There are two influential theories of the value of education: the human capital theory and the signalling theory. According to the former your education makes you more productive, and in so doing enables you to land good jobs with good salaries. According to the latter, education in itself doesn't make you more productive. However, having acquired a place and good grades at a prestigious university is a signal that you have certain desirable features (eg intelligence, conscientiousness).
Now it seems to me that if the signalling theory is right, then it doesn't matter that much what students actually learn during college, as long as employers can continue to predict who's going to be a good worker on the basis of degrees and grades. Hence if that theory is right, the market would only exercise a weak pressure to improve educational standards.
No doubt the human capital theory is closer to the truth in some areas (say medicine) than in others (say a classics student at Oxford who lands a job at a bank). However, it is a further aspect to take into consideration.
I'd be interested to hear why you think that the market would be good at correcting for this. For one thing, we often lack reliable measures of how much students learn (I take it that this is what OECD is now trying to remedy). Hence employers go by reputation even if second-tier universities are in fact better.
Another issue that should be noted is that teaching is a necessary evil for most professors: what they really are interested in is research. Also they are hired mostly on the basis of their research output. This incentivizes them not to spend too much time or effort on teaching, something which leads to a further lowering of standards.
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Increase the probability-weighted average of your utility function over Everett branches.
How do you choose the measure over Everett branches in the absence of interactions between branches?