Eudaimonic hedonism is still a form of hedonism.
That seems entirely wrong. In fact, I think "eudaimonic hedonism" is just a contradiction in terms. Normally eudaimonic well-being is contrasted with hedonistic well-being.
ETA: Maybe you were thinking, "Eudaimonist utlitiarianism is still a form of utilitarianism"?
Maybe you were thinking [...]
I meant what I said. Eudaimonic hedonism is still a form of hedonism. Eudaimonia is simply redefined happiness.
It is contrasted with "traditional" hedonism in common usage, but the relationship is quite clear. Eudaimonia is not a rejection of traditional hedonism but a modification.
(I'm thinking of this and this.)
Eudaimonic hedonism is still a form of hedonism.
(EDIT: Specifically it's epicurian as compared to cyrenaic.)
Good point. And I think I'll have to exit too, because I have the feeling that I'm doing something wrong, and I'm frankly too tired to figure that out right now.
Just one question. "Declaring a thing to be another thing does not make it that thing. Brute fiat is insufficient to normative evaluations of intrinsic worth." Among other things I may be confused about, I'm (still) confused what intrinsic worth might be. Since I don't (currently) think 'intrinsic worth' is a thing, it seems to me that it is just the nature of a terminal value that it's something you choose, so I don't see the violation.
EDIT: Edited statement edited out.
intrinsic values are values that a thing has merely by being what it is.
My question from the outset was "what's the use of happiness?" Responding to that with "its own sake" doesn't answer my question. To say that 'being useful is useful for its own sake' is to make an intrinsic utilitity statement of utility.
We -- or rather I -- framed this question in terms of utility from the outset.
Now -- hedonism is the default consensus view here on LessWrong.com. (obviously I am a dissenter. My personal history as being clinically anhedonic maaaaay have something to do with this.) the argument is made by hedonistic utilitarians that pleasure is the "measure of utility". That is; utility is pleasure; pleasure is utility.
But of course it's trivially easy to demonstrate the paucity of this reasoning -- we need only look to the wireheading existential failure mode, and other variations of it, to acknowledge that pleasure for pleasure's own sake is not an intrinsic value.
Without having intrinsic value, a value cannot be a terminal value; the terms are synonymous.
Since I don't (currently) think 'intrinsic worth' is a thing,
The position you are here aligning with is called "intrinsic nihilism". It claims that there are zero terminal/intrinsic goods. Now -- there's nothing wrong with that, from the outside view.
But it does leave us at something of an impasse; how could you then justify seeking happiness? If there are no intrinsic goods then your goals are entirely arbitrary. Which means that you must have reasoning for continuing to seek them out -- otherwise you would not continue to retain those arbitrary goals.
Absolutely -- our evolutionary history plays into this. But then, our evolutionary history includes rapine and slaughter. And we curttail that in lieu of creating a better society. So why does 'happiness' get a free pass from this inspection?
I think you're still missing the point. You can call happiness a terminal value, because you decide what those are.
I think you are confused here; what do you mean by inherently 'good'? Why must more of X always be better than less for? Does this resolve it?: yes, happiness =/= utility. I never claimed it was and I don't think anyone did. But among all the things that, when aggregated = your 'utility function', happiness (for most people) is a pretty big thing. And it is aggregate utility, and only aggregate utility, that would always be better with more.
Then, I suppose happiness isn't a terminal value. I think I was wrong. The only "terminal" value would be total utility.... but happiness is so fundamental and "self-evidently valuable" to most people that it seems useful to call such thing a "terminal value" if indeed you're going to call anything that.
P.S. I think you think you're saying something meaningful when you say "useful". I don't think you are. I think you're just expressing the idea of an aggregate utility, the sum. If not, what do you mean?
EDIT: This threw me for a loop: "I know this to be false of happiness/pleasure; I know that there is such a thing as "too happy"." Obviously, if happiness is a terminal value, you're right you can't be too happy. I think I'm either confused or tired or both. And if it so happens that in reality people don't desire, upon reflection, to maximize happiness because there's a point at which it's bad, then I understand you; such a person would be inconsistent to call happiness a terminal value in such a case.
Why do you think you can have too much happiness? (Think of some situation.) Presumably there's some trade-off.....
Now consider someone else in that same situation. Would someone else also think they have too much happiness in that situation? Because if that's not the case, you just have different terminal values. Ultimately, someone may judge their happiness to be most important to them. You can say, 'no, they should care more about (whatever tradeoff you think there is, maybe decreased ambition)'; they can simply respond, 'no, I disagree, I don't care more about that, I care more about happiness', because that's what it means for a value to be "terminal": it means for that value to the ultimate basis of judgment.
To make it clearer: you seem to think that different people's terminal values must be the same. Why do you think this?
I think you're still missing the point.
Which is funny, because I am increasingly coming to the same conclusion with regards to your integration of my statements as you respond to me with essentially the same "talking points" in a manner that shows you haven't contemplated that at the very least merely repeating yourself isn't going to cause me to consider your old point any more relevant than it was the first time I offerred a rebuttal with new informational value.
At some point, I have learned that in such dialogues the only productive thing left for me to do is to simply drop the microphone and walk off the stage. I don't think this dialogue has quite reached that stage just yet. :)
You can call happiness a terminal value, because you decide what those are.
A rose by any other name. My pet; a harrier jet.
Declaring a thing to be another thing does not make it that thing. Brute fiat is insufficient to normative evaluations of intrinsic worth.
Obviously, if happiness is a terminal value, you're right you can't be too happy.
You somehow read the exact opposite of my meaning from my statement.
Also -- if you accept the notion of wireheading as an existential failure, then you acknowledge that happiness is not an intrinsic value.
Have you read Mountains Beyond Mountains by Tracy Kidder? It's a non-fiction book recording the story of Dr. Paul Farmer, a tremendously benevolent epidemiologist that shares your worldview, does all he can to medically assist the poor (specifically, the Haitian poor), and still cannot meet the standards he sets himself. However, Kidder's depictions of Farmer's personality portray him as a happy man. Perhaps the book will be of some help, if you indeed have not yet read it.
However, Kidder's depictions of Farmer's personality portray him as a happy man. Perhaps the book will be of some help, if you indeed have not yet read it.
I'm quite certain that the vast majority of people who ever encountered me in meatspace would make the mistake of thinking that I am a happy person. I laugh, I smile, I go through all of the motions. I am upbeat and concerned with the wellbeing of others. I am patient to a fault, and nigh unto never show any signs of any kind of being foul-mannered or intemperate.
Those who know me when I am ... myself -- know a very different person. They are few.
I've read your other responses, and while I don't think my experience will assist you in an attempt to feel the emotion, it may assist in your ability to understand the emotion's desirability.
I find myself more productive when I'm happy; my mind has less cluttered thoughts, due to less anxiety and cognitive duress (I can only best describe this as a state when my subconscious works overtime on thoughts I'm only barely conscious of, and each time I try to deeply contemplate a new thought, somewhere along the halfway point it's unwillingly relegated to my subconscious as something I'm anxious over pops to the top of my mind).
I also notice a correlation between times I am unhappy, and a lowering in my self-confidence. Normally my confidence hovers right below what I would consider 'a level of confidence conducive to hubris', and when happy, it can tend to spill over into this danger zone. When unhappy, my confidence becomes akin to the normative level of confidence I've observed most people whom I've encountered to likely possess. This diminishing of confidence too lessens my productivity, and to reestablish my normative confidence level, I must then end my unhappiness.
Thus, for me, over-abundant happiness can be dangerous, but wading just above the happiness threshold gives me clarity of mind and purposeful focus. Hope this helped elucidate happiness's utility for you.
Cheers!
I also notice a correlation between times I am unhappy,
One fo the many things I dislike about the English language is that it does not readily acknowledge that "happy" is no excluded middle.
(Apologies for my earlier comment. I've been in a negative emotional funk lately, and at least I am more self-aware because of that comment and its response. Anyway---)
I'm a little confused about why you think it's hand-waving or question-begging to call happiness a 'terminal value'. Here's why.
Your utility function is just a representation of what you want to increase. So if happiness is what you want to increase, it ought to be represented (heavily) in your utility function, whatever that is. As far as I know, "utility" is a (philosophical) explication - a more precise and formalized way of talking about something. This is a concept I learned from some metalogic: logic is an "explication", see, that hopes to improve on intuitive reasoning based on intuitively valid inferences. Logical tautologies like P-->P aren't themselves considered to be true, they're only considered to represent truths, like 'if snow is white then snow is white', all of which is supposed to remind you that just because you dress something up in formalism doesn't mean you don't have to refer back to what you're trying to represent in the first place, which may be mundane in the sense of 'everyday'.
So of course you can call happiness a terminal value. Your values aren't constructed by your utility function; they're described by it. In my opinion you're taking things backward. Or, if maximal utility doesn't include increased happiness, you're doing it wrong, assuming happiness is what you value.
[Note: was edited.]
So of course you can call happiness a terminal value.
I can call my cat a Harrier Jet, too. Doesn't mean she's going to start launching missiles from under the wings she doesn't have.
Or, if maximal utility doesn't include increased happiness, you're doing it wrong, assuming happiness is what you value.
You're confusing abitrary with intrinsic. To qualify as a terminal value a thing must be self-evidently valuable; that is, it must be inherently 'good'. More of it must always be 'better' than less of it. I know this to be false of happiness/pleasure; I know that there is such a thing as "too happy".
I know of no such thing as "too useful".
This is nonsensical. Do we always conform to patterns merely because they're the patterns we always adhered to, unquestioningly? The question is being asked now.
Right now some people prefer happiness. Many of the people who prefer happiness also endorse desiring to be happy and as such they right now prefer not to self modify away from desiring happiness.
then what justifies this article?
No justification is required for preferring one's preferences. That's the default. If you keep asking "Why?" enough you are bound to end up at the bottom level terminal goals from which other instrumental goals may be derived. Agents don't need to justify having terminal goals to you.
Right now some people prefer happiness.
This is handwaving. That is; you use a description to fulfill the role of an explanation.
Many of the people who prefer happiness also endorse desiring to be happy
This is also a description, not an explanation.
No justification is required for preferring one's preferences.
... I cannot help but find this to be a silly assertion. "That's the default"? That's just... not true.
f you keep asking "Why?" enough you are bound to end up at the bottom level terminal goals from which other instrumental goals may be derived.
Absolutely. And those terminal goals are those which are intrinsic in nature.
If you are claiming that happiness is an intrinsic good -- please, explain why. Because I for one just don't see it.
... What exactly is so baffling? People want to be happy for it's own sake
Why?
The only useful answer here seems to be giving a causal explanation for why humans have the preferences that they have. Something to do with the folks who have different preferences not living long enough to get laid a lot. There isn't any reasoning that people need to execute based on more fundamental principles of what to desire. This is just what they happen to do.
The position is alien to me.
It is rather common to you fellow humans.
This is just what they happen to do.
This is nonsensical. Do we always conform to patterns merely because they're the patterns we always adhered to, unquestioningly? The question is being asked now.
If there is no decent answer -- then what justifies this article?
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Definitely just mincing words here, but...
Hedonism and eudaimonia can both be considered types of 'happiness' - thus we talk about "hedonic well-being" and "eudaimonic well-being", and we can construe both as ways of talking about 'happiness'. But it's a misconstrual of eudaimonia to think it reduces to pleasure, and a misuse of 'hedonism' to refer to goals other than pleasure.
This is simply not true. Eudaimonia is essentially epicurian hedonism, as contrasted with cyrenaic.