Do you have an ethical theory that tells you, given a collection of atoms, how much hedonic value it contains? I guess the answer is no, since AFAIK nobody is even close to having such a theory. Going from our current state of knowledge to having such a theory (and knowing that you're justified in believing in it) would represent a huge amount of philosophical progress. Don't you think that this progress would also give us a much better idea of which of various forms of consequentialism is correct (if any of them are)? Why not push for such progress, instead of your current favorite form of consequentialism?

However, if you value several things why not have wireheads experience them in succession?

I value "genuinely real" experiences. Or, rather, I want sufficiently self-aware and intelligent people to interact with other sufficiently self-aware and intelligent people (though I am fine if these people are computer simulations). This couldn't be replaced by wireheading, though I do think it could be done (optimally, in fact) via some "utilitronium" or "computronium".

Some may be tempted to think about the concept of "species" as if it were a fundamental concept, a Platonic form.

The biggest improvement to this post I would like to see is the engagement with opposing arguments more realistic than "humans are a platonic form." Currently you just knock down a very weak argument or two and then rush to conclusion.

EDIT: whoops, I missed the point, which is to only argue against speciesm. My bad. Edited out a misplaced "argument from future potential," which is what Jabberslythe replied to.

However, you really do only knock down weak arguments. What if we simply define categories more robustly than "platonic forms," like philosophers have done just fine since at least Wittgenstein and as is covered on this very blog. Then there's no point in talking about platonic forms.

For the argument from "one will be human and the next will be not" how do you deal with the unreliability of the sorites paradox as a philosophical test? Or what if we use the more general continuous model of speciesm, thus eliminating sharp lines? You don't just have to avoid deliberately strawmanning, you have to actively steelman :)

do the two situations not seem equivalent

I'm sorry, I'm confused. Which two situations?

we could just stipulate that you would be killed after in both situations so long term memories wouldn't be a factor

I see. Makes sense. I was giving long term memory formation an example of a way you could remove part of my self and decrease how much I objected to being tortured, but it's not the only way.

Is this because you expect the torture wouldn't be as bad if that happened or because you would care less about yourself in that state? Or a combination?

If I had the mental capacity of a chicken it would not be bad to torture me, both because I wouldn't matter morally. I also wouldn't be "me" anymore in any meaningful sense.

What if you were killed immediately afterwards

If you offered me the choice between:

A) 50% chance you are tortured and then released, 50% chance you are killed immediately

B) 50% chance you are tortured and then killed, 50% chance you are released immediately

I would strongly prefer B. Is that what you're asking?

Some might be willing to bite the bullet at this point, trusting some strongly held ethical principle of theirs (e.g. A, B, C, D, or E above), to the conclusion of excluding humans who lack certain cognitive capacities from moral concern. One could point out that people's empathy and indirect considerations about human rights, societal stability and so on, will ensure that this "loophole" in such an ethical view almost certainly remains without consequences for beings with human DNA. It is a convenient Schelling point after all to care about all humans (or at least all humans outside their mother's womb).

This is pretty much my view. You dismiss it as unacceptable and absurd, but I would be interested in more detail on why you think that.

a society in which some babies were (factory-)farmed would be totally fine as long as the people are okay with it

This definitely hits the absurdity heuristic, but I think it is fine. The problem with the Babyeaters in Three Worlds Collide is not that they eat their young but that "the alien children, though their bodies were tiny, had full-sized brains. They could talk. They protested as they were eaten, in the flickering internal lights that the aliens used to communicate."

If I was told that some evil scientist would first operate on my brain to (temporarily) lower my IQ and cognitive abilities, and then torture me afterwards, it is not like I will be less afraid of the torture or care less about averting it!

I would. Similarly if I were going to undergo torture I would be very glad if my capacity to form long term memories would be temporarily disabled.

(Speciesism has always seemed like a straw-man to me. How could someone with a reductionist worldview think that species classification matters morally? The "why species membership really is an absurd criterion" section is completely reasonable, reasonable enough that I have trouble seeing non-religious arguments against.)

As a mostly-vegetarian person myself, I find this article's primary moral point very unconvincing.

Yes, factory farms are terrible, and we should make them illegal. But not all meat is raised on factory farms. Chickens and cattle who are raised ethically (which can still produce decent yields, though obviously less than factory farms) have lower levels of stress hormones than comparable wild animals. We can't measure happiness directly in these low-light animals, but stress hormones are a very good analogue for an enjoyable life, and we know that high levels are directly linked to poorer health outcomes (and thus likely suffering).

It's simply not that hard to raise food animals in a way that makes them better off than wild animals, and so unless you're strongly in the "reform nature" transhumanist strain, ethical animal farming is at least somewhat of a positive over not farming at all.

(I'm personally vegetarian by ecological reasons, and abstain from eating some animals due to moral compunction against eating things likely to be sentient.)

They are often given substances to make them grow fast and big, this often leads to problems like their legs breaking.

If dogs & cats were raised specifically to be eaten & not involved socially in our lives as if they were members of the family, I don't think I'd care about them any more than I care about chickens or cows.

This article seems to assume that I oppose all suffering everywhere, which I'm not sure is true. Getting caught stealing causes suffering to the thief and I don't think there's anything wrong with that. I care about chickens & cows significantly less than I care about thieves because thieves are at least human.

What vegetarian things can I eat that won't leave me hungry an hour later?