Comment author: Julia_Galef 10 December 2015 11:56:47PM *  9 points [-]

This doesn't really ring true to me (as a model of my personal subjective experience).

The model in this post says despair is "a sign that important evidence has been building up in your buffer, unacknowledged, and that it’s time now to integrate it into your plans."

But most of the times that I've cycled intermittently into despair over some project (or relationship), it's been because of facts I already knew, consciously, about the project. I'm just becoming re-focused on them. And I wouldn't be surprised if things like low blood sugar or anxiety spilling over from other areas of my life are major causes of some Fact X seeming far more gloomy on one particular day than it did just the day before.

And similarly, most of the times I cycle back out of despair, it's not because of some new information I learned or an update I made to my plans. It's because, e.g., I went to sleep and woke up the next morning and things seemed okay again. Or because my best friend reminded me of optimistic Facts Y and Z which I already knew about, but hadn't been thinking about.

Comment author: Julia_Galef 22 July 2015 12:39:58AM *  4 points [-]

Hey, I'm one of the founders of CFAR (and used to teach the Reference Class Hopping session you mentioned).

You seem to be misinformed about what CFAR is claiming about our material. Just to use Reference Class Hopping as an example: It's not the same as reference class forecasting. It involves doing reference class forecasting (in the first half of the session), then finding ways to put yourself in a different reference class so that your forecast will be more encouraging. We're very explicit about the difference.

I've emailed experts in reference class forecasting, described our "hopping" extension to the basic forecasting technique, and asked: "Is anyone doing research on this?" Their response: "No, but what you're doing sounds useful." [If I get permission to quote the source here I will do so.]

This is pretty standard for most of our classes that are based on existing techniques. We cite the literature, then explain how we're extending it and why.

16 types of useful predictions

90 Julia_Galef 10 April 2015 03:31AM

How often do you make predictions (either about future events, or about information that you don't yet have)? If you're a regular Less Wrong reader you're probably familiar with the idea that you should make your beliefs pay rent by saying, "Here's what I expect to see if my belief is correct, and here's how confident I am," and that you should then update your beliefs accordingly, depending on how your predictions turn out.

And yet… my impression is that few of us actually make predictions on a regular basis. Certainly, for me, there has always been a gap between how useful I think predictions are, in theory, and how often I make them.

I don't think this is just laziness. I think it's simply not a trivial task to find predictions to make that will help you improve your models of a domain you care about.

At this point I should clarify that there are two main goals predictions can help with:

  1. Improved Calibration (e.g., realizing that I'm only correct about Domain X 70% of the time, not 90% of the time as I had mistakenly thought). 
  2. Improved Accuracy (e.g., going from being correct in Domain X 70% of the time to being correct 90% of the time)

If your goal is just to become better calibrated in general, it doesn't much matter what kinds of predictions you make. So calibration exercises typically grab questions with easily obtainable answers, like "How tall is Mount Everest?" or  "Will Don Draper die before the end of Mad Men?" See, for example, the Credence Game, Prediction Book, and this recent post. And calibration training really does work.

But even though making predictions about trivia will improve my general calibration skill, it won't help me improve my models of the world. That is, it won't help me become more accurate, at least not in any domains I care about. If I answer a lot of questions about the heights of mountains, I might become more accurate about that topic, but that's not very helpful to me.

So I think the difficulty in prediction-making is this: The set {questions whose answers you can easily look up, or otherwise obtain} is a small subset of all possible questions. And the set {questions whose answers I care about} is also a small subset of all possible questions. And the intersection between those two subsets is much smaller still, and not easily identifiable. As a result, prediction-making tends to seem too effortful, or not fruitful enough to justify the effort it requires.

But the intersection's not empty. It just requires some strategic thought to determine which answerable questions have some bearing on issues you care about, or -- approaching the problem from the opposite direction -- how to take issues you care about and turn them into answerable questions.

I've been making a concerted effort to hunt for members of that intersection. Here are 16 types of predictions that I personally use to improve my judgment on issues I care about. (I'm sure there are plenty more, though, and hope you'll share your own as well.)

  1. Predict how long a task will take you. This one's a given, considering how common and impactful the planning fallacy is. 
    Examples: "How long will it take to write this blog post?" "How long until our company's profitable?"
  2. Predict how you'll feel in an upcoming situation. Affective forecasting – our ability to predict how we'll feel – has some well known flaws. 
    Examples: "How much will I enjoy this party?" "Will I feel better if I leave the house?" "If I don't get this job, will I still feel bad about it two weeks later?"
  3. Predict your performance on a task or goal. 
    One thing this helps me notice is when I've been trying the same kind of approach repeatedly without success. Even just the act of making the prediction can spark the realization that I need a better game plan.
    Examples: "Will I stick to my workout plan for at least a month?" "How well will this event I'm organizing go?" "How much work will I get done today?" "Can I successfully convince Bob of my opinion on this issue?" 
  4. Predict how your audience will react to a particular social media post (on Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, a blog, etc.).
    This is a good way to hone your judgment about how to create successful content, as well as your understanding of your friends' (or readers') personalities and worldviews.
    Examples: "Will this video get an unusually high number of likes?" "Will linking to this article spark a fight in the comments?" 
  5. When you try a new activity or technique, predict how much value you'll get out of it.
    I've noticed I tend to be inaccurate in both directions in this domain. There are certain kinds of life hacks I feel sure are going to solve all my problems (and they rarely do). Conversely, I am overly skeptical of activities that are outside my comfort zone, and often end up pleasantly surprised once I try them.
    Examples: "How much will Pomodoros boost my productivity?" "How much will I enjoy swing dancing?"
  6. When you make a purchase, predict how much value you'll get out of it.
    Research on money and happiness shows two main things: (1) as a general rule, money doesn't buy happiness, but also that (2) there are a bunch of exceptions to this rule. So there seems to be lots of potential to improve your prediction skill here, and spend your money more effectively than the average person.
    Examples: "How much will I wear these new shoes?" "How often will I use my club membership?" "In two months, will I think it was worth it to have repainted the kitchen?" "In two months, will I feel that I'm still getting pleasure from my new car?"
  7. Predict how someone will answer a question about themselves.
    I often notice assumptions I'm been making about other people, and I like to check those assumptions when I can. Ideally I get interesting feedback both about the object-level question, and about my overall model of the person.
    Examples: "Does it bother you when our meetings run over the scheduled time?" "Did you consider yourself popular in high school?" "Do you think it's okay to lie in order to protect someone's feelings?"
  8. Predict how much progress you can make on a problem in five minutes.
    I often have the impression that a problem is intractable, or that I've already worked on it and have considered all of the obvious solutions. But then when I decide (or when someone prompts me) to sit down and brainstorm for five minutes, I am surprised to come away with a promising new approach to the problem.  
    Example: "I feel like I've tried everything to fix my sleep, and nothing works. If I sit down now and spend five minutes thinking, will I be able to generate at least one new idea that's promising enough to try?"
  9. Predict whether the data in your memory supports your impression.
    Memory is awfully fallible, and I have been surprised at how often I am unable to generate specific examples to support a confident impression of mine (or how often the specific examples I generate actually contradict my impression).
    Examples: "I have the impression that people who leave academia tend to be glad they did. If I try to list a bunch of the people I know who left academia, and how happy they are, what will the approximate ratio of happy/unhappy people be?"
    "It feels like Bob never takes my advice. If I sit down and try to think of examples of Bob taking my advice, how many will I be able to come up with?" 
  10. Pick one expert source and predict how they will answer a question.
    This is a quick shortcut to testing a claim or settling a dispute.
    Examples: "Will Cochrane Medical support the claim that Vitamin D promotes hair growth?" "Will Bob, who has run several companies like ours, agree that our starting salary is too low?" 
  11. When you meet someone new, take note of your first impressions of him. Predict how likely it is that, once you've gotten to know him better, you will consider your first impressions of him to have been accurate.
    A variant of this one, suggested to me by CFAR alum Lauren Lee, is to make predictions about someone before you meet him, based on what you know about him ahead of time.
    Examples: "All I know about this guy I'm about to meet is that he's a banker; I'm moderately confident that he'll seem cocky." "Based on the one conversation I've had with Lisa, she seems really insightful – I predict that I'll still have that impression of her once I know her better."
  12. Predict how your Facebook friends will respond to a poll.
    Examples: I often post social etiquette questions on Facebook. For example, I recently did a poll asking, "If a conversation is going awkwardly, does it make things better or worse for the other person to comment on the awkwardness?" I confidently predicted most people would say "worse," and I was wrong.
  13. Predict how well you understand someone's position by trying to paraphrase it back to him.
    The illusion of transparency is pernicious.
    Examples: "You said you think running a workshop next month is a bad idea; I'm guessing you think that's because we don't have enough time to advertise, is that correct?"
    "I know you think eating meat is morally unproblematic; is that because you think that animals don't suffer?"
  14. When you have a disagreement with someone, predict how likely it is that a neutral third party will side with you after the issue is explained to her.
    For best results, don't reveal which of you is on which side when you're explaining the issue to your arbiter.
    Example: "So, at work today, Bob and I disagreed about whether it's appropriate for interns to attend hiring meetings; what do you think?"
  15. Predict whether a surprising piece of news will turn out to be true.
    This is a good way to hone your bullshit detector and improve your overall "common sense" models of the world.
    Examples: "This headline says some scientists uploaded a worm's brain -- after I read the article, will the headline seem like an accurate representation of what really happened?"
    "This viral video purports to show strangers being prompted to kiss; will it turn out to have been staged?"
  16. Predict whether a quick online search will turn up any credible sources supporting a particular claim.
    Example: "Bob says that watches always stop working shortly after he puts them on – if I spend a few minutes searching online, will I be able to find any credible sources saying that this is a real phenomenon?"

I have one additional, general thought on how to get the most out of predictions:

Rationalists tend to focus on the importance of objective metrics. And as you may have noticed, a lot of the examples I listed above fail that criterion. For example, "Predict whether a fight will break out in the comments? Well, there's no objective way to say whether something officially counts as a 'fight' or not…" Or, "Predict whether I'll be able to find credible sources supporting X? Well, who's to say what a credible source is, and what counts as 'supporting' X?"

And indeed, objective metrics are preferable, all else equal. But all else isn't equal. Subjective metrics are much easier to generate, and they're far from useless. Most of the time it will be clear enough, once you see the results, whether your prediction basically came true or not -- even if you haven't pinned down a precise, objectively measurable success criterion ahead of time. Usually the result will be a common sense "yes," or a common sense "no." And sometimes it'll be "um...sort of?", but that can be an interestingly surprising result too, if you had strongly predicted the results would point clearly one way or the other. 

Along similar lines, I usually don't assign numerical probabilities to my predictions. I just take note of where my confidence falls on a qualitative "very confident," "pretty confident," "weakly confident" scale (which might correspond to something like 90%/75%/60% probabilities, if I had to put numbers on it).

There's probably some additional value you can extract by writing down quantitative confidence levels, and by devising objective metrics that are impossible to game, rather than just relying on your subjective impressions. But in most cases I don't think that additional value is worth the cost you incur from turning predictions into an onerous task. In other words, don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Or in other other words: the biggest problem with your predictions right now is that they don't exist.

Comment author: swfrank 13 December 2014 04:42:50PM 81 points [-]

Hi everyone. Author here. I'll maybe reply in a more granular way later, but to quickly clear up a few things:

-I didn't write the headlines. But of course they're the first thing readers encounter, so I won't expect you to assess my intentions without reference to them. That said, I especially wanted to get readers up to half-speed on a lot of complicated issues, so that we can have a more sophisticated discussion going forward.

-A lot fell out during editing. An outtake that will be posted online Monday concerns "normal startup culture"--in which I went to TechCrunch Disrupt. I don't take LW/MIRI/CFAR to be typical of Silicon Valley culture; rather, a part of Bay Area memespace that is poorly understood or ignored but still important. Of course some readers will be put off. Others will explore more deeply, and things that seemed weird at first will come to seem more normal. That's what happened with me, but it took months of exposure. And I still struggle with the coexistence of universalism and elitism in the community, but it's not like I have a wholly satisfying solution; maybe by this time next year I'll be a neoreactionary, who knows!!

-Regarding the statistics and summary of the LW survey. That section was much longer initially, and we kept cutting. I think the last thing to go was a sentence about the liberal/libertarian/socialist/conservative breakdown. We figured that that various "suggestive statistical irrelevancies" would imply the diversity of political opinion. Maybe we were overconfident. Anyway, after the few paragraphs about Thiel, I tried not to treat libertarianism until the final sections, and even there with some sympathy.

-"Overhygienic," I can see how that might be confusing. I meant epistemic hygiene.

-letters@harpers.org for clarifying letters, please! And I'm sam@canopycanopycanopy.com.

-

Comment author: Julia_Galef 15 December 2014 07:13:12PM 6 points [-]

Thanks for showing up and clarifying, Sam!

I'd be curious to hear more about the ways in which you think CFAR is over-(epistemically) hygienic. Feel free to email me if you prefer, but I bet a lot of people here would also be interested to hear your critique.

Comment author: ChristianKl 13 December 2014 02:27:33PM 3 points [-]

And that it's good practice to use hand sanitizers regularly, not just for your own sake but for others'.

Is that recommendation based on concret evidence, if so, could you link sources?

Comment author: Julia_Galef 15 December 2014 07:01:49PM 2 points [-]

Sure, here's a CDC overview: http://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/show-me-the-science-hand-sanitizer.html They seem to be imperfect but better than nothing, and since people are surely not going to be washing their hands every time they cough, sneeze, or touch communal surfaces, supplementing normal handwashing practices with hand sanitizer seems like a probably-helpful precaution.

But note that this has turned out to be an accidental tangent since the "overhygienic" criticism was actually meant to refer to epistemic hygiene! (I am potentially also indignant about the newly clarified criticism, but would need more detail from Sam to find out what, exactly, about our epistemic hygiene he objects to.)

Comment author: Lumifer 12 December 2014 11:46:54PM 5 points [-]

But how can you take issue with our insistence that people use hand sanitizer

You insisted (instead of just offering)? I would have found it weird. And told you "No, thank you", too.

Comment author: Julia_Galef 12 December 2014 11:55:43PM 4 points [-]

Edited to reflect the fact that, no, we certainly don't insist. We just warn people that it's common to get sick during the workshop because you're probably getting less sleep and in close contact with so many other people (many of whom have recently been in airports, etc.). And that it's good practice to use hand sanitizers regularly, not just for your own sake but for others'.

Comment author: Julia_Galef 12 December 2014 11:07:50PM *  17 points [-]

Perhaps this is silly of me, but the single word in the article that made me indignantly exclaim "What!?" was when he called CFAR "overhygienic."

I mean... you can call us nerdy, weird in some ways, obsessed with productivity, with some justification! But how can you take issue with our insistence [Edit: more like strong encouragement!] that people use hand sanitizer at a 4-day retreat with 40 people sharing food and close quarters?

[Edit: The author has clarified above that "overhygienic" was meant to refer to epistemic hygiene, not literal hygiene.]

In response to Tell Culture
Comment author: Julia_Galef 19 January 2014 08:18:50AM 50 points [-]

"I'm beginning to find this conversation aversive, and I'm not sure why. I propose we hold off until I've figured that out."

I read this suggested line and felt a little worried. I hope rationalist culture doesn't head in that direction.

There are plenty of times when I agree a policy of frankness can be useful, but one of the risks of such a policy is that it can become an excuse to abdicate responsibility for your effect on other people.

If you tell me that you're having an aversive reaction to our conversation, but can't tell me why, it's going to stress me out, and I'm going to feel compelled to go back over our conversation to see if I can figure out what I did to cause that reaction in you. That's a non-negligible burden to dump on someone.

If, instead, you found an excuse to leave the conversation gracefully (no need for annoyed body language), you can reflect on the conversation later and decide if there is anything in particular I did to cause your aversive reaction. Maybe so, and you want to bring it up with me later. Or maybe you decide you overreacted to a comment I made, which you now believe you misinterpreted. Or maybe you decide you were just anxious about something unrelated. Overall, chances are good that you can save me a lot of stress and self-consciousness by dealing with your emotions yourself as a first pass, and making them my problem only if (upon reflection) you decide that it would be helpful to do so.

In response to Why CFAR?
Comment author: ArisKatsaris 08 January 2014 01:17:40PM 9 points [-]

A small note/improvement request: Just as I asked last time for MIRI's donation bar (and that one was fixed), it's a minor annoyance for me when the donation bar doesn't indicate when it was last updated -- if I e.g. look at it on January 4 and again on January 7, and it hasn't moved, I'd like to know whether it hasn't moved because it simply hasn't been updated the last few days, or because people haven't been donating the last few days.

Please try to have this minor fix implemented, at least in time for the next donation drive. Many thanks in advance. (As I've already mentioned in another thread, I have donated $1000 to CFAR's current donation drive.)

In response to comment by ArisKatsaris on Why CFAR?
Comment author: Julia_Galef 09 January 2014 07:25:56PM 5 points [-]

Yes, that makes a lot of sense!

Since we don't have any programmers on staff at the moment, we went with the less-than-ideal solution of a manual thermometer, which we update about once a day -- but it certainly would be better to have it happen automatically.

For now, I've gone with the kluge-y solution of an "Updated January XXth" note directly above the menu bar. Thanks for the comment.

In response to Why CFAR?
Comment author: Julia_Galef 02 January 2014 07:01:06PM *  10 points [-]

several mainstream media articles about CFAR on their way, including one forthcoming shortly in the Wall Street Journal

That article's up now -- it was on the cover of the Personal Journal section of the WSJ, on December 31st. Here's the online version: More Rational Resolutions

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