Marginal thinking

But which view (if any) makes good predictions in the relationship department?

EDIT: A quick survey of abstracts on google scholar suggests that marital satisfaction is not related to the MB personality types of the couples.

I think there are better models to use when considering relationships.

like? (I'm intrigued)

The links you provide are... interesting. I must admit I have rather strong doubts about just how accurate those physical descriptions of various personality types are!

Me too. There does seem to be some correlation between physical appearance and personality, but those details are rather burdensome.

What does Less Wrong know about the Myers-Briggs personality type indicator? My sense is that it's a useful model for some things, but I'm most interested in how useful it is for relationships. This site suggests that each personality type pair has a specific type of relationship, while this site only comments on what the ideal pair is for any given type. But the two sites disagree about what the ideal pairings are.

late to the party? :)

I understand that when folks say "modal logic" in this context, they're generally referring to model logics that implicitly quantify over poorly-defined spaces. However, that's not what all modal logics are like...

Consider my eyes opened.

Equivalently: you can use whatever logical operators you like, if you can define the operator's meaning without reference to the operator.

This is my problem with the modal logics I have encountered - bad or unclear definitions of the modal operators.

the entire enterprise of modal logic seems facepalm worthy to me

Just to elaborate (for clarity's sake), by standing up and looking directly at the fox, the rabbit is changing the fox's expected utility calculation. If the rabbit doesn't see the fox, the fox will have the advantage of surprise and be able to close some of the distance between itself and the rabbit before the rabbit begins to run. This makes the chase less costly to the fox. If the rabbit does see the fox, when the fox begins the attack the rabbit will see it and be able to react immediately, neutralizing any surprise advantage the fox has. So if the fox knows that the rabbit knows that the fox is nearby, the fox may well not attack because of the amount of extra energy it would take to capture the rabbit.

The rabbit standing up and staring at the fox is an effective signal of awareness of the fox because it is difficult to fake (costliness is only one way that a signal can be difficult to fake). The rabbit can stand up and stare in a random direction if it wants to, but the probability of a rabbit doing that and being able to randomly stare directly at the fox is pretty slim. So if the fox sees the rabbit staring at it, then the fox can be pretty certain that the rabbit knows where the fox is at.

I wouldn't say the evasiveness was purposeful. Robert misunderstood something Eliezer said fairly early, taking it as an attack when Eliezer was trying to make a point about normative implications. This probably switched Robert out of curiosity-mode and into adversarial-mode. Things were going fine after Eliezer saw what was happening and dropped the subject. But later, when Robert didn't understand Eliezer's argument, adversarial-mode was active and interpreted it as Eliezer continuing (in Robert's mind) to be a hostile debate partner. I doubt Robert thought he was in trouble; more likely he thought Eliezer was in trouble and was being disingenuous.

Here's the post