Indeed, we were talking about rationalists (not only LW, but SlateStarCodex too for instance).
I think there are meaningful instinctive differences too, but that's not the point, is it ? If it was, then we can assume that people holds beliefs too. Sometime they change their beliefs too because of reasons (or lack thereof).
I agree with your model, but without the nerd-exception.
The lack of nerd focus on epistemology and meta-ethics implies that nerds don't have beliefs either.
They do have pressures to appear rational. Either external (peer pressure) or internal (intelligence/rationality being part of the core identity because of reasons).
The same model you mention has been useful for me in understanding why nerdy people don't actually care about the epistemic soundness of their argument, and only about sounding rational. It made me understand why many were angered when I pointed the lack of sound definition of the words used or the use of countless fallacies : it's perceived as an attack against their rationality.
I suppose I do insofar as the very act of experiencing experience is experience and thus by at all noticing your experience you know a way of knowing. And although you may infer things about epistemology from ontology, you cannot derive them because ontology must be constructed from knowledge gained through experience (at least if we demand a phenomenological account of knowledge), and thus all ontology is tainted by the epistemological methods of experience used to gain such knowledge.
Naive observation precedes any epistemic method to gain knowledge. However, let's say we consider naive observation and innate reasoning as being part of a proto-epistemy. Then we have to acknowledge too that we have a fair-share of embedded ontological knowledge that we don't gain through experience, but that we have when we are born. (Time, space, multiplicity, weight, etc.).
This is paramount, as without that, we would actually be trapped in infinite regress.
But you do because fields are just an after-the-fact construction to make understanding reality more manageable. There's just one reality (for a phenomenologically useful sense of "reality" as the thing which you experience), fields just pick a part of it to focus on, and as such there is much overlap between how we know things in fields.
I disagree thoroughly with that paragraph.
Science is not about "understanding reality". Or at least, not the "reality" as "the thing which you experience". The impact of science in "the thing which we experience" can only be seen through pragmatism. Quantum physics is good not because it gives to some of us a more manageable understanding of reality, but because it gives to all of us tools relying on quantum effects.
If we talk about science as "understanding reality", then it's not "the thing which we experience". And in that case, science understands many different, sometimes independent realities.
"as such there is much overlap between how we know things in fields". There are only small overlaps between NLP, linguistics and cognitive psychology, all three studying natural languages. There are strong differences between logic from a philosophical point of view, logic from a mathematical foundations point of view and logic from a CS point of view., all three studying logic. A science is defined by its object and by its method.
To be concrete about it, there are many fields we consider part of science and they all use the shared epistemological methods of science to explore particular topics.
Well, if you put all the methods used in different sciences in the common sets of "shared epistemological methods of science", then I have to tautologically agree. But as well as concrete differences (a chemical experimental protocol is very different from a physical one), there are abstract differences (controlled experiments, natural experiments, historical inquiry, formal proof, naked human reasoning). So I don't understand your point.
We don't reinvent science for physics, biology, etc. each time because each field is really just choosing to focus on a particular part of the questions science is designed to answer.
Well, if a field is solely an "after-the-fact construction", there is no intention or design in fields.
Putting that aside, my explanation to the fact that we don't reinvent science every time is more down-to-earth : tragedy of the commons and chronology. Focusing on epistemology is hard and time consuming, and doesn't benefit individuals, but everyone at the same time. Except in particular instances (foundational crisis), researchers won't take the burden on themselves. Also, epistemology advances came after these fields were set.
I think there's also a deeper confusion here where you seem to be thinking as if ontology comes first. That is, you are taking a transcendental stance.
I take ontology and epistemology as separate. A science is defined by its object (ontos), and by its method (epistemy). Given I can make both arguments for different sciences (where their ontos come before their epistemy, and where their epistemy come before their ontos), I see them as separate.
When you say "that is ontology comes first but we have to experience it so there's no way for us to know that where epistemology isn't prior", you beg the question : you assume there is no higher order ontological knowledge, but that there is higher order epistemological knowledge (without which we couldn't have relevant experiments). And I can derive epistemological knowledge from observation and ontological knowledge as much as I can derive ontological knowledge from experiments and epistemological knowledge.
Certainly a person's epistemology affects their understanding of many things
I think having an epistemy to deal with everything is a mistake. It stems from the post that the strength of an epistemy lies from its specialization.
I guess it's somewhat unclear to me just what work "epistemy" is doing
I don't understand "what work is [X] doing" means in this context.
that seems like a teleological approach to epistemology
It's more that different fields of inquiry lead to different epistemies. If you want to study different fields, you have no a priori reason to use the same epistemy for both.
I guess I'm also somewhat unclear on what binds these ideas/questions together.
I don't know of a Bayesianist account of epistemies. As such, I'm shotgunning questions aiming to reveal it. The questions are spread on different fields, and different position on the abstract-concrete spectrum.
Thank you for your thorough answer. :)
I am not asking for a general discussion place, but for an idea repository with dedicated discussion places.
From the post :
The current forum doesn’t cut it : it isn’t meant to that end. It’s easier to build a forum dedicated to that than try to artificially support a balance between “New Ideas” posts and “Information Sharing” posts so that none of these get overshadowed. The same problem applies to existing reddit boards and facebook groups.
Also, regular discussion places (reddit, fb), aren't really meant as thread repository : pinning more and more threads is a nuisance to the discussion part.
I initially needed an editor I was used to to link a post to someone on the EA Discord Server.
I thought I might as well do it on LW to gather input from LWians.
Most scientists haven't read Popper and those people in history of science that analyze what scientists actually do, don't find that scientists follow Popper's maxims.
As far as I know, this is still subject of debates. cf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability
I agree that for psychologists and many people in biology there isn't enough explicit attention paid to epistemology. On the other hand it's still import to be aware that you will never get 100% explicit.
I don't see what is your criterium to agree with my point on a given field. Also, my point isn't about "100% explicit". My point is that if a field of study is interesting enough, defining an epistemy becomes primary. Else, too much time will be wasted. Similarly, in some existing fields, an epistemy that is too implicit / loosely specified leads to noise production at best, and to counter-productive efforts at worst.
Considering the opportunity cost of having very smart people working on useless things, this is bad.
It seems I haven't fully understood your criticism of what you perceive to be bayesianism.
Indeed, I think I was too brief and that it could have been an article in itself. I might write one if you are interested. If you aren't, basically : bayesianism as the core of an approach to the world is too losely specified. It isn't a complete epistemy, nor even a complete logic.
On the article you sent, the author tried to find uses of bayesianism. However, substituting religion for bayesianism leads to the same epistemic problems : "I did that, that and that because of religion. And religion even proves some bits of rationalist common sense !"
No. I mention the practical patch right after : epistemies.
Those are two different fields, with different problems. My answer to your thing is that we have embedded epistemological/ontological when we are born. From a different line of comments :
Well, formal verification, proof systems, NLP and AGI are a thing. So I disagree.
No, there are plenty of other things. Including the aforementioned one. But more primary is fixing the "gift as a birthright". That's the point of rationalism. Our innate epistemy is a bad one. It lets us walk, gather sticks and talk with people, but it makes for bad science most of the time.
Thanks for the pointer. Checking it.