Comment author: AlanCrowe 25 May 2009 04:57:08PM 4 points [-]

This post is an example of the dangers both of fictional evidence and generational forgetting. Less than 100 years ago teachers did beat their pupils. Corporal punishment was an accepted part of educational practise. My parents are in their 80's and can remember this.

The script writers for The Wire are too young to have experienced this themselves, so they put a plausible line in their script: "They beat you if you get the count wrong." If they had been beaten themselves in their schools days they would know that it doesn't actually work. Worse they seem not to have realised that beating children to make them learn is only just dropping out of living memory. They could have asked around and realised just how ignorant the line is.

Being beaten into learning your sums is a perfectly plausible idea. Toddlers become competent at running about through a painful process of bumps and bruises administered by their environment. Perhaps an artificial environment with tawse administered by the dominie would work as well for sums?

Ofcourse it is no longer plausible once it has been tried and proved surprisingly useless. I'm disturbed to witness a dead educational idea coming back to life through a combination of fiction and forgetting.

(The point about toddlers may also be false. There is a rare genetic condition that results in pain receptors not working. The popular accounts I've read give the impression that sufferers run and play like normal children, with the exception that freed from the constraints of pain, they are more daring than normal children and do things such as breaking their legs by jumping off walls that are too high. So painful bumps and bruises may not be part of motor learning skills even when their presence is inevitable.)

Comment author: MrShaggy 25 May 2009 06:26:34PM 2 points [-]

I'm not positing that the beating helped the kid learn. See Kaj_Sotala's comment above for an example of how students perform math better when say, doing their job but they can't at school. I found the Wire anecdote plausible, but I didn't mean to suggest I accept the kid's understanding at face value: I generalized to the kid being motivated, which may've well been the case even if the kid hadn't been beaten but having been beaten, that's the explanation the kid looked to. Also, I think your historical evidence doesn't necessarily prove your point. My impression is that corporal punishment was often rather arbitrary and to enforce social norms more than teach math lessons (though that too), and I would guess that if kids are beaten for reasons they often can't understand (which is my impression from reading accounts), then being hurt for reasons they can understand (not memorizing their multiplication tables) has a diminished effect. I'm having trouble recalling any specifics, but I'm pretty sure I've read accounts from kids that suggest they saw the punishment as a motivating force for learning, whether it actually was or not. Just to be clear, even if corporal punishment were shown to be effective in certain ways if used in certain ways, I wouldn't be in favor of using it and would guess it would decrease self-motivated learning long term and there are hopefully more humane ideas to make learning motivating.

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 25 May 2009 09:43:10AM 10 points [-]

The lecturer in our Numerical cognition course told us of a result that went along the following lines. A schoolteacher was trying to teach his students to do basic arithmetic, and seeing them get the calculations wrong time after time. Then one day he decided to follow them out into town, where he saw that some of his students handled arithmetic just fine when they were doing grocery shopping, or working part-time selling things. Inspired, he returned to class and reworded his assignments to be about shopping, and guess what happened? The students failed just as miserably as they had before. The cognitive context was just too dissimiliar to the environment where they'd picked up the practice.

I got the impression that this wasn't just an isolated anecdote, but had also been replicated in more controlled studies. The reference he gave is to Jean Lave's Cognition in Practice - I have a copy of the book from the university library, but haven't had the time to read further yet. I'll see if I can skim it through this evening to find the part he was talking about.

Comment author: MrShaggy 25 May 2009 06:19:16PM 1 point [-]

This example helps clarify something for me. I don't think it's that the "cognitive context was...too dissimilar" for the students, I would guess that it's that they don't care in class. When they're doing they're job or shopping, they do care. But the obvious reply is: why do I hypothesize that cheating-examples make people care in a fictional context? Maybe someone can help say it clearly for me, but it just makes sense to me that math requires a higher threshold of "caring" than something like "cheating." If I were reading a novel about a kid solving math problems in class, I'd probably wouldn't care about the math problems, but if I were reading a novel and cheating was possible, it probably would cause a reaction. This is what I was trying to get at with testing "various types of emotionally-motivating things," it just seems obvious that some things will evoke emotions in some contexts but not others, and some emotional responses will increase performance or some won't, but I can't put it better than that right now.

The Wire versus Evolutionary Psychology

15 MrShaggy 25 May 2009 05:21AM

In their Evolutionary Psychology Primer, Cosmides and Tooby give an example of a hypothesized adaptation that allows us to detect cheaters in a certain type of logical task (Wason) that we generally fail at.  In the Wason selection task (both article and wiki give examples) you are presented a type of logic puzzle that people tend to do poorly at and even formal training in logic helps little, yet when the examples involve cheating (such as "If you are to eat those cookies, then you must first fix your bed" and the task would be to figure out if someone whose eating the cookies did indeed fix the bed) perform much better (25% right in the regular task, 65-80% in this version, according to the article).

In the show The Wire, in season one, episode eight, Wallace, a teen-age drug dealer is asked by a young child to help her with her math homework.  It's an addition and subtraction word problem about passengers on a bus (can't remember the numbers, but along the lines of, if the bus has 10 people on it and at the next stop 3 get on and 4 leave, etc.).  Wallace rephrases the word problem to be about drugs and the kid gets it right.  Wallace frustrated asks why and the kid replies along the lines of: "They beat you if you get the count wrong." (Edit:simpleton gives the quote as "Count be wrong, they fuck you up.")

C&T conclude that there are evolved "algorithms" in our brains that deal with social contract processing that explain why people do better on certain Wason selection tasks.  The Wire points out a simpler possible explanation that their experiments did not control for: people do better on tasks they care about, unless one would like to suppose there are special math circuits in the brain for certain "social contract" situations.

Of course, I am not saying a fictional anecdote disproves C&T's claim, but it does point to something they didn't test for, and something that I find rather plausible.

Possible tests: Look at emotionally-motivating things that vary across culture and develop Wason selection tasks to test for that; look at various types of emotionally-motivating things (which I do not presume all emotional responses will affect the test results), and obviously, test The Wire example itself.

In response to This Failing Earth
Comment author: CronoDAS 24 May 2009 09:20:18PM *  26 points [-]

Indeed, our Earth's Westphalian concept of sovereign states is the main thing propping up Somalia and North Korea. There was a time when any state that failed that badly would be casually conquered by a more successful neighbor.

I have to disagree here. First of all, North Korea has the world's third largest army. Any state that tried to conquer it would have its hands full. Additionally, counterinsurgency warfare has become damn hard these days - consider the Soviet failure in Afghanistan during the 1980s. As Stalin observed, it takes a generation and a half to pacify a country and convert it to your ideology by force.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, conquering poorly defended land isn't profitable any more; some time around World War I, conquest became far more trouble than it's worth. Nobody wants Somalia, even if the rest of the world would be okay with someone marching an army into it. It's just not worth anything. The British Empire, a more modern example of conquest for profit, never occupied Afghanistan. It would have cost far more to subdue the natives than it would ever produce in revenue. Today, far more wealth is created by Internet startups than could be stolen by a modern-day Alexander the Great or Genghis Khan.

To put the worthlessness of Somalia into perspective, here's some numbers:

  • The GNP of Somalia is $2 billion.
  • The market capitalization of Amazon.com is $32 billion. Its revenue in 2008 was $19.1 billion, and its net income was $0.64 billion.
  • Bernie Madoff convinced people to invest at least $10 billion in a completely fraudulent stock fund, and reported $50 billion in bogus returns.
Comment author: MrShaggy 25 May 2009 04:47:53AM 0 points [-]

Yeah, the idea that a certain concept of states is what explains North Korea and Somalia is wrong. Seconding the point on North Korea: it can defend itself quite well, and it's not just the size of the army. Also, compare post-Westphalian but pre-WW2 with post-WW2 to see a difference in terms of conquering other countries and redrawing borders. The difference: a deal between the US and USSR, two countries with enough power to enforce a certain kind of stability in general, and with the collapse of Stalinism leading to an uptick in the exceptions (esp. Kosovo and Russia-Georgia stuff).

Comment author: Annoyance 22 May 2009 06:42:30PM 1 point [-]

but according to what measure is it more complex than another part of the brain?

It directs, integrates, and regulates many of the other parts of the brain, and causes them to work together in particular ways or suppresses their output.

It is responsible for the complexity of what we regard as human behavior. The losses when this part of the brain is damaged are horrifying. Sufficient damage, and it is questionable whether the resulting creature can be considered 'human' in any meaningful abstract sense. (The biological sense is met, of course. But concepts like 'personhood' no longer seem to apply.)

Comment author: MrShaggy 23 May 2009 04:17:09AM 0 points [-]

Right, it's responsible for the complexity of what we regard as human behavior, but that doesn't meant that part of the brain is more complex than other parts. Also, I doubt but do not know that it's the only part that regulates or suppresses other parts.

Comment author: MrShaggy 22 May 2009 05:24:22AM 1 point [-]

"These points illustrate a very important basic principle: the mind is made out of ‘layers’ of modules and functions, starting with the most rudimentary, basic, and primitive, and moving to the most complex and subtle."

The evidence you gave doesn't point to this conclusion. Modules and functions are the dominate way of thinking about how the brain works currently, but what you've shown is only that the brain isn't a single process free of contradiction. More importantly, even in the view of modules and functions, the rudimentary/basic/primitive ladder to complex/subtle doesn't follow. Sure the front cortext is more recently evolved, but according to what measure is it more complex than another part of the brain? I could be wrong, but I think you're sort of anthropomorphizing parts of the brain (the reptilian part is primitive, the 'human' part is complex).

Comment author: Annoyance 22 May 2009 03:01:18AM 0 points [-]

I must disagree with you on both points. The introduction to the piece takes up most of it, I acknowledge, and this is intended as an introduction to a later piece.

People complained that previous posts were too long, so I thought I'd try to keep this short and incremental.

Comment author: MrShaggy 22 May 2009 05:19:48AM 0 points [-]

Sure, but this is basically only worthwhile to us as an introduction...meaning you just gave us an introduction, the point of which is for something more substantial to come after it. Neat example yes, but still wordy for that neat example. This could've been two paragraphs.

Comment author: Douglas_Knight 18 May 2009 02:43:57AM 3 points [-]

I have also seen instances where nearly an entire field is making some elementary error, which people outside that field can see more clearly, but which they can't communicate to people in that field because they would have to spend years learning enough about the field to write a paper, probably with half a year's worth of experimental work, and not get rejected, even if their insight is something that could be communicated in a single sentence.

I think that you're saying that the outsiders can't be published without learning the jargon and doing experiments. But publication is not the only avenue. If it really only takes a single sentence, the outsider should be able to find an insider who will look past jargon and data and listen to the sentence. Then the insider can tell other insiders, or tack it onto a publication, or do the new experiments.

If jargon is not just a barrier to publication, but also to communication it's a lot harder to find a sympathetic insider, but it hardly seems impossible. Also, in that situation, how can outsiders be sure they understand?

These situations sound like there is a much bigger problem than the elementary error, perhaps that the people involved just don't care about seeking truth, only about having a routine.

Comment author: MrShaggy 18 May 2009 09:55:56PM 0 points [-]

"These situations sound like there is a much bigger problem than the elementary error, perhaps that the people involved just don't care about seeking truth, only about having a routine."

Well, a large part of it is funding/bureaucracy/grants. I tend to thing that's the main part in many of these fields. Look at Taubes's Good Calories, Bad Calories for a largely correct history of how the field of nutrition went wrong and is still going at it pretty badly. You do have a growing number of insiders doing research not on the "wrong" path and you did all along, but they never got strong enough to challenge the "consensus" and it's due not just to the field but the forces outside the field (think tanks, government agencies, media reports). So even being published and well-known isn't enough to change a field.

Comment author: hrishimittal 17 May 2009 01:07:39PM *  4 points [-]

I'm seriously thinking about asking my boss about that one. With a pro-rata decrease in salary, of course.

The extra money just doesn't seem to be worth the constant struggle with myself. Plus I think it would be good to start at a level I'm comfortable with and build on that. By forcing myself to work at a rate I'm clearly incapable of, I'm losing out on all the positive feedback that comes from small successes.

To draw a crude analogy, air pollution modelling is as hard a problem for me as say, AI is for EY. And if he needed to take every other day off once upon a time,...

EDIT: PS I have been reading OB/LW for a while but have started commenting here only recently. Hello everyone!

Comment author: MrShaggy 18 May 2009 08:33:42PM 4 points [-]

You would probably like Ferris's Four hour workweek, has an example of how to get your boss to let you work from home and stuff like that. Not the same as above, but similar enough to help you.

In response to Rationalistic Losing
Comment author: Drahflow 30 April 2009 07:12:06PM 1 point [-]

Fun fact - better strategy for memory: You play memory 1 vs. 1, and it's your move.

  1. If you know a pair, take it (this much is obvious).
  2. Chose an unknown tile at random.
  3. If you know the match take it (also clear).
  4. Take a tile known to both of you (if there is doubt, take one your oponent knows).

People don't do step 4 right usually.

Comment author: MrShaggy 01 May 2009 02:57:48AM *  0 points [-]

"Take a tile known to both of you (if there is doubt, take one your oponent knows)."

I don't understand the parenthetical comment: it seems to be saying "If you are not sure both of you know what a tile is, then choose a tile your opponent knows." How could you know your opponent knows what a tile is but not be sure you know? Or maybe I'm just not understanding?

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