It seems to me that the notion of expertise can only apply to fields in which there is an established body of knowledge. By that I mean fields in which we have (empirical) grounds for believing our knowledge is at least an approximation or heading in the right direction. Physics or genetics or how to fix cars are examples of such fields. You can be an expert in physics.

Philosophy seems different. What makes philosophy interesting is that it's about things we don't understand well. In philosophy we're not even sure that existing approaches to problems are heading in the right direction.

Philosophy is pretty much by definition about things we don't understand well. Once a philosophical topic is understood it ceases to be part of philosophy, and becomes part of another field like physics, biology, economics, etc. (or alternatively, the problem may be dissolved and seen as a kind of misunderstanding.)

I would say the kind of knowledge that exists in the field of philosophy is more of ways of describing problems, or particular arguments for or against a view of problems. It's more like a discussion.

You can be an expert in the different positions about a philosophical problem, but I would distinguish this from the idea that someone can be an expert on a philosophical subject.

For example, someone can be an expert on the various problems and arguments associated with consciousness, but I don't think anyone can claim to be an expert on consciousness (at least the hard problem of consciousness) because we just don't understand it.

So rather than saying there are experts in philosophy I would say that there are people who are very learned in philosophy.

Why does this distinction matter?

When there isn't established knowledge, we're less certain that existing approaches are correct. The fact that an existing approach hasn't been able to solve a problem for long time may mean that it's the wrong approach. It is more likely in philosophy that someone who comes from outside of the field, who isn't well versed in the existing approaches, can add something of use to the table. The fact that they aren't familiar with existing arguments may even be a virtue.

If there aren't philosophical experts, then there aren't experts to challenge.

Yet it seems to me that philosophy seems to hold greater reverence for 'experts' than most other fields.

What do you think?

[I originally posted this to reddit/r/philosophy but -- to my surprise, since it is somewhat critical of how philosophy is done -- it didn't generate any comments.]

[edit: sorry, the formatting of links and italics in this is all screwy.  I've tried editing both the rich-text and the HTML and either way it looks ok while i'm editing it but the formatted terms either come out with no surrounding spaces or two surrounding spaces]

In the latest Rationality Quotes thread, CronoDAS  quoted  Paul Graham: 

It would not be a bad definition of math to call it the study of terms that have precise meanings.

I've noticed that here on Less Wrong people often identify themselves as rationalists (and this community as a rationalist one -- searching for 'rationalist' on the site returns exactly 1000 hits).  I'm a bit concerned that this label may work against our favour.

Paul Graham recently wrote a nice essay Keep Your Identity Small in which he argued that identifying yourself with a label tends to work against reasonable -- rational, you might say -- disscusions about topics that are related to it.  The essay is quite short and if you haven't read it I highly reccommend doing so.

If his argument is correct, then identifying with a label like Rationalist may impede your ability to be rational.

My thinking is that once you identify yourself as an X, you have a tendancy to evaluate ideas and courses of action in terms of how similar or different they appear to your prototypical notion of that label - as a shortcut for genuinely thinking about them and instead of evaluating them on their own merits. 

Aside from the effect such a label may have on our own thinking, the term 'rationalist' may be bad PR.  In the wider world 'rational' tends to be a bit of a dirty word.  It has a lot of negative connotations.   

Outside communities like this one, presenting yourself a rationalist is likely to get other people off on the wrong foot.  In many people's minds, it'd strike you out before you'd even said anything.  It's a great way for them to pigeonhole you.  

And we should be interested in embracing the wider world and communicating our views to others.

If I was to describe what we're about, I'd probably say something like that we're interested in knowing the truth, and want to avoid deluding ourselves about anything, as much as either of these things are possible.  So we're studying how to be less wrong.  I'm not sure I'd use any particular label in my description.

Interestingly, those goals I described us in terms of -- wanting truth, wanting to avoid deluding ourselves -- are not really what separates "us" from "them".  I think the actual difference is that we are simply more aware of the fact that there are many ways our thinking can be wrong and lead us astray.  

Many people really are -- or at least start out -- interested in the truth, but get led astray by flawed thinking because they're not aware that it is flawed.  Because flawed thinking begets flawed beliefs, the process can lead people onto systematic paths away from truth seeking.  But I don't think even those people set out in the first place to get away from the truth.

The knowledge our community has, of ways that thinking can lead us astray, is an important thing we have to offer, and something that we should try to communicate to others.  And I actually think a lot of people would be receptive to it, presented in the right way.