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Sorry to confuse you. I did respond to the specific and coherent feedback, I just changed it on OB as well, so you can't tell.
What's the 'error they 'share'?
I don't know what you mean by 'large world issues'.
Why is the agent's distance from you relevant to predicting its inputs? Why does a large distance imply huge complexity?
I don't follow why your rephrasing is SIA-specific.
Here I'm not arguing for SIA in particular, just against the position that you should only update when your observations completely exclude a world (i.e. 'non-indexical' updating, as in Radford Neal's 'full non-indexical conditioning' for instance). If we just talk about the evidence of existence, before you know anything else about yourself (if that's possible) SSA also probably says you shouldn't update, though it does say you should update on other such evidence in the way I'm arguing, so doesn't have the same problems as this non-indexical position.
I'm addressing this instead of the usual question because I want to settle the debate.
Yes. Anything in particular there you think is relevant?
Yes. SSA is complicated though - it effectively doesn't take your existence as a thing in the reference class as evidence, but then it does take any further information you get about yourself into account.
Yes, my associate rejects the scientific relevance of any anthropic principles.
Answering questions about whether there are more or fewer people like you is equivalent to answering which planets exist or what characteristics they have, if those things coincide to some degree. If they don't, you won't get much out of anthropic reasoning anyway.
You do get the idea. Assuming that before taking your existence into account you put .5 probability on each type of planet, then the two options you give are the standard SIA and SSA answers respectively. The former involves treating your existence as more evidence than just that someone exists, as I was suggesting in this post.
I think everyone agrees that in the multiverse case (or any case where everyone exists in the same world) you should reason as you do above. The question is whether to treat cases where the people are in different possible worlds analogously with those where the people are just on different planets or in different rooms for instance.
If your existence depends on X, there are two possibilities: you observe X, you observe nothing
If your existence doesn't depend on X but you have some other way of observing whether X is true, the possibilities are: you observe X, you observe not X.
Do you think that observing X provides different information about something else in these two cases?
Perhaps, but then there is the question of how you should pretend they were chosen. This is controversial.
If you weren't alive you wouldn't be observing "I'm alive". If X wasn't true you wouldn't be observing X. Could you be more clear on how you think the logic differs?
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