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Comment author: Jabberslythe 13 May 2013 08:06:12AM 0 points [-]

Yeah, I would like a ride and it's Max.

Comment author: Jabberslythe 12 May 2013 07:17:41PM 0 points [-]

Wow, this sounds awesome. I hope you drive then, I'd come for sure.

Comment author: Jabberslythe 14 April 2013 04:50:43PM 2 points [-]

There is a lot of diversity of opinions in philosophers and that may be true as a whole of the discipline, there is some good stuff to be found there. I'd recommend staying here for the most part rather than wading through philosophy elsewhere, though.

Also, many moral philosophers may have very different moral sentiments from you and that maybe that makes them seem like idiots more than they actually are. Different moral sentiments as to whether consequentialism rather than just within consequentialism among other things.

Comment author: Jabberslythe 08 March 2013 09:25:22PM 0 points [-]

I think I am less productive when someone else is around. It seems like I am less effective at my current job when coworkers are around and certainly when I am being evaluated at work. This may be because I am socially anxious and socially maladjusted, though.

Comment author: Jabberslythe 21 February 2013 02:35:06AM 0 points [-]

No, though I admit it has felt like that for me at some points in my life. Even if I did, there are a bunch of reasons why that I would not trust that intuition

I like certain things and dislike certain things, and in a certain sense I would be mistaken if I were doing things that reliably caused me pain. That certain sense is that if I were better informed I would not take that action. If, however, I liked pain, I would still take that action, and so I would not be mistaken. I could go through the same process to explain why an sadist is not mistaken.

I do not know what else to say except that this is just an appeal to intuition, and that specific intuitions are worthless unless they are proven to reliably point towards the truth.

Comment author: Jabberslythe 13 February 2013 07:38:49AM 0 points [-]

I don't directly apprehend anything as the being "good" or the "bad" in the moral realist sense and I don't count other peoples' accounts of directly apprehending such things as evidence (especially since schizophrenics and theists exist).

Comment author: Jabberslythe 30 January 2013 11:59:00AM 0 points [-]

I'm curious to know whether there's actually somebody who picks “Neither, both are good.”

I saw someone who answered that way, but it must have been as a joke. Not a good thing to do for matching purposes...

Comment author: Jabberslythe 28 January 2013 08:58:33AM *  2 points [-]

You could reduce human suffering to 0 by reducing the number of humans to 0, so there's got to be another value greater than reducing suffering.

Almost all hedonistic utilitarians are concerned with maximizing happiness as well as minimizing suffering, including Brian. The reason that he talks about suffering so much is because, it is most people rank a unit of suffering as, say a -3 experience and a unit of suffering as, say, a -1 experience. And he thinks that there is much more suffering than happiness in the world and that it easier to prevent it.

(Sorry if I got any of this wrong Brian)

Comment author: Jabberslythe 28 January 2013 08:48:09AM 1 point [-]

It seems to me that reducing suffering in a numbers game is the kind of thing you would say is your goal because it makes you sound like a good person

I am not sure that the hedonistic utilitarian agenda is high status. The most plausible cynical/psychological critique of the hedonistic utilitarian agenda, is that they are too worried about ethical consistency and about coherently extrapolating a simple principle from their values.

Comment author: Jabberslythe 23 January 2013 04:03:45AM 0 points [-]

I tried briefly to find some similar books but couldn't see any others.

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