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Not in one day you didn't.
I didn't read them in one day and not all of them either.
I 'stubled upon' this article on the night of June 1 (GMT + 5.30) and did a bit of research on the site looking to check if my question had been previously raised and answered. In the process I did end up reading a few articles and sequences.
... the apparent choice is simply the inability, at current level of knowledge, of being able to predict exactly what choice will be made.
That's true. And there is no problem within it.
Evolutionary survival can say nothing about emergence of sentient species, let alone some capacity for correct cognition in that species.
If the cognition was totally incorrect, leading to beliefs unrelated to the outside world, it would be only a waste of energy to maintain such cognitive capacity. Correct beliefs about certain things (like locations of food and predators) are without doubt great evolutionary advantage.
If the popular beliefs and models of the universe until a few centuries ago are incorrect, that seems to point in the exact opposite direction of your claim.
Yes, but it is a very weak evidence (more so, if current models are correct). The claim stated that there was at least some capacity for correct cognition, not that the cognition is perfect.
There exist beings with a consciousness that is not biologically determined and there exist those whose consciousness is completely biologically detemined.
Can you explain the meaning? What are the former and what are the latter beings?
If the cognition was totally incorrect, leading to beliefs unrelated to the outside world, it would be only a waste of energy to maintain such cognitive capacity. Correct beliefs about certain things (like locations of food and predators) are without doubt great evolutionary advantage.
Not sure what kind of cognitive capacity the dinosaurs held, but that they roamed around for millions of years and then became extinct seems to indicate that evolution itself doesn't care much about cognitive capacity beyond a point (that you already mentioned)
Can you explain the meaning? What are the former and what are the latter beings?
You are already familiar with the latter, those whose consciousness is biologically determined. How do you expect to recognise the former, those whose consciousness is not biologically determined?
Yep, kind of. But your view of determinism is too depressing :-)
My program didn't know in advance what options it would be presented with, but it was programmed to select the option that makes the most sense, e.g. the determinist worldview rather than the mystical one. Like a program that receives an array as input and finds the maximum element in it, the output is "predetermined", but it's still useful. Likewise, the worldview I chose was "predetermined", but that doesn't mean my choice is somehow "wrong" or "invalid", as long as my inner program actually implements valid common sense.
My program didn't know in advance what options it would be presented with, but it was programmed to select the option that makes the most sense, e.g. the determinist worldview rather than the mystical one.
You couldn't possibly know that! Someone programmed to pick the mystical worldview would feel exactly the same and would have been programmed not to recognise his/her own programming too :-)
Like a program that receives an array as input and finds the maximum element in it, the output is "predetermined", but it's still useful.
Of course the output is useful, for the programmer, if any :-)
Likewise, the worldview I chose was "predetermined", but that doesn't mean my choice is somehow "wrong" or "invalid", as long as my inner program actually implements valid common sense.
It doesn't appear that regardless of what someone has been programmed to pick, the 'feelings' don't seem to be any different.
the 'choices' you make are not really choices, but already predetermined
The only way that choices can be made is by being predetermined (by your decision-making algorithm). Paraphrasing the familiar wordplay, choices that are not predetermined refer to decisions that cannot be made, while the real choices, that can actually be made, are predetermined.
Of course! Since all the choices of all the actors are predetermined, so is the future. So what exactly would be the "purpose" of acting as if the future were not already determined and we can choose an optimising function based the possible consequences of different actions?
Do your choices have causes? Do those causes have causes?
Determinism doesn't have to mean epiphenomenalism. Metaphysically, epiphenomenalism - the belief that consciousness has no causal power - is a lot like belief in true free will - consciousness as an uncaused cause - in that it places consciousness half outside the chain of cause and effect, rather than wholly within it. (But subjectively they can be very different.)
Increase in consciousness increases the extent to which the causes of one's choices and actions are themselves conscious in origin rather than unconscious. This may be experienced as liberation from cause and effect, but really it's just liberation from unconscious causes. Choices do have causes, whether or not you're aware of them.
Whether someone is a determinist or not should itself have been determined biologically including all discussions of this nature!
This is a point which throws many people, but again, it comes from an insufficiently broad concept of causality. Reason itself has causes and operates as a cause. We can agree, surely, that absurdly wrong beliefs have a cause; we can understand why a person raised in a cult may believe its dogmas. Correct beliefs also have a cause. Simple Darwinian survival ensures that any conscious species that has been around for hundreds of thousands of years must have at least some capacity for correct cognition, however that is achieved.
Nonetheless, despite this limited evolutionary gift, it may be true that we are deterministically doomed to fundamental error or ignorance in certain matters. Since the relationship of consciousness, knowledge, and reality is not exactly clear, it's hard to be sure.
Do your choices have causes? Do those causes have causes?
Determinism doesn't have to mean epiphenomenalism. Metaphysically, epiphenomenalism - the belief that consciousness has no causal power - is a lot like belief in true free will - consciousness as an uncaused cause - in that it places consciousness half outside the chain of cause and effect, rather than wholly within it. (But subjectively they can be very different.)
I don't equate determinism with epiphenomenalism, but that even when it acts as a cause, it is completely determined meaning the apparent choice is simply the inability, at current level of knowledge, of being able to predict exactly what choice will be made.
Simple Darwinian survival ensures that any conscious species that has been around for hundreds of thousands of years must have at least some capacity for correct cognition, however that is achieved.
Not sure how that follows. Evolutionary survival can say nothing about emergence of sentient species, let alone some capacity for correct cognition in that species. If the popular beliefs and models of the universe until a few centuries ago are incorrect, that seems to point in the exact opposite direction of your claim.
It appears that the problem seems to be one of 'generalisation from one example'. There exist beings with a consciousness that is not biologically determined and there exist those whose consciousness is completely biologically detemined. The former may choose determinism as a 'belief in belief' while the latter will see it as a fact, much like a self-aware AI.
Yep, your view is confused.
So where does choice enter the equation, including the optimising function for the choice, the consequences?
The optimizing function is implemented in your biology, which is implemented in physics.
In other words, the 'choices' you make are not really choices, but already predetermined, You didn't really choose to be a determinist, you were programmed to select it, once you encountered it.
P.S. Welcome to Less Wrong! Besides posts linked from the "free will" Wiki page - particularly How An Algorithm Feels From Inside - you may be interested in browsing the various Sequences. The introductory sequence on Map and Territory is a good place to start.
Edit: You may also try browsing the backlinks from posts you like - that's how I originally read through EY's archive.
Thanks! I read the links and sequences.
From what I read, it appears a determinist consequentialist believes it is 'biology all the way down' meaning all actions are completely determined biologically. So where does choice enter the equation, including the optimising function for the choice, the consequences?
I think you might be confused on the matter of free will - it's not obvious that there is any conflict between determinism and choice.
I used the word choice, but 'free will' do as well.
Was your response to my question biologically determined or was it a matter of conscious choice?
Whether there is going to be another response to this comment of mine or not, would it have been completely determined biologically or would it be a matter of conscious choice by some?
If all human actions are determined biologically the 'choice' is only an apparent one, like a tossed up coin having a 'choice' of turning up heads or tails. Whether someone is a determinist or not should itself have been determined biologically including all discussions of this nature!
In response to
Diseased thinking: dissolving questions about disease
It was an interesting read. I am a little confused about one aspect, though, that is determinist consequentialism.
From what I read, it appears a determinist consequentialist believes it is 'biology all the way down' meaning all actions are completely determined biologically. So where does choice enter the equation, including the optimising function for the choice, the consequences?
Or are there some things that are not biologically determined, like whether to approve someone else's actions or not, while actions physically impacting others are themsleves completely determined biologically? It doesn't appear to be the case, since the article states that even something like taste for music, not an action physically impacting the others, is completely determined biologically.
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Dinosaurs weren't a single species, though. Maybe better compare dinosaurs to mammals than to humans.
Or we could pick a partciular species of dinaosaur that survived for a few million years and compare to humans.
Do you expect any changes to the analysis if we did that?