I vaguely object to the common practice of soliciting responses, and implying that the results will/may be meaningful, without simultaneously precommitting to a particular mapping of raw results to inferred meaning. (The precommitment can be done while keeping the mapping secret, by using a hash algorithm.)
Recall that the goal isn't to undershoot reality every time, but to do so half the time.
You can also do Bayesian analysis with 'non-informative' priors or weakly-informative priors. As an example of the latter: if you're trying to figure out the mean change earth's surface temperature you might say 'it's almost certainly more then -50C and less than 50C'.
Unfortunately, if there is disagreement merely about how much prior uncertainty is appropriate, then this is sufficient to render the outcome controversial.
My general impression is that Bayes is useful in diagnosis, where there's a relatively uncontroversially already-known base rate, and frequentism is useful in research, where the priors are highly subject to disagreement.
1000 - (random 6-digit integer)*(10^-(the XKCD number))
Tell me what Zork is and i'll let you know. : )
Insufficient: the colony ship leaves no evidence.
Least convenient possible world - we discover the universe will definitely expand forever. Now what?
Or what about the past? If I tell you an alien living three million years ago threw either a red or a blue ball into the black hole at the center of the galaxy but destroyed all evidence as to which, is there a fact of the matter as to which color ball it was?
I suspect that the answer to the alien-ball case may be empirical rather than philosophical.
Suppose that there existed quantum configurations in which the alien threw in a red ball, and there existed quantum configurations in which the alien threw in a blue ball, and both of those have approximately equal causal influence on the configuration-cluster in which we are having (approximately) this conversation. In this case, we would happen to be living in a particular type of world such that there was no fact of the matter as to which color ball it was (except that e.g. it mostly wasn't green).
My first reaction is that this would increase the expected cost of revival, for the same reason that it's harder to get plane tickets if you're in a group that wants to sit near each other.
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How about an expanded version: if we could be a timeless spaceless perfect observer of the universe(s), what evidence would we expect to see?
Can you guarantee that a TSPO wouldn't see epiphenomenal consciousness?