Compartmentalization is, in part, an architectural necessity - making sure beliefs are all consistent with each other is an intractable computation problem (I recall reading somewhere that the entire computational capacity of the universe is only sufficient to determine the consistency of, at most, 138 propositions).

Exactly... especially since different populations have different gene frequences.

There is a false assumption that if a certain trait or preference varies between populations, then it must be culturally influenced, and not related to evolution, such that you can "debunk" evolutionary hypotheses for a trait/preference by showing that it varies between populations. Here is an example of that false assumption from WrongBot's post:

This more than anything else is its failure: it does not acknowledge the mutability of human preference. The current mainstream American standard of female beauty values low body fat, which is a powerful signal of something about genetic fitness. Not long ago, the mainstream Mauritanian standard of female beauty valued obesity (as some subpopulations still do), which is a powerful signal of something contradictory about genetic fitness. No evo-psych theory should be able to explain both of these desirability criteria in a fashion more direct than "desirability criteria are easily influenced by social pressures."

There is no necessary contradiction here. It's not surprising at all from the standpoint of evolutionary theory that there should be some variation in preferences between geographically isolated populations. Difference areas with different ecology will have different selection pressures, so which traits lead to "genetic fitness" may differ between areas. As a result of this differing selection pressures, populations that were geographically isolated for long enough could evolve different traits, and preferences for different traits in their partners.

The fact that a certain trait varies between different populations with different ancestry is only weak evidence against an evolutionary factor in that trait, and weak evidence for a cultural hypothesis (these hypotheses are not, of course, mutually exclusive). Different genetic backgrounds and selection pressures between the populations could be the underlying third variable that explains both the difference in traits between two populations, and the differences in cultures and culturally-encouraged preferences.

What would be more impressive evidence against an evolutionary hypothesis, or for a cultural hypothesis, is if the trait varies between two different measures of one population at different times (accompanied by documented cultural changes within that population), or if the trait varies between two different populations with similar ancestry.

How would it even be possible to have sex with the mermaid with the fish bottom? I don't even know if that would work. Anyway, I'd pick the human bottom.

Drowning Does Not Look Like Drowning

Fascinating insight against generalizing from fictional evidence in a very real life-or-death situation.

Why did you link to TV Tropes instead of the thing itself?

I'm a bit surprised that nobody seems to have brought up The Salvation War yet. [ETA: direct links to first and second part]

It's a Web Original documentary-style techno-thriller, based around the premise that humans find out that a Judeo-Christian Heaven and (Dantean) Hell (and their denizens) actually exist, but it turns out there's nothing supernatural about them, just some previously-unknown/unapplied physics.

The work opens in medias res into a modern-day situation where Yahweh has finally gotten fed up with those hairless monkeys no longer being the blind obedient slaves of yore, making a Public Service Announcement that Heaven's gates are closed and Satan owns everyone's souls from now on.

When commanded to lie down and die, some actually do. The majority of humankind instead does the logical thing and unites to declare war on Heaven and Hell. Hilarity ensues.

The work is rather saturated with WarmFuzzies and AwesomeMoments appealing to the atheist/rationalist crowd, and features some very memorable characters. It's a work in progress, with the second part of the trilogy now nearing its finale.

If anything of the classical supernatural existed, it would be a branch of engineering by now.

-- Steve Gilham

http://www.badscience.net/2010/07/yeah-well-you-can-prove-anything-with-science/

Priming people with scientific data that contradicts a particular established belief of theirs will actually make them question the utility of science in general. So in such a near-mode situation people actually seem to bite the bullet and avoid compartmentalization in their world-view.

From a rationality point of view, is it better to be inconsistent than consistently wrong?

There may be status effects in play, of course: reporting glaringly inconsistent views to those smarty-pants boffin types just may not seem a very good idea.

Question: Tegmark, in one of his multiverse papers, suggests that ordering measure by complexity seems to be an explanation for finding ourselves in a simple universe as well as a possible to answer to the question 'how much relative existence do these structures get?' My intuition says rather strongly that this is almost assuredly correct. Do you know of any other sane ways of assigning measure to 'structures' or 'computations' other than complexity?

The skills may be different, but the assumption that everyone should have at least moderate skill at what comes easy to you is the same.

And the belief that "Y, rather than Z is the obvious inference given X " is different across people, and is evidence of psychological diversity, and is the case frequently, including here. The universal presence of a belief of the form "You should have moderate skill at X" does not contradict this.