is not a conclusion, it is a memory. If you introspect on yourself making a decision, the process is not (as you would expect): consideration (of pros and cons) -> decision -> option selected. It is in fact: consideration -> 'will' yourself to decide -> knowledge of option chosen + memory of having chosen it. The knowledge that you chose is not worked out, it is just given to you directly. So their is no scope for you to err.

No scope to err? Surely you know that human memory is just about the least reliable source of information you can appeal to? Much of what you seem to remember about your decision process is constructed in hindsight to explain your choice to yourself. There is a nice anecdote about what happens if you take that hindsight away:

In an experiment, psychologist Michael Gazzaniga flashed pictures to the left half of the field of vision of split-brain patients. Being shown the picture of a nude woman, one patient smiles sheepishly. Asked why, she invents — and apparently believes — a plausible explanation: “Oh — that funny machine”. Another split-brain patient has the word “smile” flashed to his nonverbal right hemisphere. He obliges and forces a smile. Asked why, he explains, “This experiment is very funny”.

So much for evidence from introspective memory...

Frank Hirsch: "I don't think you can name any observations that strongly indicate (much less prove, which is essentially impossible anyway) that people have any kind of "free will" that contradicts causality-plus-randomness at the physical level."

Ian C.: More abstract ideas are proven by reference to more fundamental ones, which in turn are proven by direct observation. Seeing ourselves choose is a *direct observation* (albeit an introspective one). If an abstract theory (such as the whole universe being governed by billiard ball causation) contradicts a direct observation, you don't say the observation is wrong, you say the theory is.

Yikes! You are saying that because it seems to you inside your mind that you had freedom of choice, it must automagically be so? Your "observation" is that there seems to be free will. Granted! I make the same observation. But this does not in any way bear on the facts. How do you propose to lend credibility to your central tenet "If you seem to have free will, then you have free will"? To this guy it seemed he was emperor of the USA, but that didn't make it true. Also, how will you go and physically explain this free will thing? All things we know are either deterministic or random. If you plan to point at randomness and cry "Look! Free will!", we had better stop here. Or were you thinking about the pineal gland?