The reason all these problems are so tricky is that they assume there's a "you" (or a "that guy") who has a view of both possible outcomes. But since there aren't the same number of people for both outcomes, it isn't possible to match up each person on one side with one on the other to make such a "you".
Compensating for this should be easy enough, and will make the people-counting parts of the problems explicit, rather than mysterious.

I suspect this is also why the doomsday argument fails. Since it's not possible to define a set of people who "might have had" either outcome, the argument can't be constructed in the first place.

As usual, apologies if this is already known, obvious or discredited.

Isn't the quantum part of Quantum Russian Roulette a red herring, in that the only part it plays is to make copies of the money ? All the other parts of the thought-experiment work just as well in a single world where people-copiers exist.

To make the situations similar, suppose our life insurance company has been careless, and we get a payout for each copy that dies. Do you have someone press [COPY], then kill all but one of the copies before they wake ?

Doesn't "harm", to a consequentialist, consist of every circumstance in which things could be better, but aren't ? If a speck in the eye counts, then why not, for example, being insufficiently entertained ?

If you accept consequentialism, isn't it morally right to torture someone to death so long as enough people find it funny ?

I find it hard to believe that you could really think the most likely explanation of the flaws you perceive are that Aaronson and the students that implemented this purposely introduced flaws and are trying to sabotage the work. So why do you utter such nonsense?

And did it not occur to you that disagreeing that children should have the vote could be resolved by being neutral on everybody having the vote, which is what I did after realizing that there are plausible interpretations under which I would disagree and plausible interpretations under which I would agree.

Mostly agree is a higher degree of agreement than Agree ?

To Somewhat agree that everyone should have the vote and Disagree that children should have the vote is inconsistent ?

Obviously this is the work of the Skrull "Scott Aaronson", whose thinking is not so clear.

Scott Aaronson announced Worldview Manager, "a program that attempts to help users uncover hidden inconsistencies in their personal beliefs".

You can experiment with it here. The initial topics are Complexity Theory, Strong AI, Axiom of Choice, Quantum Computing, Libertarianism, Quantum Mechanics.

My metaphor lobes appear to be on fire.

There are no objective measures of utility. But just about everyone who has failed a diet or exercise schedule could be seen as failing beause of hyperbolic discounting.

So if I removed the lungs of chicken, you would no longer consider it a bird? Or if I surgically modified some other creature (e.g. a pig) to have circulatory lungs, you would consider this to be a bird?

Different people's concepts of "bird" agree on most real-world examples, but I see no reason why they should agree on all conceivable hypothetical examples, so the task of "defining" a word is futile.

Warrigal gave a good recognition algorithm: it inspects a small subset of properties and gives an answer that accords with our judgment in most real-world cases. That's about as far as one can or should go when "defining" something outside of mathematics.

Of course hyperbolic discounting is a useful heuristic. The paradigm I subscribe to is not just bias. We have these heuristics because they're the best that evolution or our developing minds could do. That is, they're pretty good in some other environment (ancestral or childhood), which might be very different. You singled out hyperbolic discounting, among all the biases, but it seems to me much more likely to be maladapted to the present than the other standard biases.

Most of your comment argues that it's a good heuristic, but your first paragraph ("bite the bullet and accept hyperbolic discounting") seems to make a stronger claim.

Usually the points of time where you can "change your mind" correspond to events which introduce all the new kinds of risks and transaction costs and are not neutral.

That is a different heuristic than I would call hyperbolic discounting. You can certainly produce situations in the lab where people apply a worse heuristic than that. I expect the two heuristics were more similar in EEA than today.

If you want to make a quick decision, go with your gut and trust hyperbolic discounting. But trust it for a decision on an action, not its intermediate output of utility. It mixes up probability and utility. "If you're building complex interconnected structures of beliefs" then you have to separate the two and you can't trust your gut model of yourself because of hyperbolic discounting. People screw up long term planning all the time because of hyperbolic discounting.