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I would call it cognitive obscurantism or epistemological denialism. I am not actually anti-epistemology, and did not start the post myself, however, the poster asked for advice so that is mine.

I would like to argue that it is less important to determine IF it is a fallacy, than what kind it is.

One view is that this is a "deliberation" fallacy, along the lines of a failed thought experiment; e.g. 'something went wrong because conditions weren't met.' Another view is that this fallacy, which relates if I am correct to "resource shortages" or "debt crises" is in fact a more serious 'systems error' such as a method fallacy involving recursivity or logic gates.

To some extent at this point I am prone to take the view that the extent of the problem is proportionistic, leading to a kind of quantitative rather than qualitative perspective, which makes me think in my own reasoning that it is not true logic, and therefore not a true logical problem.

For example, it can be argued modal-realistically that in some contingent or arbitrarily divergent context or world, debt might be a functional or conducive phenomenon that is incorporated in a functional framework.

I would be interested to know if this kind of reasoning is or is not actually helpful in determining about a debt crisis. Perhaps as might be expected, the solution lies in some kind of "technologism," and not a traditional philosophical debate per se.

My upcoming book, 1-Page-Classics gives examples of a kind of "reduced" Bayesianism in the form of a one-pager called "Traditional Claims" and another called "Modal Realism."

The book might also be interesting for virtue ethics, in the form of abbreviations of the famous scroll "The Mandate of Heaven," Confucius' "Analects or Analectus," and Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching."

I also abbreviate Epictetus' "Enchiridion" in a creative fashion, and "Republic of Plato" includes an excellent form of sophist criticism to that project (poetry, the ring of Giges, etc.).