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I completely fail to see the point of your first example. Obviously if the amount you bet is so insignificant that you're literally indifferent between winning the money or losing it, then the bet doesn't hedge anything. But who cares, and why have a table to work that out?
In response to
[Link] Less Wrong Wiki article with very long summary of Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow
Is the formatting messed up? You've got a ten-page paragraph in there.
I don't know. I'm taking that argument from authority and posting it, in part, to remind myself to reprocess the ideas when I'm better prepared to receive them.
The following link trail conditioned my interpretation:
Zero-Knowledge Proof is a very new, very speculative field with few if any academic research - plus, it is currently plagued with the trusted accumulator issue (you have to trust the very first "user"), scalability issue and, more intrinsic to the procedure, issues with wholly obscured economy, which prevents detecting a bug/exploit until it is much too late. Also, ZKP is considered doubtful.
Where the author here hyperlinks to the above article with 'doubtful'
The blogpost you linked to is explaining, in detail, with a worked example, that zero-knowledge proofs are possible. The only thing in it that even slightly matches the reddit guy's view is the sidenote near the beginning pointing out that just because someone claims a cryptosystem is zero-knowledge, doesn't mean they're actually right, or that the cryptosystem is secure.
Ah, sorry to get your hopes up, it's a degenerate approach: http://pastebin.com/Jee2P6BD
It also hasn't won. (Unless someone more secretive than me had had the same idea)
I used the first meaning. Doesn't Chalmers use it as well?
I get the impression Chalmers is using something like Conceivable1 for the "zombies are conceivable" part of the arguments then sneakily switching to something more like Conceivable3 for the "conceivable, therefore logically possible" part.
We have hundreds of people in this complex. I suspect at least 50% is more extroverted than me as the the uni etc. the ratio was more like 90%. If they did not do the BBQ thing I think I would not have much chance with it...
On the trust. Facebook does not also give you your neighbors location nor a way to check if someone claiming to be in your neighborhood is genuine.
I sort of agree to the extent that showing the address to everybody in the hood is perhaps too much, people would tell each other when they need so, but verifying is IMHO a good idea because it efficiently keeps spammers out. Perhaps sharing the address with everybody in the hood is a way to enforce politeness.
As for the last issue, I have actually a way to test it, as I was looking for a babysitter putting up an ad with a maximal cuteness baby photo in all our 12 stairways. I got two applicants. Out of 12 stairways times 6 levels times dunno like 6 flats. I will put up ads advertising this site some of these days and then if we get like 50 people there try again. But that 2 applicants was for me disappointingly low. Of course it could be that it will be even lower on the site as well.
If people don't care when it's a poster on a stairwell, why are they going to start caring when it's a message on a website?
I think "website for local area stuff" has a problem where people think they'd use it far more than they actually would. People don't care about that sort of thing as much as they think they should, and this sort of thing is the digital equivalent of a home exercise machine that people buy, use once and then leave to moulder.
So, what if one day you learned that hypothetical-you is the actual-you, that is, what if Omega actually came up to you right now and told you about the study etc. and put you into the "genetic Newcomb problem"?
Well, I can say that I'd two-box.
Does that mean I have the two-boxing gene?
Ah, okay. Well, the idea of my scenario is that you have no idea how all of this works. So, for example, the two-boxing gene could make you be 100% sure that you have or don't have the gene, so that two-boxing seems like the better decision. So, until you actually make a decision, you have no idea which gene you have. (Preliminary decisions, as in Eells tickle defense paper, are also irrelevant.) So, you have to make some kind of decision. The moment you one-box you can be pretty sure that you don't have the two-boxing gene since it did not manage to trick into two-boxing, which it usually does. So, why not just one-box and take the money? :-)
My problem with all this is, if hypothetical-me's decisionmaking process is made by genetics, why are you asking real-me what the decisionmaking process should be?
Real-me can come up with whatever logic and arguments, but hypothetical-me will ignore all that and choose by some other method.
(Traditional Newcomb is different, because in that case hypothetical-me can use the same decisionmaking process as real-me)
Maybe I should have added that you don't know which genes you have, before you make the decision, i.e. two-box or one-box.
I wasn't assuming that I knew beforehand.
It's just that, if I have the one-boxing gene, it will compel me (in some manner not stated in the problem) to use a decision algorithm which will cause me to one-box, and similarly for the two-box gene.
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Having this in mind, could it be possible to construct such roulette betting system, which have positive expected utility value?
Not if the marginal utility of money decreases as you have more.
If your utility function has convex parts then it might be possible, though. If you have $1000 but owe the Mafia $2000 and they're coming to collect, betting it all on black might be a good idea.