To a certain degree, different brands of feminism could function as different parties (certainly in academic feminism they do). A Christina-Hoff-Sommers-esque conservative feminist is unlikely to agree much with a Dworkinite radical feminist. For instance, "rape is a subset of violence with no particularly gendered component" and "rape is the natural outgrowth of a culture in which women's subordination to men is eroticized" are two substantially different positions (both of which I disagree with).*
Admittedly, the average person is not particularly clear on the distinct branches of feminism; hell, there is still a widespread belief that radical feminist means "a feminist who's really extreme" as opposed to a distinct framework of theories and political beliefs. And even among the different groups of feminists there are usually some common premises (gender being at least partially a social construct, men being privileged over women, etc.).
That said, I too would like more variation in the gender politics space; some groups (most notably, men) are distinctly underserved by the current gender discourse, and more competition in the marketplace of ideas can only be a good thing. :)
*I am somewhat cheating here by picking an issue on which there is a lot of disagreement among different branches of feminism, as opposed to (say) the gender gap, in which the primary disagreement is between feminists who do and do not suck at math.
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It is, but it's possible to argue somewhat convincingly that the lack of friendliness is in fact due to lack of intelligence. My favorite counterexample was Von Neumann, who didn't really seem to care much about anyone, but then I heard that he actually had somewhat complex political views but simplified them for consumption by the masses. On the whole it seems that intelligent folk really are significantly more moral than the majority of humanity, and this favors the "intelligence implies, or is the same thing as, cosmic goodness" perspective. This sort of argument is also very psychologically appealing to Enlightenment-influenced thinkers, i.e. most modern intellectuals, e.g. young Eliezer.
(Mildly buzzed, apologies for errors.)
(ETA: In case it isn't clear, I'm not arguing that such a perspective is a good one to adopt, I'm just trying to explain how one could feel justified in holding it as a default perspective and feel justified in being skeptical of intuitive non-technical arguments against it. I think constructing such explanations is necessary if one is to feel justified in disagreeing with one's opposition, for the same reason that you shouldn't make a move in chess until you've looked at what moves your opponent is likely to play in response, and then what move you could make in that case, and what moves they might make in response to that, and so on.)
That's been my observation, also. But if it's true, I wonder why?
It could be because intelligence is useful for moral reasoning. Or it could be because intelligence is correlated with some temperamental, neurological, or personality traits that influence moral behavior. In the latter case, moral behavior would be a characteristic of the substrate of intelligent human minds.