About Decision Theory, specifically DT relevant to LessWrong.

Since there is quite a lot of advanced material already on LW that seem to me as if they would be very helpful if one is one is perhaps near to finishing or beyond an intermediate stage:

Various articles: http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/tag/decision_theory/ http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/tag/decision/

And the recent video (and great transcript): http://lesswrong.com/lw/az7/video_paul_christianos_impromptu_tutorial_on_aixi/

And there are a handful of books that seem relevant to overall decision making, but none specifically for Decision Theory on the textbook list: http://lesswrong.com/lw/3gu/the_best_textbooks_on_every_subject/

What currently are the best textbooks, websites/webpages and other resources for learning Decision Theory (with a goal of becoming useful in the cutting-edge of LW's DT) to make sense of the above for someone that has a math education up to basic Calculus?

EDIT: Just after looking around LW for DT related things I happened to notice the links on top of http://lesswrong.com/lw/b7w/decision_theories_a_semiformal_analysis_part_iii/ of which http://lesswrong.com/lw/aq9/decision_theories_a_less_wrong_primer/ is one of the links. Though I am definitely interested in textbooks and more like this.

In my view it would cause an average USian to think you are female but that only matters if you care to be mistaken for female. I wouldn't call it deceptive and to me people can choose any nickname they want for whatever reason as long as it's not overly crass/offensive/inane.

Though I'm not sure this warranted its own post, rather than say a comment in an open thread.

Please, please, someone put it on YouTube, and someone transcribe it.

I'm currently trying to avoid having opinions on this whole subject. I kept thinking it all around in circles; I'm now letting my back-brain see if it can come up with any insights. But yours is one of the ideas that passed my mind.

There's an interesting interaction of "identical copies don't mean anything" with one of the problem-of-identity solutions you see around this site, which is that you should treat copies and simulations of yourself as yourself, indeed in proportion to how closely they resemble you. If an identical- or near-copy of me has moral weight when I'm trying to decide whether to one-box, or defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma, or the like, it would seem to have to have the same weight in questions like this one, or vice-versa.

I view more math games as definitely a good thing. I would think such a game would have to display its mechanics in such a way that the player can make judgments based on them, which would be so nice to have more of (being able to reason about what a game is doing without dropping to a debugger or something).

The more MoR-types of things that get out there makes it much easier for an average person to help raise the sanity waterline. People talking as much about the mechanics of various games versus talking about LW topics seems neat.

I would prefer professional jurors now that transparency can be maintained via technological means. These would be people who give up their right to privacy and train in weighing evidence correctly in exchange for high social status and good pay.

Partially referenced elsewhere in the thread already, but I would caution one from necessarily starting with a philosophy then working backwards to see how it matches reality.

I would recommend one instead train themselves to read scientific research papers, especially in one's field of interest, then later compare those results to existing philosophies.

I would say it's a mistake to view a philosophy/philosophies as a periodic table with unfilled spaces, where one can infer what they should contain easily. I would liken it more to a bible where the anything-du-jour was used to fill up space.

Hmm, let's say we don't count identical copies as having moral weight, and we assume that Many Worlds is correct.

In that case, I build a device that will utterly annihilate the Earth with a 50/50 probability based on a single quantum event, Schrodinger's Really Big Nuke. That event happens/doesn't happen, branching two universes identical except for that single event by MWI, one of which has an Earth immediately annihilated by the device, the other surviving.

By the not-counting-duplicates theory, the moral weight of the annihilation of an entire planet of seven billion thinking beings is zero, because they were all duplicated by the quantum event that caused their destruction.

It's the same thing, as I understand. Two identical copies are two different people.