It seems to me that there is an important distinction between these scenarios. Of course, it could be that I'm just not enlightened enough to see the total similarity.

In the first scenario, 'you' are at least attempting to explain yourself to the shaman. In fact, you have answered, both literally with "yes" and to the shaman's intent by explaining. That he does not believe your explanation is a separate matter.

In the second scenario, I imagine your literal answer to John would be "no"---because there is no such thing as "same stuff" anyway. Why, then, didn't you at any point tell him "no" or "there is no such thing as 'same stuff' anyway"? If John refused to believe your explanation, this would of course be similar to the first case.

In the third scenario, 'Eliezer' has refined his question to this point: "I want to know if the lower levels of organization underlying the banana have a substantially different structure than before, and whether the causal relation between that structure and my subjective experience has changed in style." What in the world is ill-defined in this question? What word do we have to taboo? (Perhaps 'structure', perhaps 'subjective experience'?) It seems deserving of a straight answer to me.

(One possibility is that you are suggesting future advances in understanding, so that you really don't know what could be ill-defined about such a question---you are just saying in general that seemingly commonsense ideas may not be as solid as they appear. In that case, it's hard to object, but it would be nice if I could imagine knowledge that would make me believe 'Eliezer' and John weren't asking real questions.)

This is the first clear explanation of the phenomenon of quantum entanglement that I have ever read (though I gather it's still a simplification since we're assuming the mirrors aren't actually made out of particles like everything else). I have never really understood this phenomenon of "observation", but suddenly it's obvious why it should make a difference. Thank you.

I agree with some others that Eliezer is here arguing against a fairly na誰ve form of anti-reductionism, and indeed is explaining rather than refuting it. However, I assume, Eliezer, that the point of your entry is (in keeping with the theme of the blog) to illustrate a certain sort of bias through its effects, rather than to prove to everyone that reductionism is really truly true. So explanation over refutation is entirely appropriate here.

If harm aggregates less-than-linearly in general, then the difference between the harm caused by 6271 murders and that caused by 6270 is less than the difference between the harm caused by one murder and that caused by zero. That is, it is worse to put a dust mote in someone's eye if no one else has one, than it is if lots of other people have one.

If relative utility is as nonlocal as that, it's entirely incalculable anyway. No one has any idea of how many beings are in the universe. It may be that murdering a few thousand people barely registers as harm, because eight trillion zarquons are murdered every second in Galaxy NQL-1193. However, Coca-Cola is relatively rare in the universe, so a marginal gain of one Coca-Cola is liable to be a far more weighty issue than a marginal loss of a few thousand individuals.

(This example is deliberately ridiculous.)

"Nainodelac and Tarleton Nick": This is not about risk aversion. I agree that if it is vital to gain at least $20,000, 1A is a superior choice to 1B. However, in that case, 2A is also a superior choice to 2B. The error is not in preferring 1A, but in simultaneously preferring 1A and 2B.

I don't see the relevancy of Mr. Burrows' statement (correct, of course) that "Very wealthy people give less, as a percentage of their wealth and income, than people of much more limited means. For wealthy philanthropists, the value from giving may be in status from the publicity of large gifts."

This is certainly of concern if our goal is to maximize the virtue of rich people. If it is to maximize general welfare, it is of no concern at all. The recipients of charity don't need a percentage's worth of food, but a certain absolute amount.