There seem to be far too many people hung up on the mathematics which ignores the purpose of the post as I understand it.

The post is not about truth but about conviction. Eliezer is not saying that there could be a scenario in which the rules of mathematics didn't work, but that there could be a scenario under which he was convinced of it.

Deconstructing all elements of neurology, physics and socialogy that make up the pathway from complete ignorance to solid conviction is not something I could even begin to attempt - but if one were able to list such steps as a series bullet points I could conceive that the manipulation of certain steps could lead to a different outcome, which appears to me to be the ultimate point of the post (although not hugely ground-breaking, but an interesting thought experiment).

It is not a claim that the strongly held conviction represents fact or that the conviction would not be shaken by a future event or presentation of evidence. As a fundamental believer in scientific thought and rationality there is much that I hold as firm conviction that I would not hesitate to re-think under valid contradictory evidence.

I appreciate that these are being used as simple analogies, but since they are phrased as real-world scenarios I feel that it weakens my visualisation of the situation in hand by not explicitly commenting on the time-scales over which the teacher/pupil wishes to maximise their utility.

Each example refers to the impact of the initial setup, or decision made when faced with an excuse, to the overall utility of the outcome but fails to convey to me clearly the success or failure criteria.

I would find it valuable if we were able to split the scenarios into a timeline decision tree to show how the impact of initial setup and decisions made would affect the utility over time, which would allow me to visualise the most beneficial path once I had decided on the timescale over which I wish to consider. (Taking this even further I would most likely attribute different weightings to my utility function depending on time-horizons and then attempt to maximise over the whole.)

What variation would there be in setup and decision if my consideration was for a one-shot decision versus a long-term career?

I noticed something recently which might be a positive aspect of akrasia, and a reason for its existence.

Background: I am generally bad at getting things done. For instance, I might put off paying a bill for a long time, which seems strange considering the whole process would take < 5 minutes.

A while back, I read about a solution: when you happen to remember a small task, if you are capable of doing it right then, then do it right then. I found this easy to follow, and quickly got a lot better at keeping up with small things.

A week or two into it, I thought of something evil to do, and following my pattern, quickly did it. Within a few minutes, I regretted it and thankfully, was able to undo it. But it scared me, and I discontinued my habit.

I'm not sure how general a conclusion I can draw from this; perhaps I am unusually prone to these mistakes. But since then I've considered akrasia as a sort of warning: "Some part of you doesn't want to do this. How about doing something else?"

Now when the part of you protesting is the non-exercising part or the ice-cream eating part, then akrasia isn't being helpful. But... it's worth listening to that feeling and seeing why you are avoiding the action.

If I could attempt to summarise my interpretation of the above:

Joe realises that the best payout comes from proposing sincerely even though he is defined to be insincere (10% probability of surely breaking his promise to never try and leave her if they marry). He seeks a method by which to produce an insincere sincere proposal.

As sincerity appears to be a controllable state of mind he puts himself in the right state, making him appear temporarily sincere and thus aiming for the bigger payout.

As you have not assigned any moral or mental cost associated with this then there appears to be no choice required in the matter and this path is clear (which is the one he took).

Could I suggest a possible adjustment? I would either replace the fixed probability of happiness with a varying probability depending on sincerity (ie 90% chance of happiness if sincere, 1% chance if insincere!) or perhaps provide a cost associated with the act of "lying".

This latter "cost of lying" would make this a slightly more real world example as I believe that I have witnessed examples such as the one above where a persons cost of lying has been low or has been high and the two outcomes have been different accordingly.

I would not ignore the impact of an internal stimulus other than tastiness in driving over-eating.

In the case of chocolate, for example, I have often continued to eat well passed the point at which both my common sense and even my taste have begun to object to satisfy a craving.

Here the craving is clearly visualised in the form of direct sugar and chocolate stimulating the pleasure senses. Knowing the impact allows me to focus will-power towards avoiding it and yet I still give in on occasion.

Now consider the stimulus hidden more deeply. MSG subtly adding to the flavour of a ready meal. It is well know that this can induce cravings in the same way (although perhaps not to the same extent, i don't have any data on this) as other drugs with more commonly understood addictive properties.

Could the same cravings not still be present driving the desire to continue eating beyond otherwise sensible levels? Without the clear visualisation of the problem, as it is hidden behind food that we have otherwise been trained to consider healthy, there is no internal defence.

Once you pop, you can't stop - wasn't just a rhyme.

These percentages are supposedly Bayesian estimates, so it basically just means that it isn't easy to tell one way or another but the thing was more inclined to take it as female. If the thing is well calibrated it would be right 63% of the time and wrong 37% of the time with this estimate. But at least for my tests it was right even more often-- it seems other people had different experiences.

According to the GenderAnalyzer, that blog post was written by a man. I tested your original post as well and it was correctly guessed as being written by a woman.

I tried it on some other pages and if anything the thing is underconfident-- it's right more often than it supposes.

It can't just be harmlessness-- all sorts of things (like pencils) are harmless but not cute.

Is it not worth considering "cuteness" to be defined in terms of threat levels. It seems to me that in most cases there is a direct correlation between cuteness and perceived threat.

By threat I am referring not just to physical (claws versus soft paws, large vs small, dominant versus meek, hard versus soft) but even biological (messy / unhygenic looking creatures versus fluffy / cuddly looking ones) or social (flawed versus flawless).

This may explain why some people perceive cuteness differently. One person may look at a human baby and see no possible threat, others may be more inclined to be considering health implications or even the threat of embaressment / fear it is associated with.

With this association in mind it would seem that selection towards lower threat is prevalent - babies looking cute leads to lower abandonment or attack by other parties, animals allowed to come close to humans without fear and benefiting from shelter / food / care etc.

It is common practice, when debating an issue with someone, to cite examples.

Has anyone else ever noticed how your entire argument can be undermined by stating a single example or fact which is does not stand up to scrutiny, even though your argument may be valid and all other examples robust?

Is this a common phenomenon? Does it have a name? What is the thought process that underlies it and what can you do to rescue your position once this has occurred?