Multipartite

Running through this to check that my wetware handles it consistently.

Paying -100 if asked:

When the coin is flipped, one's probability branch splits into a 0.5 of oneself in the 'simulation' branch, 0.5 in the 'real' branch. For the 0.5 in the real branch, upon awaking a subjective 50% probability that on either of the two possible days, both of which will be woken on. So, 0.5 of the time waking in simulation, 0.25 waking in real 1, 0.25 waking in real 2.

0.5 x (260) + 0.25 x (-100) + 0.25 x (-100) = 80. However, this is the expected cash-balance change... (read more)

(For thoroughness, noting that the other approach was also wondered about a little earlier. Surface action is an alternative to look at if projectile-launching would definitely be ineffective, but if the projectile approach would in fact be better then there'd no reason not to focus on it instead.)

A fair point. On the subject of pulling vast quantities of energy from nowhere, does any one country currently possess the knowledge and materials to build a bomb that detonated on the surface could {split the Earth like a grape}/{smash the Earth like an egg}/{dramatic verb the Earth like a metaphorical noun}?

And yes, not something to try in practice with an inhabited location. Perhaps a computer model, at most... actually, there's a thought regarding morbid fascination. I wonder what would be necessary to provide a sufficiently-realistic (uninhabite... (read more)

Not directly related, but an easier question: Do we currently have the technology to launch projectiles out of Earth's atmosphere into a path such that, in a year's time or so, the planet smashes into them from the other direction and sustains significant damage?

(Ignoring questions of targeting specific points, just the question of whether it's possible to arrange that without the projectiles falling into the sun or just following us eternally without being struck or getting caught in our gravity well too soon... hmm, if we could somehow put it into an o... (read more)

()

In practice, this seems to break down at a specific point: this can be outlined, for instance, with the hypothetical stipulation "...and possesses the technology or similar power to cross universe boundaries and appear visible before me in my room, and will do so in exactly ten seconds.".

As with the fallacy of a certain ontological argument, the imagination/definition of something does not make it existential, and even if a certain concept contains no apparent inherent logical impossibilities that still does not mean that there could/would exi... (read more)

(Absent(?) thought after reading: one can imagine someone, through a brain-scanner or similar, controlling a robot remotely. One can utter, through the robot, "I'm not actually here.", where 'here' is where one is doing the uttering through the robot, and 'I' (specifically 'where I am') is the location of one's brain. The distinction between the claim 'I'm not actually here' and 'I'm not actually where I am' is notable. Ahh, the usefulness of technology. For belated communication, the part about intention is indeed significant, as with whether a diary is written in the present tense (time of writing) or in the past tense ('by the time you read this[ I will have]'...).) enjoyed the approach

To ask the main question that the first link brings to mind: What prevents a person from paying both a life insurance company and a longevity insurance company (possible the same company) relatively-small amounts of money each in exchange for either a relatively-large payout from the life insurance if the person dies early and a relatively-large payout from the longevity insurance if the person dies late?

To extend, what prevents a hypothetically large number of people to on average create this effect (even if each is disallowed from having both instead of just one or the other) and so creating a guaranteed total loss overall on the part of an insurance company?

Thank you!

To answer the earlier question, an alteration which halved the probability of failure would indeed change an exactly-0% probability of success into a 50% probability of success.

If one is choosing between lower increases for higher values, unchanged increases for higher values, and greater increases for higher values, then the first has the advantage of not quickly giving numbers over 100%. I note though that the opposite effect (such as hexing a foe?) would require halving the probability of success instead of doubling the probability of failure.

The eff... (read more)

For what it's worth, I'm reminded of systems which handle modifiers (multiplicatively) according to the chance of failure:

[quote]

For example, the first 20 INT increases magic accuracy from 80% to

(80% + (100% - 80%) * .01) = 80.2%

not to 81%. Each 20 INT (and 10 WIS) adds 1% of the remaining distance between your current magic accuracy and 100%. It becomes increasingly harder (technically impossible) to reach 100% in any of these derived stats through primary attributes alone, but it can be done with the use of certain items.

[/quote]

A clearer exampl... (read more)

The Turing machine doing the simulating does not experience pain, but the human being being simulated does.

Similarly, the waterfall argument found in the linked paper seems as though it could as-easily be used to argue that none of the humans in the solar system have intelligence unless there's an external observer to impose meaning on the neural patterns.

A lone mathematical equation is meaningless without a mind able to read it and understand what its squiggles can represent, but functioning neural patterns which respond to available stimuli causally(/thr... (read more)

(Assuming that it stays on the line of 'what is possible', in any case a higher Y than otherwise, but finding it then according to the constant X--1 - ((19/31) * (1/19)), 30/31, yes...)

I confess I do not understand the significance of the terms mixed outcome and weighted sum in this context, I do not see how the numbers 11/31 and 20/31 have been obtained, and I do not presently see how the same effect can apply in the second situation in which the relative positions of the symmetric point and its (Pareto?) lines have not been shifted, but I now see how in ... (read more)

Rather than X or Y succeeding at gaming it by lying, however, it seems that a disinterested objective procedure that selects by Pareto optimalness and symmetry would then output a (0.6, 0.6) outcome in both cases, causing a -0.35 utility loss for the liar in the first case and a -0.1 utility loss for the liar in the second.

Is there a direct reason that such an established procedure would be influenced by a perceived (0.95, 0.4) option to not choose an X=Y Pareto outcome? (If this is confirmed, then indeed my current position is mistaken. )

I may be missing something: for Figure 5, what motivation does Y have to go along with perceived choice (0.95, 0.4), given that in this situation Y does not possess the information possessed (and true) in the previous situation that '(0.95, 0.4)' is actually (0.95, 0.95)?

In Figure 2, (0.6, 0.6) appears symmetrical and Pareto optimal to X. In Figure 5, (0.6, 0.6) appears symmetrical and Pareto optimal to Y. In Figure 2, X has something to gain by choosing/{allowing the choice of} (0.95, 0.4) over (0.6, 0.6) and Y has something to gain by choosing/{allowi... (read more)

A very interesting perspective: Thank you!

' I am still mystified by the second koan.': The novice associates {clothing types which past cults have used} with cults, and fears that his group's use of these clothing types suggests that the group may be cultish.

In practice (though the clothing may have an unrelated advantage), the clothing one wears has no effect on the validity of the logical arguments used in reasoning/debate.

The novice fears a perceived connection between the clothing and cultishness (where cultishness is taken to be a state of faith over rationality, or in any case irrationality... (read more)

Depending on the cost, it at least seems to be worth knowing about. If one doesn't have it then one can be assured on that point, whereas if one does have it then one at least has appropriate grounds on which to second-guess oneself.

(I have been horrified in the past by tales of {people who may or may not have inherited a dominant gene for definite early disease-related death} who all refused to be tested, thus dooming themselves to a lives of fear and uncertainty. If they were going to have entirely healthy lives then they would have lived in fear and u... (read more)

'I haven't seen a post on LW about the grue paradox, and this surprised me since I had figured that if any arguments would be raised against Bayesian LW doctrine, it would be the grue problem.':

If of relevance, note http://lesswrong.com/lw/q8/many_worlds_one_best_guess/ .

'The second AI helped you more, but it constrained your destiny less.': A very interesting sentence.

On other parts, I note that the commitment to a range of possible actions can be seen as larger-scale than to a single action, even before which one is taken is chosen.

A particular situation that comes to mind, though:

Person X does not know of person Y, but person Y knows of person X. Y has an emotional (or other) stake in a tiebreaking vote that X will make; Y cannot be present on the day to observe the vote, but sets up a simple machine to detect what ... (read more)

Thought 1: If hypothetically one's family was going to die in an accident or otherwise (for valid causal wish-unrelated reasons), the added mental/emotional effect on oneself would be something to avoid in the first place. Given that one is infallible, one can never assert absolute knowledge of non-causality (direct or indirect), and that near-infinitesimal consideration could haunt one. Compare this possibility to the ease, normally, of taking other routes and thus avoiding that risk entirely.

...other thoughts are largely on the matter of integrity... ... (read more)