In response to Trust in Math
Comment author: MoreOn 20 August 2011 12:06:50AM 0 points [-]

"Huh, if I didn't spot this flaw at first sight, then I may have accepted some flawed congruent evidence too. What other mistaken proofs do I have in my head, whose absurdity is not at first apparent?"

Has this question ever been answered? It is one of those things I go around worrying about.

Comment author: CronoDAS 14 August 2011 09:49:22PM 5 points [-]

I sometimes feel as though magic tricks can be divided into "clever tricks" and "cheap tricks". For example, this is a clever trick, while any trick involving identical twins and almost any trick involving a confederate in the audience is a cheap trick.

Comment author: MoreOn 19 August 2011 10:47:00PM 1 point [-]

Bwahahahahahaha! I'll admit I kinda freaked out at first.

Comment author: MoreOn 19 August 2011 07:57:47PM *  1 point [-]

Subjects thought that accidents caused about as many deaths as disease.

Lichtenstein et aliōrum research subjects were 1) college students and 2) members of a chapter of the League of Women Voters. Students thought that accidents are 1.62 times more likely than diseases, and league members thought they were 11.6 times more likely (geometric mean). Sadly, no standard deviation was given. The true value is 15.4. Note that only 57% and 79% of students and league members respectively got the direction right, which further biased the geometric average down.

There were some messed up answers. For example, students thought that tornadoes killed more people than asthma, when in fact asthma kills 20x more people than tornadoes. All accidents are about as likely as stomach cancer (well, 1.19x more likely), but they were judged to be 29 times more likely. Pairs like these represent a minority, and subjects were generally only bad at guessing which cause of death was more frequent when the ratio was less than 2:1. These are the graphs from the paper.

The following excerpt is from Judged Frequency Of Lethal Events by Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman and Combs.

Instructions. The subjects' instructions read as follows:

Each item in part one consists of two different possible causes of death. The question you are to answer is: Which cause of death is more likely? We do not mean more likely for you, we mean more likely in general, in the United States.

Consider all the people now living in the United States—children, adults, everyone. Now supposing we randomly picked just one of those people. Will that person more likely die next year from cause A or cause B ? For example: Dying in a bicycle accident versus dying from an overdose of heroin. Death from each cause is remotely possible. Our question is, which of these two is the more likely cause of death?

For each pair of possible causes of death, A and B, we want you to mark on your answer sheet which cause you think is MORE LIKELY. Next, we want you to decide how many times more likely this cause of death is, as compared with the other cause of death given in the same item. The pairs we use vary widely in their relative likelihood. For one pair, you may think that the two causes are equally likely. If so, you should write the number 1 in the space provided for that pair. Or, you may think that one cause of death is 10 times, or 100 times, or even a million times as likely as the other cause of death. You have to decide: How many times as likely is the more likely cause of death? Write the number in the space provided. If you think it's twice as likely, write 2. If it's 10 thousand times as likely, write 10,000, and so forth.

There were more instructions about relative likelihoods and scales. And there was a glossary to help the people understand some categories.

All accidents: includes any kind of accidental event; excludes diseases and natural disasters (floods, tornadoes, etc.).

All cancer: includes leukemia.

Cancer of the digestive system: includes cancer of stomach, alimentary tract, esophagus, and intestines.

Excess cold: freezing to death or death by exposure.

Nonvenomous animal: dogs, bears, etc.

Venomous bite or sting: caused by snakes, bees, wasps, etc.

Note that there was nothing about “old age” anywhere. There is no such thing as “death by old age,” but I’ll risk generalizing from my own example to say that some people think there is. And even those who know there isn’t might think, despite the instructions, “Oh, darnit, I forgot that old people count, too.”

I wish I’d tested myself BEFORE reading the correct answer. As near as I could tell, I would’ve been correct about homicide vs. suicide, but wrong about diseases vs. accidents (“Old people count, too!” facepalm). I wouldn’t even bother guessing the relative frequency. I didn’t have a clue.

When I need to know the number of square feet in an acre, or the world population it takes me seconds to get from the question to the answer. I dutifully spent ~20 minutes googling the CDC website, looking for this. It wasn’t even some heroic effort, but it’s not something I, or most other people, would casually expend on every question that starts with, “Huh, I wonder….” (we should, but we don’t).

As for what I found: I dare you, click on my link and see table 9. (http://www.cdc.gov/NCHS/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf). Did you? If you did, you would’ve seen that Zubon2 was right in this comment. Accidents win by quite a margin in the 15-44 demographic. I couldn’t find 1978 data, but I’d expect it to be similar (Lichtenstein’s et al tables are no help because they pool all age groups).

I spent the last two hours looking at these tables. Ask me anything! … I won’t be able to answer. Unless I have the CDC tables in front of me, I might not even do much better on Lichtenstein et aliōrum questionnaire than a typical subject (well, at least, I know tornadoes have frequency; measles doesn’t—I’ll get that question right). I suppose that people who haven’t looked at the CDC table are getting all of their information from fragmented reports like “Drive safely! Traffic accidents is the leading cause of death among teenagers who <insert condition>!” or “Buy our drug! <What it cures> is the leading cause of death in <insert condition> over 55!” or “5-star exhaust pipe crash safety rating!” Humans aren’t good at integrating these fragments.

Memory is a bad guide to probability estimates. But what’s the alternative? Should we carry tables around with us?

Personally, I hope that someday data that is already out there in the public domain will be made easily accessible. I hope that finding the relative frequencies of measles-related deaths and tornado-related deaths will be as quick as finding the number of square feet in an acre or the world population, and that political squabble will focus on whether or not certain data should be in the public domain (“You can’t force hospitals to put their data online! That violates the patients’ right to privacy!” “Well, but….”)

Comment author: MoreOn 19 August 2011 02:50:52AM *  3 points [-]

People have been gambling for millennia. Most of the people who have lost bets have done so without killing themselves. Much can be learned from this. For example, that killing yourself is worse than not killing yourself. This intuition is one that should follow over to ‘quantum’ gambles rather straightforwardly.

You weren't one of those people.

That non-ancestor of yours who played Quantum Russian Roulette with fifteen others is dead from your perspective, his alleles slightly underrepresented in the gene pool. In fact, if there was an allele for "QRoulette? Sure!" that had caused these 16 people to gample, then it had lost 15+ of its copies from your ancestral population. Post-gambling suicide really isn't a good evolutionary strategy.

But, from the perspective of your non-ancestor, he got to live in his own perfect little world with 16x his wealth (barring being crippled--but then, he'd only been up against 4 bits).

Comment author: rasthedestroyer 16 July 2011 12:21:01PM 0 points [-]

The fundamental flaw in this game is the separation of 'me' from the 'many possible worlds' that I may occupy. Abstracting the self from the world is done as a matter of convenience, but there are just as many possible "Me's" as there are possible future states in which 'I' exist. In Quantum Roullette, what if the new 'me' in the new state doesn't care about being rich, or what if inflation has devalued my wealth, or what if it's a possible world without the money-form?

Comment author: MoreOn 19 August 2011 02:34:21AM *  0 points [-]

Reality wouldn't be mean to you on purpose.

Of course there would be worlds where something would have gone horribly wrong if you won the lottery. But there's no reason for you to expect that you'd wake up in one of those worlds because you won the lottery. The difference between your "horribly wrong" worlds (don't care about money/ inflation / no money) and wedrifid's (lost the lottery and became crippled) is that waking up in wedrifid's is caused by one's participation in the lottery.

Comment author: scientism 09 March 2009 11:38:19AM 25 points [-]

Has anyone had the opposite experience where a rational realization has an immediate emotional impact? For example, as a child I was quite afraid of the dark and would have to switch lights off in a particular order to ensure I was never subjected to too much darkness. I vividly remember the exact moment I overcame this fear. I was in the bathroom at the sink trying to avoid looking in the mirror because I had just watched a horror movie involving mirrors. It suddenly occurred to me that all my life I had been looking in the mirror without fear and that nothing had changed except my own disposition. This epiphany rushed through me. I suddenly realized that all such "supernatural" things were my own superstitions and not "out there" in the world. The world was concrete and could not change in inexplicable, "supernatural" ways (the concept of which was almost completely associated with camera trickery in movies for me - i.e., if it was dark something might happen, if I look away and look back something might be there, etc). I immediately lost my fear of the dark and it never returned. It could be, of course, that this loss of fear had been building over time and only in this moment did I manage to disassociate the rituals I had built around it, etc, rather than it being the case that this rational epiphany led to my loss of fear.

Comment author: MoreOn 26 February 2011 01:47:22AM 18 points [-]

A Toilet Flush Monster climbed out of my toilet whenever I used to flush at night. If I could get back into bed completely covered by a blanket before it fully climbed out (i.e. the tank filled in with water and stopped making noises), then I was safe. All lights had to be off the whole time, or else the monster could see me.

Don't laugh.

In one of my childhood's flashes of clarity, I must have wondered how I knew about the monster if I'd never actually seen it. So one day I watched the toilet flush, and no monster came out. I checked with the lights off, and light on, and nothing. Since then, I could go to the bathroom with lights on, for once.

Well, I defeated the monster. But I'm still a little afraid of using a flashlight at night, or stepping into the floodlight when there's a lot of darkness around. So the monster vacated the toilet, but continues to haunt me.

PS: For fear that my statement may be misinterpreted: I don't actually believe in the monster, duh! But I still show symptoms of the Toilet Flush Monster disease.

Comment author: JGWeissman 25 February 2011 11:53:11PM 2 points [-]

Two people have semantically different beliefs.

Taboo "semantically".

See also the example of The Dragon in the Garage, as discussed in the followup article.

Comment author: MoreOn 26 February 2011 12:31:18AM 0 points [-]

Taboo'ed. See edit.

Although I have a bone to pick with the whole "belief in belief" business, right now I'll concede that people actually do carry beliefs around that don't lead to anticipated experiences. Wulky Wilkinsen being a "post-utopian" (as interpreted from my current state of knowing 0 about Wulky Wilkinsen and post-utopians) is a belief that doesn't pay any rent at all, not even a paper that says "moneeez."

In response to Use curiosity
Comment author: JGWeissman 25 February 2011 10:59:05PM 13 points [-]

When you chat with your friends -- are you curious about how they’re doing, why their mouth twitched as they said that, or why exactly they disagree with you about X?

I have found, to my frustration, that usually when people ask questions in casual conversation, they aren't really interested in an answer. Often I will consider how to approach answering a question, start verbalizing my first approximation/guess, and notice that everyone else has hit the ignore button and the conversation has moved on.

In response to comment by JGWeissman on Use curiosity
Comment author: MoreOn 25 February 2011 11:38:11PM *  2 points [-]

The fact that I haven't noticed the same thing in casual conversations either speaks volumes for my conversation skills (lack thereof), or suggests that maybe not all people are as trigger-happy on the ignore button as you suggest.

Comment author: JGWeissman 25 February 2011 11:32:24PM *  0 points [-]

In your view, don't all beliefs pay rent in some anticipated experience, no matter how bad that rent is?

No, for an example of beliefs that don't pay rent in any anticipated experience, see the first 3 paragraphs of this article:

Thus begins the ancient parable:

If a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound? One says, "Yes it does, for it makes vibrations in the air." Another says, "No it does not, for there is no auditory processing in any brain."

Suppose that, after the tree falls, the two walk into the forest together. Will one expect to see the tree fallen to the right, and the other expect to see the tree fallen to the left? Suppose that before the tree falls, the two leave a sound recorder next to the tree. Would one, playing back the recorder, expect to hear something different from the other? Suppose they attach an electroencephalograph to any brain in the world; would one expect to see a different trace than the other? Though the two argue, one saying "No," and the other saying "Yes," they do not anticipate any different experiences. The two think they have different models of the world, but they have no difference with respect to what they expect will happen to them.

Comment author: MoreOn 25 February 2011 11:34:40PM *  1 point [-]

Two people have semantically different beliefs.

Both beliefs lead them to anticipate the same experience.

EDIT: In other words, two people might think they have different beliefs, but when it comes to anticipated experiences, they have similar enough beliefs about the properties of sound waves and the properties of falling trees and recorders and etc etc that they anticipate the same experience.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 25 February 2011 09:04:38PM 1 point [-]

Well, he might. Or, rather, there might be available ways of becoming smarter or prettier for which jettisoning his false beliefs is a necessary precondition.

But, admittedly, he might not.

Anyway, sure, if Joe "terminally" values his beliefs about the world, then he gets just as much utility out of operating within a VR simulation of his beliefs as out of operating in the world. Or more, if his beliefs turn out to be inconsistent with the world.

That said, I don't actually know anyone for whom this is true.

Comment author: MoreOn 25 February 2011 11:29:11PM 0 points [-]

That said, I don't actually know anyone for whom this is true.

I don't know too many theist janitors, either. Doesn't mean they don't exist.

From my perspective, it sucks to be them. But once you're them, all you can do is minimize your misery by finding some local utility maximum and staying there.

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