Comment author: ChristianKl 29 August 2015 07:36:16PM 0 points [-]

In Europe with higher rates of atheism you still don't get a majority of people to want to live forever.

Comment author: Ishaan 29 August 2015 09:10:58PM *  1 point [-]

Is belief in the supernatural (crystal healing, ghosts, "something higher", that sort of thing) actually lower? I'd be very surprised if this turned out to be a cultural or demographic thing, rather than a human thing. I think that, absent some sort of active cultural intervention preventing it, a psychologically typical human will believe in spirits and magic. I know I would.

I think atheists, being psychologically typical humans, still retain certain implicit beliefs about this sort of thing. Ideas about how our matter goes on to circulate through the ecosystem, or the notion that we're all made of star-stuff and are generally one with the universe, are powerful and comforting to many.

The embrace of impermanence is so often accomplished by manufacturing a different sort of permanence to cling to.

Comment author: David_Bolin 29 August 2015 01:02:15PM *  5 points [-]

I don't think the belief in life after death necessarily indicates a wish to live longer than we currently do. I think it is a result of the fact that it appears to people to be incoherent to expect your consciousness to cease to be: if you expect that to happen, what experience will fulfill that expectation?

Obviously none. The only expectation that could theoretically be fulfilled by experience is expecting your consciousness to continue to exist. This doesn't actually prove that your consciousness will in fact continue to exist, but it is probably the reason there is such a strong tendency to believe this.

This article here talks about how very young children tend to believe that a mouse will have consciousness after death, even though they certainly do not hear this from adults:

For example, in a study by Bering and Bjorklund (2004), children (as well as an adult comparison group) were presented with a puppet show in which an anthropomorphized mouse was killed and eaten by an alligator, and then asked about the biological and psychological functioning of the now-dead mouse. Kindergartners understood that various biological imperatives (e.g., the capacity to be sick, the need to eat, drink, and relieve oneself) no longer applied to the dead mouse. The majority of these children even said that the brain of the dead mouse no longer worked, which is especially telling given that children at this age also understand that the brain is “for thinking” (Bloom 2004; Gottfried & Jow 2003; Johnson & Wellman 1982; Slaughter & Lyons 2003). Yet when asked whether the dead mouse was hungry or thirsty, or whether it was thinking or had knowledge, most kindergartners said yes. In other words, young children were cognizant of the fact that the body stops working at death but they viewed the mind as still active. Furthermore, both the children and adults were particularly likely to attribute to the dead mouse the capacity for certain psychological states (i.e., emotions, desires, and epistemic states) over others (i.e., psychobiological and perceptual states), a significant trend that will be addressed in the following section. In general, however, kindergartners were more apt to make psychological attributions to the dead mouse than were older children, who were not different from adults in this regard. This is precisely the opposite pattern that one would expect to find if the origins of such beliefs could be traced exclusively to cultural indoctrination. In fact, religious or eschatological-type answers (e.g., Heaven, God, spirits, etc.) among the youngest children were extraordinarily rare. Thus, a general belief in the continuity of mental states in dead agents seems not something that children acquire as a product of their social– religious upbringing, because increasing exposure to cultural norms would increase rather than attenuate afterlife beliefs in young minds. Instead, a natural disposition toward afterlife beliefs is more likely the default cognitive stance and interacts with various learning channels (for an alternative interpretation, see Astuti, forthcoming a). Moreover, in a follow-up study that included Catholic schoolchildren, this incongruous pattern of biological and psychological attributions to the dead mouse appeared even after controlling for differences in religious education (Bering et al. 2005).

Comment author: Ishaan 29 August 2015 09:04:24PM *  0 points [-]

Yeah, in general, I'm sure part of it is that humans can't easily conceptualize true death in the first place (but that's even further grounds for not taking them seriously when they say they want to die). Just like part of it is our instinctive animism/anthropomorphism. I certainly don't want to minimize the role of "cognitive illusions" in the whole thing.

But I don't think it's a coincidence that these beliefs depict the universe as fairly utopian - the afterlife often resolves misunderstandings, rebalances moral scales, makes room for further growth... and earthly suffering is generally given higher purpose. Remember - a true human utopia doesn't give its members all they think they desire, or eliminate the sort of suffering which serves a deeper human value, fiction is replete with failed utopias along those lines. Despite all the terrible things, we could be in a utopia right now if only we have sufficiently optimistic beliefs about what happens outside the narrow window of our worldly experiences. Is it a coincidence that religions often have precisely these optimistic beliefs?

Anyway, I doubt you need to get into "what does the mouse expect" to explain that particular result: Very young children also lack the theory of mind to understand that not everyone has the same information as they do. If the mouse had simply left the room and the alligator ate the mouse's friend squirrel, they might say the mouse was sad and angry (not realizing that the mouse was gone from the room and wouldn't know about what the alligator did).

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Comment author: Ishaan 29 August 2015 02:12:09AM *  -1 points [-]

I disagree with the idea that the desire to die is normal for humans.

The vast majority of humanity, spanning hunter-gatherers to information economy techies, believe in some form of consciousness which continues after the physical body as passed away. They believe this to the point that, if you disabuse them of this notion, they'll enter a spiritual crisis and begin to feel that life is meaningless. The older people get, the more enthusiastically they believe this.

If the collective fantasy common to our entire species doesn't reflect an extremely powerful human wish to live longer than we currently do, I don't know what does.

When the average person says they want to die at 80, what they really mean that they want to leave this world for another at 80. They don't want to continue things as they are, or re-live their youth - they want to move on to a different sort of existence.

But practically speaking, I think you might be right that getting someone interested in something worldly would encourage them to stay on in this world longer, and in the end that might be better than trying to explain that death means really death (once we actually have the option to stop true death which doesn't seem like a long shot, which realistically we really don't yet).

Comment author: Evan_Gaensbauer 03 August 2015 01:38:20AM 3 points [-]

Bonus Stupid Question

I remember reading about how some biologists took some wild foxes, and allowed ones which were friendlier to humans to breed. In the next generation of fox offspring, they let the friendliest ones of those litters reproduce. They repeated this several times. After some number of generations, they found these friendliest of foxes had droopy ears like domesticated dogs. This demonstrates how a simple process of artificial selection, like just selecting for friendlier animal companions, may have been sufficient to lead to the domestication of dogs.

Now, my question is, could we humans do the same thing with octopi? Could we just take a population of octopi, and identify the ones which can meaningfully interact with humans in a friendly and docile way, and let them breed, and iterate this process until we have some kind of domesticated octopi?

If they're not long-lived, they wouldn't make good work animals, but I want to know if octopi could at all be domesticated regardless. The fact they're short-lived might mean humans could breed domesticated octopi even faster.

Comment author: Ishaan 04 August 2015 02:46:36AM *  3 points [-]

I'd speculate that if you did an identical breeding experiment with octopuses (as in, the breeding criteria of non-aggressively interaction with human hand) you'd breed for curious, bold, or playful octopuses which tend to approach novel stimuli ... but not friendly in the sense of affectionate.

It's not that they're asocial, I think they sometimes lay eggs cooperatively and obviously seek each other out for mating... but primarily octopuses see others of their species as predators or prey. (I mean, cats do eat each other but only in bounded contexts, like infanticide, not hunting.)

Comment author: Grothor 01 August 2015 11:46:49PM *  8 points [-]

I was recently at a bar with some friends, most of which are from the same physics PhD program as me. We had a discussion about how hard it is to spend all your time around unusually intelligent people, and then go out into the real world and have conversations with normal people. It seems to be intelligence-related, because it's usually much easier to have a conversation with, for example, a psychology grad student from Singapore than with a fashion designer who lives in the same city as me.

Is this just because we have no practice talking to people of average-ish intelligence?

Is it because intelligence gaps are inherently difficult in social settings?

Is there some factor other than intelligence that's causing this?

Are we just socially inept?

(Is this more of an open thread question or stupid question?)

Comment author: Ishaan 02 August 2015 05:28:16PM 2 points [-]

Your culture is bounded by lexography, not geography

and it simultaneously attracts and bestows the various qualities that it has defined as "intelligence".

Comment author: Ishaan 01 August 2015 10:37:42PM *  1 point [-]

Bulletproof vests have anecdotally saved police officers from car accidents as well.

Seems like the sort of thing you might successfully convince new teen drivers to do despite the weird factor (since they're the highest risk demographic).

Edit: If the hats aren't extremely uncomfortable, might also be good fall protection for the elderly...

Comment author: juliawise 20 July 2015 07:39:38PM 1 point [-]

I did the same thing. The studies/abstracts I've read talk about effects on children of women with "high levels" of PCBS but I have no idea where I fall on that scale. Like, Inuit women have very high levels, but they're eating very large amounts of fish, seals, etc. This paper has info about health effects of people eating Great Lakes fish, which may be more relevant to you.

My very non-expert impression is that it seems to be less serous than mercury. And even the evidence on mercury had some weird bits, like studies that show mercury is good for babies' neurodevelopment (because they didn't control for maternal fish consumption, and apparently the fish was more helpful than the mercury was harmful!) But obviously the goal is to get the good fish nutrition without the pollutants.

Comment author: Ishaan 30 July 2015 06:32:24PM *  0 points [-]

Of course, I live on the great lakes and my family eats a lots of fish... It probably doesn't matter for me but not sure what to feed my little sister now, especially considering what you said about half-life. Attempts at guidelines keep waving around "moderation" in response to mixed messages from research, but even if by coincidence the effects are ∩ shaped and not linear I doubt vague ideas about moderation are going to hit approximately optimal.

Cross fingers and hope the good list is accurate, I guess?

Comment author: Ishaan 20 July 2015 04:24:07PM *  0 points [-]

Blah. My current fish information factored in mercury but not PCB. I've been thinking atlantic salmon was fine. Now googling "PCB mercury". Is the first result pretty much accurate or is there more to the story? (And any estimates for the magnitude of effect / whether it is worth worrying about?)

Comment author: ZoltanBerrigomo 09 July 2015 01:49:32AM *  1 point [-]

I confess that I have not read much of what has been written on the subject, so what I am about to say may be dreadfully naive.

A. One should separate the concept of effective altruism from the mode-of-operation of the various organizations which currently take it as their motto.

A.i. Can anyone seriously oppose effective altruism in principle? I find it difficult to imagine someone supporting ineffective altruism. Surely, we should let our charity be guided by evidence, randomized experiments, hard thinking about tradeoffs, etc etc.

A.ii. On the other hand, one can certainly quibble with what various organization are now doing. Such quibbling can even be quite productive.

B. What comes next should be understood as quibbles.

B.i. As many others have pointed out, effective altruism implicitly assumes a set of values. As Daron Acemogulu asks (http://bostonreview.net/forum/logic-effective-altruism/daron-acemoglu-response-effective-altruism), "How much more valuable is to save the life of a one-year-old than to send a six-year-old to school?"

B.ii. I think GiveWell may be insufficiently transparent abut such things. For example, its explanation of criteria at http://www.givewell.org/criteria does not give a clearcut explanation of how it makes such determinations.

Caveat: this is onlybased on browsing the GiveWell webpage for 10 minutes. I'm open to being corrected on this point.

B.iii. Along the same lines I wonder: had GiveWell, or other effective altruists, existed in the 1920s, what would they say about funding a bunch of physicists who noticed some weird things were happening with the hydrogen atom? How does "develop quantum mechanics" rate in terms of benefit to humanity, compared to, say, keeping thirty children in school for an extra year?

B.iv. Peter Singer's endorsement of effective altruism in the Boston Review (http://bostonreview.net/forum/peter-singer-logic-effective-altruism ) includes some criticism of donations to opera houses; indeed, in a world with poverty and starvation, surely there are better things to do with one's money? This seems endorsed by GiveWell who list "serving the global poor" as their priority, and in context I doubt this means serving them via the production of poetry for their enjoyment.

I do not agree with this. Life is not merely about surviving; one must have something to live for. Poetry, music, novels -- for many people, these are a big part of what makes existence worthwhile.

C. Ideally, I'd love to see the recommendations of multiple effective altruist organizations with different values, all completely transparent about the assumptions that go into their recommendations. Could anyone disagree that this would make the world a better place?

Comment author: Ishaan 10 July 2015 10:45:39PM *  1 point [-]

A.i. Can anyone seriously oppose effective altruism in principle? I find it difficult to imagine someone supporting ineffective altruism. Surely, we should let our charity be guided by evidence, randomized experiments, hard thinking about tradeoffs, etc etc.

I emphatically don't, but yes, one can. The quantitative/reductionist attitude you've outlined here biases us towards easily measurable causes.

Some examples of difficult to measure causes include: 1) All forms of funding-hungry research, scientific or otherwise 2) most x-risks, including this forum's favorite AI risk 3) causes which claim to influence social, economic, military, and political matters in complex but possiblyhigh impact ways 4) (Typically local and community-driven) causes which do good via subtle virtuous cycles, human connections, and various other intangibles

Comment author: Ishaan 09 July 2015 07:03:18AM *  4 points [-]

Effective Altruism says that all humans have roughly equal intrinsic value and takes necessary steps to gather evidence and quantify the degree to which humans are helped.

Short, but pretty much summarizes the entirety of the appeal for me. Is there even a name for the two perspectives contained in that sentence?

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