When calculting the odds of the winning/losing/machine defect, shouldn't you add the odds of the Many Worlds hypothesis being true? Perhaps wouldn't affect the relative odds, but might change odds in relation to "moderately rich/poor and won't try Quantum Immortality"

I think one useful thing is to try and find out why some explanations are more plausible than others (which seems standard, the fact of which explanation is actually true then, won't affect the guess that much).

When asked a question by an experimenter, I imagine myself trying to give a somewhat quick answer (rather than ask the experimenter to repeat the experiment isolating some variables so that I can answer accurately). I imagine my mind going through reasons until it hits a reason that sounds like ok, i.e. would convince me if I heard it from someone else, and pick that up.

Many of those researches don't seem to give "the time to answer" as a variable. What if the subjects were asked to think it over for 30 minutes before answering? I am not suggesting they will get the right answer, but perhaps a different answer, since different brain parts may be included in the decision then.

One thing that amazes me is the change over time of this desire/goal divide. Personally, with things like regular exercise, I find that in times of planning my brain will seem in complete coherence - admitting my faults for not exercising and putting forth a plan which seems agreeable to both the consious and unconcious. Once the timefor exercise comes, the tricks start playing.

Maybe the moment of coherence could be somehow captured to be used in the moment of tricks? Also, would those moments be useful to avoid unconscious signalling?

Could that be of any value: trends

Maybe using social network websites could generate a better turnover in the short term

Interesting.

Where does this fit with the idea that voluntary behavior can become involuntary in time. Like driving, where you start by fully thinking (consciously) of each move, and in time it becomes unconscious (not sure if we can call it involuntary). This was discussed a bit by Schrodinger in What is Life.

Will this, now unconsious action, be susceptible to reinforcement? If you find you make lots of accidents, maybe driving will jump back to voluntary?

Your pleasant thoughts were about "being able to speak Swahili" rather than "learning Sawahili". Your thoughts were about the joy of the reward, which I guess are not reinfornced in total independence from actions (imagine trying to learn Swahili without the rewarded thoughts, you'd probably not make it through th first few calsses), but are certainly not identical.

What would happen if you think about the effort of actually learning? Will it get negatively reinforced the same way as actually doing the effort?

after the computer program above calculates the amplitude (the same every time we run the program), can we incorporate in the program additional steps to simulate our magical measurement tool (the detector)?

Or to be mentioned and praised by people, therefore, it is also for himself

Isn't this like saying I wont pay for grocery because al the grocer wanted was to get paid?

Anyways, my counter argument will be "I have no choice in giving credit/blame too". Of course, the reply could well be "and I have no choice in debating the idea" etc - which, I confess, can lead to some wasted time

I think the distinction between decisions (as an end result) and other brain processes can be useful in fields of behavioral economics and the like on the short term, as it reahes results quite fast. But the complexity of decisions makes me visit the examples of unifications in physics. Perhaps if all decisions (not only final output) are treated as the same phenomena, aspects like framing can be understood as altering sub decisions by using their constant value functions, leading to a different decision later in time (which just happens to be the output decision). The idea is perhaps understanding the building blocks of decisions (on a level smaller than final outputs and bigger than single nueron firings) can provide a better model for decision making