It's not clear that 'MWI' in the LW sense has very much content -- in particular, it's not clear that Eliezer is committed when he endorses MWI to Carroll's description above. His recognition of the mysteriousness of 'reality fluid' and his willingness to entertain ideas like mangled worlds suggests he's perfectly happy to modify QM to generate the Born probabilities, provided the modifications reflect the character of physical law better than Bohmian Mechanics and objective collapse do.

If MWI is just 'Bohmian mechanics is wrong' plus 'objective collapse is wrong' plus 'the right answer will structurally resemble our current physics', then the best articles criticizing MWI might be ones that defend Bohmian mechanics or an objective collapse theory as non-ridiculous, and argue that until we have a finished empirically adequate MWI we can't be confident it will actually turn out simpler or more-in-the-character-of-physics than BM.

I'd like to see the best anti-MWI/Everett article out there.

The link to A Kruel's blog has 404ed. What did it say? My bets on "something superficially respectable under the transhumanist aesthetic but irredeemably incorrect" because I've never seen a Kruel post that wasn't like that.

If asked your salary requirements, put off your answer to as late a phase as possible.

I precommit to myself to always say "let's see if we're a fit first, I'm sure we'll agree on a reasonable salary" at any phase of negotiations before they know they want me. " I perfume to do this even I think it will lose me the job. I don't think it ever has.

When asked my salary requirements by third party recruiters, I always say " you're the expert. You know the member better than i do. What do you think i can make at a stretch?"

One way to get yourself some flexibility is to remember that compensation includes not only salary but also various benefits. So, if you crack under pressure and tell them previous pay or requirements, you can use that fact to later give your answers the interpretation you want.

If asked your previous salary, say "my contract with my former employerforbids me to say that [which is probably true], and I take my responsibilities to my employers very seriously."

I rewrote the LW Wiki article on Acausal Trade. I had originally written this article, but it was too heavily based on multiverse concepts, which are not essential to acausal trade. Also, it made too much use of quasimathematical variables.

I rewrote it in the style I'd use to explain the concept face-to-face to a LessWronger. I will appreciate edits and improvements on the Wiki. Actually, it would be good to see a number of articles, including one in academic style.

This is, as far as I know, the only article explaining the concept. Considering that this term is in common use in LW circles and was even used in Bostrom's recent academic article, I am surprised that no one else has written one.

Would a boxed AI be able to affect the world in any important way using the computer hardware itself? Like, make electrons move in funky patterns or affect air flow with cooling fans? If so, would it be able to do anything significant?

I don't understand the details, so this is all just guessing... but seems to me it's something about induction and infinity. How, if you are not careful enough, you could use induction to prove something that is not true. Something like: "There is a natural number greater than 1. If there is a natural number greater than N, there is also a natural number greater than N+1. Therefore, there is a natural number greater than any natural number." but more complicated.

The procrastination paradox seems to have a form of: "To believe that I will clean my room some day, it is not necessary to clean it today. I just have to know that starting tomorrow, I will clean it in a finite time." Which seems reasonable, but then tomorrow, you will use the very same reasoning for postponing the cleaning yet another day. Et cetera, forever.

In the context of self-modifying agents, imagine that you are trying to build a room-cleaning AI. Is it okay to accept as a "provably room-cleaning AI" one that does not clean the room today, but tomorrow it self-modifies to a provably room-cleaning AI? If you say yes, you may build a machine that will never actually clean the room. But it is difficult to explain why "no" is the correct answer, because it seems completely harmless.

tl;dr: Don't use infinite induction to prove that something will happen in a "finite but unspecified time", because the limit of "finite but unspecified time" could easily be "never".

What is the Procrastination Paradox? I read the recent "Vingean Reflection" paper and other materials I found, but still don't get it.