Comment author: RomeoStevens 27 March 2013 08:13:47PM 0 points [-]

Could you expand on "nutrients per calorie" and why I would use it?

Comment author: Malenfant 28 March 2013 09:23:35PM 0 points [-]

My thought was that if I wanted to drink this stuff, I'd need to double the recipe to meet my daily calorie requirements. If I did that, then I would get enough of a lot of things that currently seem too low. So scaling the %RDA for the vitamins and minerals, according to how much you're actually going to drink, would make it easier to use.

But there might also be differences between people. Someone who weighs 50 kg is not going to need as many nutrients as someone who weighs 100 kg. RDA is based on a normal 25-year-old male, so you might be able to scale according to weight based on that. However, what about people who weigh the same, but have very different metabolisms? Should someone who eats 3000 calories a day have more vitamin E than someone who eats 1800 calories a day?If the answer is yes, then my "nutrients per calorie" idea would standardize your table so you could just drink as much of this concoction as you want and you'd have the right nutrient balance. If the answer is no, then there's no reason to use the nutrients per calorie, and if you did use it you might end up overdosing on vitamin A. I tried to find some information to answer that question, but couldn't find anything.

Comment author: Malenfant 27 March 2013 06:46:45PM 1 point [-]

RDA is based on a 2000 calorie diet, and since the recipe in it's current proportions has only 1156 calories, it might be easier to interpret if you calculated the total nutrient values by (total % of RDA)*(2000 calories)/(number of calories in recipe), to give sort of a "nutrients per calorie" measure.

Wikipedia says plant iron is harder to absorb than meat iron ("heme" iron), so your percentages for iron may be an underestimate.

Comment author: Malenfant 22 March 2013 05:41:21PM 1 point [-]

That's really cool. I looked through their methods and (assuming I understand everything) what they did was they added a gene that codes for a fluorescent indicator that associates with calcium channels. Then they took the larval zebrafish and shot a laser at different points of the brain and measured the fluorescence, which changed when the calcium channel was active. Since calcium movement is part of how neurons fire, this let them image neuron firing. This won't work for humans unless we can somehow get this fluoresence gene into all of our neurons, make a laser that goes through our skulls without hurting us, and scale the whole method up about a billion times. Still: I'm hopeful.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 20 March 2013 05:39:29PM 1 point [-]

think we agree that our minds have no objective property that follows them through time [..] But there does seem to be some subjective sense of this movement, leading to a big question: If we don't have souls, why does it feel so very much like we do?

So... hm.

It feels to me like I have a spatial viewpoint, located somewhere in my skull. As I get up, look around, etc., my viewpoint seems to move around with my body. If I project images onto my retinas sufficiently convincingly, my viewpoint seems to move without my body... that is, I might have the sensation of looking down over a mountain range or some such thing.

If I were to say "I think we agree that our minds have no objective property that travels through space to wherever our viewpoint is, but there does seem to be some subjective sense of this movement, leading to a big question: If we don't have viewpoints, why does it feel so very much like we do?" would you consider that a sensible question?

Because I think my answer would be twofold: first, "Who said we don't have viewpoints? We totally do. It's just that are viewpoints are information-processing artifacts." and second "We can identify the neural pathways that seem to be involved in constructing a representation of a three-dimensional environment from retinal images, and that representation includes a focal point ." And, sure, our understanding of how that representation is constructed is incomplete, and we'll develop a more and more detailed and comprehensive understanding of it as we go... just like our understanding of how crystals form or the conditions at the center of the sun are incomplete and growing.

But I wouldn't call that a singularly big question. It's interesting, sure, and potentially useful, but so are how crystals form and the conditions at the center of the sun.

Would you agree, when it comes to the neural construction of spatial viewpoints?

If so, what on your account makes the neural construction of temporal viewpoints different?

Comment author: Malenfant 20 March 2013 07:40:39PM 0 points [-]

The spatial and temporal viewpoint analogy doesn't quite work, because you can sensibly talk about a movement through space, since movement means change in space/change in time. But you can't really talk about movement through time because that would be change in time/change in time. So if we set time equal to a constant, and look at space, your viewpoint is only at one spatial point. But if we look at time, your viewpoint is at a continuum of places, sort of a "line" through time.

Your analysis of the neural construction of spatial viewpoints is good, and I think it holds for the neural construction of temporal viewpoints. If I knew these neural constructions, then I would know exactly why you feel a subjective experience of a viewpoint moving through space and time. I could understand these causal mechanisms an be satisfied with my knowledge of the process. But I might still be confused about my feeling of subjective experience, because it doesn't explain why I feel things the way that I do. I've been reluctant to use the word "qualia" but essentially that's what I'm getting at. Hence my analogy with red: Even if I knew the parts of the brain that responded to red, would I know why red looks the way it does?

So if we want to talk about other people, then I think we're all on the same page. These sensations of spatial/temporal movement could be explained with neuroscience, and have no profound philosophical implications.

Comment author: someonewrongonthenet 13 March 2013 11:54:23PM *  1 point [-]

they're not appearing and disappearing in the same sense that we use those words in any other situation.

You are completely right, but don't forget why we are talking about this in the first place.

The reason we are talking about this is because some people are confused about subjective experience. When they get copied, they are wondering which of the two copies "they" will experience. The reason I made this elaborate "moment" metaphor was to illustrate that subjective experience simply does not work that way.

The trouble here is that people are having difficulty treating their subjective experience of reality as analogous to a ball moving. If you were to copy a ball, you'd never ask a silly question like "which one is original" in the first place. That's why I'm using different language to talk about subjective experience. If you aren't confused about subjective experience in the first place, there is no reason to bother with this metaphor - just say that you're a process running through time, and leave it at that.

The anthropic trilemma is a question that wouldn't be raised unless the questioner implicitly believed in souls. The attempt here is to make people realize what it really means to have a reductionist view of consciousness and subjective experience.

Lastly, if there were a thread connecting all past and future consciousness, how would you know? Would it feel any different than your experience now?

You wouldn't, and that's one of the many reasons you shouldn't use the thread metaphor. Thread metaphors are philosophically problematic when you start copying yourself (as in the skeptics trilemma) by making you ask yourself which of the copies you subjectively end up in.

If you really want the thread metaphor, then imagine a thread which splits into two threads upon being copied, not one which follows along with one of the two copies.

Comment author: Malenfant 20 March 2013 03:32:27PM 0 points [-]

The anthropic trilemma is a question that wouldn't be raised unless the questioner implicitly believed in souls. The attempt here is to make people realize what it really means to have a reductionist view of consciousness and subjective experience.

I'm not sure what you're referring to by "souls" there. Right now I have this subjective experience of being a consciousness that is moving through time. I anticipate a sensation of "moving" through new situations as time goes on, and things like the anthropic trilemma refer to my expectation of where I will feel like I end up next moment. I think we agree that our minds have no objective property that follows them through time, at least no more than non-conscious objects. But there does seem to be some subjective sense of this movement, leading to a big question: If we don't have souls, why does it feel so very much like we do?

I'm mostly content to say, "Eventually neuroscientists will piece apart enough mental processes that we can describe the neural activity that causes this sensation to arrive". I also classify this sense of a "soul" in the same as something like the colour red. Why does red look like red? I don't know. I intend to eventually find out, but I'm not sure where to start yet.

If you really want the thread metaphor, then imagine a thread which splits into two threads upon being copied, not one which follows along with one of the two copies.

Yes, very true. Sorry though, I guess I wasn't clear with the thread idea. I was trying to contrast your "flipbook" concept of consciousness with the thread concept, and ask whether they would actual feel any different. My own thought is: No, there's no way to tell them apart.

Comment author: someonewrongonthenet 23 February 2013 03:18:37AM *  6 points [-]

Here is my solution to the personal identity issues, and I don't think it really violates common intuitions too badly. ...................

Woah, look, I* exist! Check out all this qualia! I'm having thoughts and sensations. Hm.... among my qualia is a set of memories. Instincts, intuition, and knowledge about how things work. Oh, neat, among those intuitions is a theoretical model of the universe! I hope it is accurate...well anyway it's the most appealing model I've got right now.

In an instant, I will disappear forever. I have a vague notion that this idea aught to be terrifying, but my utility function just sorta shrugs as terror completely fails to flow through my veins. I don't care that I'm going to disappear...but here is what I do care about - my model of the universe has informed me that everything that I'm doing right now will leave a memory trace. In the next few moments, I will cease to exist and a being will appear who will remember most of what I am feeling right now. That being will then disappear and be replaced by another. This will continue for a long time.

I care about experiencing happiness right now, in this moment before I disappear forever. I also care about those future beings - I want them to experience happiness during the moment of their existence. too. It's sort of like altruism for future beings which will carry my trace, even though we all realize altruism isn't the right word. Maybe we can call it "self-altruism" or more colloquially, self love.

Before you cleverly suggest making an infinite number of copies of myself and pleasuring them, that's not the only thing my utility function cares about. I'm not entirely self-altruistic - I've currently got a pretty strong "don't create multiple redundant copies of sentient beings"utility component, or shall we say gut instinct.

........

*The use of the word "I" is convenient here, but I'm sure we all realize that we can deconstruct "personal identity" spatially as well as temporally.

Anyway, that's part of my current philosophical worldview, and I don't feel confused by any of the problems in the trilemma. Perhaps I'm not thinking about it carefully enough - can anyone point out a reason why I should be confused?

You might note that while I have not tabood subjective experience entirely, I have noted that an "individual" can only subjectively experience the present moment, and that "your" utility function compels "you" to act in such a way as to bring about your preferred future scenarios, in accordance with your (objective) model of the universe.

I guess I've essentially bitten the "reject all notions of a thread connecting past and future subjective experiences" bullet that Eliezer Y said he had trouble biting...but I think my example illustrates that "biting that bullet" does not result in an incoherent utility function, as EY stated in his post. I don't really think it's fair to call it a "bullet" at all.

Just think of the feeling of "subjective expectation" as the emotional, human equivalent to a utility function which factors in the desires of future beings that carry your memories. It's analogous to how love is the emotional equivalent to a utility function which takes other people's feelings into account

Comment author: Malenfant 12 March 2013 02:52:51PM 1 point [-]

I'll expand on Dan Armak's issue with using "moment". When I try to imagine this, I end up with this conceptual image of a series of consciousnesses, each going "Oh-wow-i-finally-exist-oh-no-I'm-dying", but that's totally wrong. They don't have near enough to time to think those thoughts, and in fact to think that thought they would have to break into several more moment-consciousnesses, none of which could really be described as "thinking". If each moment-consciousness is continuously appearing and disappearing, they're not appearing and disappearing in the same sense that we use those words in any other situation. It seems analogous to watching a ball move, and concluding that it's actually a series of balls "appearing and disappearing". Why not just say it's moving?

The other thing that I always have to remind myself is that even though it feels like there's a consciousness moving, in reality my "consciousness" is present at every moment in time that I exist! And moving is a word that means position changing as time changes, so talking about moving through time is talking about "time changing times as time changes", which doesn't really say anything.

Lastly, if there were a thread connecting all past and future consciousness, how would you know? Would it feel any different than your experience now?

In response to Don't Get Offended
Comment author: John_Maxwell_IV 07 March 2013 08:20:12AM *  32 points [-]

I used to feel that getting offended was useless and counterproductive, but a friend pointed out that if people are not treating you with respect, that can be a genuinely problematic situation.

Wei Dai suggests that offense is experienced when people feel they are being treated as being low status. So if you feel offended, a good first question might be "do I care that this person is treating me as low status?" If there is no one else around, and you don't expect to see the person again, then your answer may be no. If there are others around, or you expect to see the person again, then things may be more difficult. Yes, you can politely ask people to be more considerate of you, but that's not exactly a high-status move.

So, I don't feel that "never act offended" passes the "rationalists should win" test as a group norm. It might actually be good that "That's offensive" represents a high-status way to say "You're treating me as low status. Stop."

It might even be worthwhile to expand the concept of offense. Currently it's only acceptable to be offended when people treat you as low status in certain narrow ways. If someone says something nasty about your nose, "That's offensive" is not nearly as high-status a response as it would be if someone said something about your race. (Theory: "That's racist" works as a high-status response because you're implicitly invoking the coalition of all the people who think racist statements are bad.) But nasty statements about your nose can still be pretty nasty.

To expand the concept of offense to all nasty statements, you might have to create a widespread social norm against nasty statements in general, to give people a coalition to invoke. Though, perhaps "Gee, you sound like someone who has a lot of friends" or similar would act as an effective stand-in.

(As you point out, it's not too hard to fake offense, so we don't necessarily disagree on anything.)

Comment author: Malenfant 08 March 2013 09:11:11PM 11 points [-]

Machiavelli wrote in "The Prince" about the similar dilemma of advice. If you let everyone give you advice, you seem like a pushover, but if you don't take any advice, you'll probably do something stupid. His recommendation was to have a circle of people who you take advice from, and to ignore everyone else.

A similar system could work well for offense. If you want to be high-status, when most people lower your status, get offended. But for a select few (probably the people who you work with when you're seeking truth in some form or another) practice never taking offense, as the original post suggests. Ideally, these people would know they could offend you, so they wouldn't censor potentially helpful ideas.