In response to LessWrong 2.0
Comment author: V_V 04 December 2015 10:58:04AM 10 points [-]

My two cents:

  • Merge Main and Discussion

  • Make new content more visible. Right now the landing page, and in particular the first screen, mostly consists of boilerplate. You have to scroll or click in order to view if new content has been posted. In the current attention scarce era of Facebook and Twitter streams, this is not ideal.

  • Discourage/ban Open threads. They are an unusual thing to have on a an open forum. They might have made sense when posting volume was higher, but right now they further obfuscate valuable content.

In response to comment by V_V on LessWrong 2.0
Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 04 December 2015 06:01:01PM 5 points [-]

These are the exact three points that I wanted to voice. The fewer steps there are between entering lesswrong and seeing articles, the fewer steps there are between entering lesswrong and participating in discussions. That our landing page is a navigation list and not a a set of recent articles, the way any other group blog website would have, has irked me since the previous skull graphic was introduced.

In response to Crazy Ideas Thread
Comment author: polymathwannabe 08 July 2015 03:08:12PM 3 points [-]

A single world language should be designed and promoted. Previous attempts have been too Eurocentric to take advantage of all useful grammatical features that are available.

Alternative option: English is already a de facto world language, and it is well suited to borrowing foreign terms when it needs to, but humanity should be ashamed that it conducts its main scientific, commercial and diplomatic operations in a language with such a defective writing system. Spelling reform (or a completely new, purely phonetic alphabet) is urgent. I would advocate adapting Hangul for that purpose.

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 08 July 2015 07:31:49PM 6 points [-]

The International Phonetic Alphabet was originally meant to be used as a natural language writing system (for example, the journal of the International Phonetic Association was originally written in IPA: http://phonetic-blog.blogspot.com/2012/06/100-years-ago.html). Between IPA's theoretical (physiological) grounding, its wide use by linguists, and its near-legibility by untrained English literati, IPA is over-determined as the obvious choice for a reformed orthography, if English were every made to conform phonetically to a standard pronunciation. That said, it's not going to happen, because spelling reform is not urgent to anyone with capital to try it. Like, someone could make a browser extension that would replace words their IPA spellings, so that an online community could familiarize themselves with the new spelling, but no one has made that, or paid for it to be made, and this places a strong upper bound on how much anyone cares about spelling reform.

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 16 March 2015 09:17:23PM *  0 points [-]

I have a few recurrent self-actualization fantasies that make use of fanciful abilities and resources. Sometimes the ability is time travel, which made this tweet by Liron Shapira stand out to me:

A time machine is a mechanism that lets you pretend like something far from you is actually near you, with respect to causal distance.

Likewise with your telekinesis and "vanishing into the floor", I propose that daydreams (as recurrent, unproductive consideration of situations involving plans that are, in reality, non-actionable for their use of fanciful skills and resources) commonly serve as agency-superstimuli: imagined successes, relying on expanded abilities (such as those which reduce effort, cost, or uncertainty of achieving some material effect), produce an inference with in-pretense-validity of one's own exceptional personal character.

Maybe it's worth distinguishing "wishing for an outcome", and "imagining the experience of the desired outcome (eating breakfast)", and "imagining a fantastical plan for achieving the outcome" as having different effects on one's motivation / decisions.

For your copy writing example, you list a few interesting techniques which show up later in only abbreviated form in the section of responses to Type 3 problems. Rephrasing and expanding a little bit, if you're worried about poor task performance you might motivate yourself by: 1) highlighting to yourself that you are uncertain about your performance quality, rather than certain that it will be bad, and that you're thus neglecting the possibility that you will do well at the task, 2) highlighting your comparative advantage in solving the problem for reasons other than skill (such as being in a unique position / time / place to solve the problem, or having special access to relevant resources, or having a title with related useful liberties / authorities), or 3) highlighting your (role-consonant) duty to try / to perform, while trivializing your duty to evaluate your performance (perhaps diffusing that responsibility by deciding that it belongs to some non-specified others).

I might add that questioning whether your own performance will be adequate / sufficient, probably has at least these three functions: 1) to make you change/improve your plans, or give up on your plans if they seem inadequate, 2) to motivate you to ask other people for information about your current/future performance, and 3) to excuse future failure ("I knew I couldn't do this. I kept saying I didn't know how. Everyone heard me. I shouldn't have been forced to do this. This isn't my fault. This outcome shouldn't/doesn't justify an inference decreasing anyone's estimation of my skill / social standing."). (Please not that I'm using "you" rhetorically. I don't know the specifics of your work with CFAR, haven't perceived any failure, and am not trying to accuse you of any, I don't know what you call that, "epistemic misfeasance" maybe.)

These suggest a few ways to suppress (the decision relevance / import of) such worries: 1) making more resolute in your mind that a) nothing more can/should be done to improve your plans / your expected future performance, that b) "backing out" would be more costly than continuing, 2) asking aloud for others to help evaluate / improve your performance, or 3) verifying (to your satisfaction in advance of the performance) a communal perception of the validity of your excuse by (confirming that others will not / persuading others that they should not) make such a judgment to bad character, due to whatever circumstances are in effect.

I think one of the most interesting parts of this post is your conceptualization of System I and System II as not just being parts of your decision making apparatus, but as being separate person with their own preference, beliefs, and signature behavioral characteristics. Is there other literature which suggests that dual process of decision making are paired with dual processes of motivation (appetitive/aversive drives (and also maybe some preference-like psychological state behind habitual / scripted action) vs. reflective / higher order, verbally endorsed, ego-syntonic preferences)?

Comment author: Velorien 08 March 2015 09:33:02PM 11 points [-]

I fail to see how your proposal constitutes justice. Neville gets bullied by Slytherins. Lesath gets bullied by Gryffindors. These two facts do not cancel each other out; they just make the world a worse place twice over.

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 10 March 2015 01:53:25AM 0 points [-]

To say that justice matters intrinsically is to say that sometimes, for justice's sake, we should do things that would make people worse off than if justice were not an issue. Or more accurately, there will at least sometimes be policies trading some welfare (or for any other component of utility) for some justice, that are equally as good as policies which do not (according to the enlarged set of concerns containing justice).

Comment author: Jack 20 March 2011 08:07:45PM 22 points [-]

In order to flourish, humans need to be both subjectified and objectified-- that is, they they need to feel like they are in control of their life and that their wellbeing is taken as an end in itself by others (subjectified) but they also need to feel useful and wanted by others (objectified).

Of course they ideal balance between these two paradigms probably varies greatly between individuals and between groups. But I think it is plausible that our culture, in general, over-objectifies women and under-objectifies men. I don't think this is actually that controversial, most narrative protagonists are men, most people who make money from their physical attractiveness are women. Bosses tend to be men, secretaries tend to be women. Traditionally men headed families, went to work and made the important decisions. Traditionally a woman's role was to support her husband, cook for him, raise his children and look nice.

Now, if we assume that, whatever the ideal ratio of objectification to subjectification is for women, our culture over objectifies it becomes clear why feminists would oppose female objectification (one would also suspect that outspoken feminists would be among the most over-objectified relative to their ideal). The person doing the objectifying is contributing to patterns and trends that, on balance, make life worse for women. Conversely, men might be under-objectified and that is why they don't understand why women object to certain instances of objectification. For example, most men probably want to be stared and desired just for their bodies more often than they are right now.

I don't mean to suggest that the situation is symmetrical for men and women, exactly. It seems likely being over objectified is worse than being under objectified (a free person who isn't needed or wanted by anyone is probably still better off than most slaves). Men and women may also, on average, prefer different levels of objectification.

In general, if we want a culture that provides something close to the ideal amount of objectification and subjectification for everyone we probably want a system that doesn't objectify whole groups-- better for people to get the objectification they need on an individual basis which should be better calibrated.

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 24 February 2015 07:26:09AM *  0 points [-]

This comment is good, but it could be improved by using symmetric terms to describe the two conditions.

Objectified: Others will..
1) give you few freedoms or choices,
2) dominate you, make decisions for you, control you,
3) have uses for you,
4) initiate romance with little confirmation of your participatory consent
5) want/expect you to care about their well being
6) not care about your well being
7) support you with resources / financially
8) value you for your attractiveness, help, concern, (and child raising and housekeeping)
a) rather than for your financial support or decision making / control
9) want you to value them for their financial support and decision making / control
a) rather than for their attractiveness, help, concern

Subjectified: Others will...
1) give you many freedoms and choices,
2) submit to you, rely on you to make decisions for them, want you to control them
3) want you to use them for things,
4) want you to initiate romance with little confirmation of their participatory consent
5) care about your well being
6) want/expect you to not care abut their well being
7) depend on you for resources / financially
8) value you for your financial support and decision making / control
a) rather than for your attractiveness, help, concern
9) want you to value them for their attractivenss, help, concern, (and child raising and housekeeping)
a) rather than for their financial support or decision making / control

Is that a fair, symmetric restatement of your points?

Comment author: ChristianKl 15 February 2015 09:12:13PM 1 point [-]

Is there decent evidence behind the concept of Jungian archetypes?

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 23 February 2015 10:26:52PM *  0 points [-]

Jung didn't really play the science game, and Jungians continue not to play the science game, but if we squint a little, we can see that some of his ideas have been vindicated by science.

The term ‘archetype’ is often misunderstood as meaning certain definite mythological images or motifs. ... The archetype is a tendency to form such representations of a motif. ... My critics have incorrectly assumed that I am dealing with "inherited representations"

From Jung's Approaches to the unconscious (1964), quoted in Jones, Mixed Metaphors and Narrative Shifts (2003).

In this narrow sense, Jung's archetypes are uncontroversial: Much reasoning in humans is framed in cognitive science as proceeding by a mechanism of counter-factual simulation called manipulation of mental imagery. Kosslyn, for example, was a pioneer of studies of (visual modality) mental imagery manipulation. The knowledge used in this reasoning, stored in neural degrees of freedom, such as firing biases or synaptic connectivity, may be called abstract, semantic, or conceptual when it is generalized from across many episodic contexts and when its access does not strongly evoke vivid, specific memories of the experiences from which it was generalized (i.e. so much as you can reason about dogs without thinking of the last dog you saw, your dog knowledge may be called semantic rather than episodic). Features of concepts which are typical or discriminative of instances of those concepts are sometimes called prototypical, stereotypical, or (occasionally) archetypal. For science here, the study of cognitive biases relating to typical and discriminative features of conceptual reasoning were pioneered by Rosch. In addition to cached knowledge which is source-situated (exemplar knowledge from episodic memories of individual entities), there may be cached abstract knowledge, such as a mental image of a bird which takes its character from typical or discriminative features of the concept (perhaps specified randomly or unspecified in regard to features which have wide variance across birds), rather than as a cut-and-past mixture of bird-instance parts.

This is all pretty strongly based on visual-modality knowledge of physical objects, and it doesn't always generalize exceptionally well to other modalities. Like Ullman does nice research on how the declarative / procedural division of memory types maps well onto a lexical / grammatical division of language capacities; a lexicon, Ullman says, is cached linguistic knowledge, and certainly I can recall cached lexical entities, like idioms, which are not episodically situated ("sick as a dog" without thinking of anyone saying that phrase"), yet my introspection suggests that when I think about idioms generally, I'm not usually looking to "sick as a dog" to guide my reasoning. And it's much harder to find a reasonable interpretation wherein "sick as a dog" is a conjunction of discriminative features of idioms, than it is to understand how a mental image of a bird could have typical features of birds and yet not be identifiable as belonging to a recognized genus.

Other parts of the Jungian archetype construct than "capacity to reason with non-situated mental images having discriminative features" probably haven't been borne out so well by scientific inquiry.

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 01 February 2015 06:26:42AM 6 points [-]

Sometimes I feel uncomfortable talking to strangers, and will put off scheduling appointments. Today, after a few days of trying to beat myself into getting a haircut at a barber's shop or salon, I decided to cut my own hair instead. I'm very pleased with the results, and I will probably make a habit of cutting my own hair from now on. I know this solution doesn't generalize to other appointments, such as medical examinations, but I'm very glad to have put that one source of distress to rest.

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 09 January 2015 04:13:35AM 3 points [-]

Relevant in winter, when air is dry and noses are frequently blown: Placing petroleum jelly in one's nostrils for moisture, despite being icky, is a superior experience to a nosebleed.

Comment author: katydee 26 April 2014 05:18:39PM 4 points [-]

Could you give example where it helped you make decisions against learning a skill?

For a while I was interested in learning martial arts for self-defense. Then I realized that a version of me that had advanced martial arts knowledge would be more inclined to fight people, while a version of me that did not have advanced martial arts knowledge would be more inclined to avoid conflict.

Given that fighting someone-- even with advanced/superior skill-- is likely much more dangerous than avoiding conflict, and that there is a risk of injury in martial arts training, I concluded that self-defense martial arts are largely an antiskill and instead pursued martial arts that are useless for self-defense but much more fun.

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 14 December 2014 05:13:25AM 0 points [-]

Not learning combat skills as a commitment to avoid conflict is a nice mirror image of Schelling's Xenophon example, where cutting off your ability to retreat is a way to commit yourself to winning a fight.

Comment author: Azathoth123 03 December 2014 01:47:32AM 2 points [-]

A dead thing can go with the stream, but only a living thing can go against it.

G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man

Comment author: MotivationalAppeal 07 December 2014 04:12:06PM 11 points [-]

Pathological counter example: "Passive propulsion in vortex wakes" by Beal et al. PDF

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