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Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 18 March 2009 02:50:43AM 1 point [-]

"first-order logic cannot, in general, distinguish finite models from infinite models."

Specifically, if a fist order theory had arbitrarily large finite models, then it has an infinite one.

Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 31 January 2009 08:33:56PM 0 points [-]

Did Ira Howard actually say that? In which story?

In response to Lawful Creativity
Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 09 November 2008 08:10:16AM 0 points [-]

I'm getting Deja Vu again. Are you recycling bits of older posts or other things you've written?

Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 29 October 2008 08:27:52PM 1 point [-]

Eliezer: have you given any thought to the problem of choosing a measure on the solution space? If you're going to count bits of optimization, you need some way of choosing a measure. In the real world solutions are not discrete and we cannot simply count them.

Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 25 October 2008 09:22:31PM 0 points [-]

I swear to god I've read these Kasparov posts before...

Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 25 October 2008 09:17:57PM 0 points [-]

I feel like I've read this exact post before. Deja Vu?

In response to Ethics Notes
Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 22 October 2008 04:56:26AM 0 points [-]

> Moral questions are terminal. Ethical questions are instrumental.

I would argue that ethics are values that are instrumental, but treated as if they were terminal for almost all real object-level decisions. Ethics are a human cognitive shortcut. We need ethics because we can't really compute the expected cost of a black swan bet. An AI without our limitations might not need ethics. It might be able to keep all it's instrumental values in it's head *as* instrumental, without getting confused like we would.

Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 05 October 2008 09:31:08PM 0 points [-]

"But it was PT:TLOS that did the trick. Here was probability theory, laid out not as a clever tool, but as The Rules, inviolable on pain of paradox"

I am unaware of a statement of Cox's theorem where the full *technical* statement of the theorem comes even close to this informal characterization. I'm not saying it doesn't exist, but PT:TLOS certainly doesn't do it.

I found the first two chapters of PT:TLOS to be absolutely, wretchedly awful. It's full of technical mistakes, crazy mischaracterizations of other people's opinions, hidden assumptions and skipped steps (that he tries to justify with handwaving nonsense), and even a discussion of Godel's theorems that mixes meta levels and completly misses the point.

Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 19 September 2008 06:06:40AM 1 point [-]

Eliezer, I think you have dissolved one of the most persistent and venerable mysteries: "How is it that even the smartest people can make such stupid mistakes".

Being smart just isn't *good* *enough*.

Comment author: Larry_D'Anna 23 August 2008 05:59:00AM 0 points [-]

J Thomas
Larry, you have not proven that 6 would be a prime number if PA proved 6 was a prime number, because PA does not prove that 6 is a prime number.

No I'm afraid not. You clearly do not understand the ordinary meaning of implications in mathematics. "if a then b" is equivalent (in boolean logic) to ((not a) or b). They mean the exact same thing.

The claim that phi must be true because if it's true then it's true

I said no such thing. If you think I did then you do not know what the symbols I used mean.

It's simply and obviously bogus, and I don't understand why there was any difficulty about seeing it.

No offense, but you have utterly no idea what you are talking about.

Similarly, if PA proved that 6 was prime, it wouldn't be PA

PA is an explicit finite list of axioms, plus one axiom schema. What PA proves or doesn't prove has absolutely nothing to do with it's definition.


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