In 'Proust and the Squid', Maryanne Wolf talks about just that, how external reading and writing skills behave as a kind of storage area for brain contents. I can't remember the exact passage (I guess because I have it written down in a book at home) but she talks about how we don't write things down to remember them, but so that it's okay for us to forget them. She goes into an analysis of a few cultures and their strengths and weaknesses when it comes to writing, reading, and memory. Very related and a good read. It follows along a bit with Plato's Phaedrus, the story of Socrates' objection to the written word.

I think it's interesting the way what you have memorized, exactly, seems to change based on where you are or what you are doing. I'm sure most of us without eidetic memories have experienced the sudden loss of some memorized bit of information, only to remember it with ease a few hours later.

Memories of certain friends seem completely solid and close when you are around them but utter inaccessible otherwise, never entering into your day to day thought processes. I often wonder if this is even a brain-wide effect, with different tools in the toolbox other than just memory being triggered or non-triggered based on your environment. It would be strange if some environments caused tools in your brain to trigger that increased your skill at a task, tools that would go forgotten at another time. I think I ran into an example of that the other Friday. I got my arm stuck past the elbow in a narrow metal slat, reaching for something in a warehouse after hours. Legs off the ground, lacking leverage and totally unable to free myself, I struggled for a while then just sat around thinking, trying to figure out what to do. After half an hour, I realized I could spit on my arm to get it lubricated up and slip it out of the slat -- some gross struggling and a couple minutes later I was free, if really bruised up. I feel like I would have come across that solution faster if my worries weren't tending toward being stuck all weekend in the warehouse.

A biomoderate singularity managed by a superintelligent singleton would not have much difficulty with these problems. For example, the singleton could make slight changes to individuals' genetic code to make sure these things didn't go wrong. I don't think people would mind the odd bit of messing around to prevent people gradually becoming retards.

I don't understand your point about levels of abstraction.

Imagine if someone said "This shape is not a rectangle. It is a quadrilateral." You would probably think, "Well, some quadrilaterals are rectangles, so the shape being a quadrilateral does not mean it is not a rectangle." "Quadrilateral" represents a higher level of abstraction than "rectangle" in that it specifies the shape less. Generally, the fact that something is accurately described in a vague manner does not mean it cannot also be accurately described in a more precise manner.

That evolution selects for the most reproductively fit is tautological, it is practically the definition of "reproductively fit". The reason this tautology is useful is that it gets us to ask the question: what more concrete properties must an organism have to be reproductively fit? Here the property of "tameness" has been proposed as such a property, and represents a lower level of abstraction. Though, not much lower, you correctly point out that "Evidence would require a clear definition of tame".

I think it's simply false that human reproduction now selects for the 'tamest' humans, whatever that means. Now, as always, human reproduction selects for those who are most able to reproduce.

It does not make sense to say that human reproduction does not select for the 'tamest' humans because it really selects for those most able to reproduce. Those are different levels of abstraction. The question is: are the 'tamest' humans the ones most able to reproduce, and therefore selected for by evolution?

I don't understand how you can relate health problems in pure bred dogs usually attributed to in-breeding, to a theory of degeneration of current humans. Mongrels ('Mutts' in US English?) have a reputation for being healthier, smarter, and longer-lived than most pure breds, and most of them come about due to random stray boy dogs impregnating random stray girl dogs.

I think it's simply false that human reproduction now selects for the 'tamest' humans, whatever that means. Now, as always, human reproduction selects for those who are most able to reproduce.

Did Dawkins actually articulate an argument like the one you present?

I feel as though if you are hoping to preserve the specific biological scope of humanity you have some significant roadblocks on the way. Our species was generated in millions of years of shifting genes with selection factors blatant to subtle, and more recently we've stripped as many selection factors out as we can. (For good reason, natural selection is a harsh mistress...)

Malaria etc still is a selecting factor as has been documented but they're greatly reduced. In Dawkin's 'The Ancestor's Tale', he tells the story of the Russian Silver Fox breeding experiment in which wild foxes were selected for tame characteristics, resulting in foxes that behaved like border collies.

He hypothesizes that if humans were subject to a similar non-natural sexual selection, picking for the 'tamest' humans (adult male chimpanzees will kill each other and definitely don't work well with groups, while adolescent chimps can work together in large groups no problem -- this is another suggestion w/ the skeleton and other claims for the whole idea of species right after the human-chimpanzee concestor being pushed toward neoteny in order to work in larger groups.)

The border-collie-foxes ended up having floppy ears, liked being pet, yipped and enjoyed playing with humans. If Dawkins is correct, we're a bunch of domesticated humans in a similar fashion. When you throw a wrench into natural selection like that, things start to go out of whack instantly like the constant birth problems Pugs have, bloat in Bassett hounds to back problems in daschunds. It's difficult to predict -- a part of the naturally selected whole that had one purpose, modified to another, can have all kinds of unexpected repercussions. Anything that can 'loves' to do double or triple duty in the body.

So unless you snapshot the human genome the way it is and keep people from randomly reproducing as they like to do, you don't get to maintain a 'pristine' human condition.

Is it preferable to slowly wreck and junk up your genome and species via a more or less unguided (at least in the center of the curve) process, or attempt to steer it in a humane way without eugenics by genetic engineering even though the consequences could be drastic?

The bottom line is that our species will change no matter what we do. I don't know for sure, but I would prefer thought going into it over neglect and leaving the whole thing up to chaos.

Yes, I agree - my point was that the skill of translating is a difficult one to acquire, not that it's irrational to acquire it.

Rationality and intelligence are not the same thing - I've seen plenty of discussions here despairing about the existence of obviously-intelligent people, masters in their fields, who haven't decided to practice rationality. I also know people who are observably less intelligent than I am, who practice rationality about as well as I do. One major difference between people in that latter group, and people who are not practicing rationality, no matter what the irrational peoples' intelligence levels are, is that those people don't get offended when someone points out a flaw in their reasoning, just as I don't get offended when they, or even people who are not practicing rationality, point out a flaw in mine. People who are less intelligent will probably progress more slowly with rationality, as with any mental skill-set, but that's not under discussion here. The irrational unwillingness to accept criticism is.

So you agree that yes, intelligence is continually generating "extra problems" for us to deal with. As you point out, many of the most pressing problems in the modern world are unforeseen consequences of useful technologies. You just believe that increases in human intelligence will invariably outpace the destructive power of the problems, whereas I don't.

The premise of this diary was many earths, so I'd submit that certainly there are many earths for which the problem of nuclear warfare outpaced humanity's capacity to intelligently deal with it, and that in the end we could very well share their fate.

I'll also note that I fail to see how anyone could conclude from what I've written above that my prescription for humanity is stupid pills.

I think you're underestimating the degree of social intelligence required. To pull that off while still keeping the rationalistic habits that such people find offensive, you'd have to:

• Recognize the problem, which is nontrivial,
• Find a way of figuring out who falls on which side of the line, without tipping people off,
• Determine all of the rationalistic habits that are likely to offend people who are not trying to become more rational,
• Find non-offensive ways of achieving those goals, or find ways of avoiding those situations entirely,
• Find a way not to slip up in conversation and apply the habits anyway - again, nontrivial. Keeping this degree of focus in realtime is hard.

You'd also probably have to at least to some degree integrate the idea that it's 'okay' (not correct, just acceptable) to be irrational into your general thought process, to avoid unintentional signaling that you think poorly of them. If anything, irrational people are more likely to notice such subtle signals, since so much of their communication is based on them.