= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
the methods rely on a number of assumptions that you can't test (like independance).
You can test independence. There is a ton of frequentist literature on hypothesis testing, and Bayesian methods too, of course. Did you mean something else?
I wasn't very clear, and probably misleading. Although I'm not an expert, I have "read" Pearl's book a few years ago (Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, it's available as a pdf) and it really seemed to me that some independence was hard to test, and sometimes was an assumption given the system. It's also true that I haven't read it deeper now that I have a bit more knowledge, and I lack time to do so.
If you have more hindsight about that, I would love to read it.
In response to
How my social skills went from horrible to mediocre
So ... Should I understand that you're now talking about subjects you have no interest in ?
Or your final point is that you're working on talking about subjects you do have an interest in with more "sociality" (and I don't get why people would take it differently if the subjects are, as I perceive, not common) ?
The most funny thing about Popper is that I don't get the impression that he or most of the people reading him seek to falsify his theories. Often because someone, as it's philosophy the rules of falsification don't matter. Popper didn't try to study scientists and how scientists come up with new scientific findings to try to falsify his hypothesis.
From a more LW perspective Lukeprog writes:
For centuries, philosophers wondered how we could learn what causes what. Some argued it was impossible, or possible only via experiment. [...] Then, in the 1990s, a breakthrough: Judea Pearl and others showed that, in principle, we can sometimes infer causal relations from data even without experiment, via the mathematical machinery of probabilistic graphical models.
Popper isn't really a recent thinker. He wrote 50 years ago. Jaynes wrote his book in the 1990s. Kahnemans works wasn't known before that time.
We have modern tools to deal with uncertainty like credence calibration. We have found that in cases with low costs of false positives trusting intuition is highly useful and that most experts make a lot of their decisions based on intuition rather than analytical reasoning.
I agree with gurugeorge response and see Popper the same way.
That said, I do think that although Pearl's work is great, the key word is "in principle" - the methods rely on a number of assumptions that you can't test (like independance) and he also says that the experiment is the only guaranteed way to establish causation (in his talk the art and science of cause and effect). I also may be wrong, as this talk was given in 1996, he might have changed his mind.
Moreover, your "trust your intuitions sometimes" is misleading: it is still not simply trusting your intuitions, it is trusting them only in the cases where there is data suggesting that intuition gives better results in similar cases. It has data behind it - the intuition is not taken for granted.
As Popper wrote, sensory data comes through organs that aren't 'perfect' sensers. Our brain is also not a 'perfect' thinker. We know all that thanks to our knowledge of evolution - and that's the starting point of Popper. Popper didn't have Kahnemans' or Pearl works, but he still encouraged critical thinking of hypotheses while not treating intuitions as given (only as hypotheses, and only if they were falsifiable), and falsification is still the basis of science at this moment.
The final idea would be like yours, more Bayesian thinking.
What do you mean with that? Especially while you try to treat Popper as an important thinker?
Updating priors with evidence. Standing by your beliefs seems to be praised - at least where I live.
I consider Popper as an important thinker, falsification is quite important right now for example. Why do you seem to think he's unimportant ?
In response to
Which ideas from LW would you most like to see spread?
More knowledge about bias, which would particularly undermine the unfortunately common and well regarded stance "I only believe what I see". People rely too much on their direct feelings/intuitions without assessing them.
The idea that in order to have an accurate representation of reality, one must have background knowledge in science. Add in a little philosophy (recent philosophy, like Popper).
Also praising the ones who admit their mistakes - that happens too little.
The final idea would be like yours, more Bayesian thinking.
I'm probably too optimistic.
In response to
Thoughts on minimizing designer baby drama
I don't know if that has been pointed out, but it has been done only recently and with moderately bad results ...
It could become a thing if every human on the planet wouldn't go crazy at every mention of "gene editing" (or simply "gene" for that matter, as 80% of americans support the labeling of DNA containing foods ...).
This kind of development would be ... strange. The generations of semi-enhanced humans would indeed feel rather strange.
But I have to point out one thing: genes don't work like that. You don't have one (or few) gene for height, genes for psychopathy, genes for intelligence, compassion, benevolence, reflectiveness ... Each of those groups has more than one single effect. Modifying such genes (or corresponding regulatory regions) have way more than one single effect and the result would be much harder to guess than what our imagination enables us to when we hear "gene-editing".
In response to
Punctuality - Arriving on Time and Math
Bell curves may be the general case, but for the non-car-owning public-transport-using among us the situation is quite different. If a train runs every 20 minutes then being 1 minute late for the train means being 20 minutes late at the destination. Being 1 minute early has no effect on the time arriving at the destination.
It makes the prep-time discontinuous I guess.
Course, in London everyone expects everyone to often be 20 minutes late coz of the damned trains, so maybe it matter less then, heh.
For this problem, you could make the distribution of the time it takes to get to the train station - you could easily compute the average time it takes for going there, and seeing that by planning to take exactly this amount of time to get there will make you 20 minutes late 50% of the time.
The prep time will only make the "late amount of time" discontinuous, it won't change the probability of being late.
One problem I see is trying to see the signals that would raise the crush probability ... While you would also need to see the signals that would make that probability drop.
The sensible route seems in my opinion to be what signals would they give me if they didn't have a crush on me ?, as you seem to be going the confirmation bias route otherwise.
I'm also one of those for whom the whole "You're overthinking this, don't think, stay natural" simply does not work. I appreciate the idea of such a survey to get a prior though, it seems like a great idea.
In response to
Newcomb's Problem and Regret of Rationality
The way I see it, causal decision theory simply ignores a part of the problem: that the Predictor is able to "predict".
Evidence should get inside the equation, but not the same way as evidential decision theory: the evidence is what should fuel the hypothesis "The Predictor predicts our choices".
It does not matter if we "think" that our "choice" shouldn't change what's inside the boxes - as the main thing about a prediction is that we aren't actually making any "choice", that "choice" is already predicted. It's the whole "free will" illusion all over again, that we think our choices are ours, when the presence of such a Predictor would simply invalidate that hypothesis.
Causal decision theory should still work, but not with a reasoning that forgets about the Predictor. Since the Predictor is gone, our choice shouldn't (and won't) affect what's in the boxes - but as our choice was predicted, accurately, and as we have supposedly enough evidence to infer this prediction, we should one box - and this won't be a "choice", it will simply have been predicted, and we'll get the money.
I'm probably not being clear, and will try to say it another way. "Choosing" to one box will simply mean that the Predictor had predicted that choice. "Choosing" to two box will also mean the same. It's not a "choice" at all - our behavior will simply be deterministic. Therefore we should one box, even though that is not a real "choice".
The features of the Predictor should appear in causal decision theory.
= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d){kind=logo}
No, socializing has become fascinating to me because I realized the degree to which social skills have been the limiting factor for me, how much room for improvement I have.
Does your increase in social skills made you better at discussing (without boring others) subjects you have an interest in then ?