Apparently, most of what one sees on Lie To Me is spurious. At any rate, viewing the show causes people to make more false positive identifications of deception relative to a control group, without being any more accurate at catching real deception:
The Impact of Lie To Me on Viewers' Actual Ability to Detect Deception
You mean, you can't detect lies by standing three inches from someone and squinting up their nostrils?
Then "human behaviour is predictable" doesn't apply to life in general.
Yes it does since we know that human behavior is predictable. Scientists don't need to add "in controlled environments" because that's necessarily the case. Nothing, absolutely nothing, is predictable in uncontrolled environments. So if you're saying that human behavior is unpredictable because it can't be predicted in uncontrolled environments, then you've simply defined human behavior (and everything) as being unpredictable. How did you describe this kind of argument? "And 11 fingered people have 11 fingers"?
Predictability in controlled experiments isn't taken by physicists to prove a sweeping statement like "the universe is predictable". Some physical system are well known to be unpredictable.
Your analogy is a misrepresentation. Behavioral scientists saying human behavior is predictable is akin to physicists saying that the movement of a falling object is predictable. The fact that physicists can only predict the motion of falling bodies when they know the mass of the object, the force of gravity, etc, does not mean that they have to say, "Falling bodies are predictable in controlled environments, but they are unpredictable in the real world".
Or some other reason.
There cannot be any other reason.
Which is to say that some real situation have straightforward rules and rewards, allowing predictability.
So it's just a coincidence that every "free range" behavior which has been tested happens to be predictable?
Oh we know that, They are.
You think the movement of billiard balls are unpredictable because of "quantum mechanics"?... You do understand that indeterminism and probabilism do not preclude predictability, right?
No, it doesn't necessarily mean that.
There is no other option.
That, again, is getting what you are looking for.
No. Knowing the variables in an environment does not mean you get what you're looking for. There is an almost infinite number of ways in which the variables could be combined to reach different conclusions and predictions. If we come up with a law that uses specific parameters that give us an accurate prediction, then that means the phenomenon we're observing is predictable.
I don't understand why you think controlled environments (i.e. environments where the values of parameters are known) automatically produces some behavior or outcome. That's nonsensical.
No physicist would say physics is successful in predicting without specifying a system. What does "human behaviour is predictable" mean? We already knew you could predict behaviour in some situations, so that isnt a discovery. And we don't know that it is predictable by and large, because it isn't.
"Human behavior is predictable" means that human behavior can be predicted. Informally we might have known that behavior is predictable in some situations, but that's no better than saying "We already knew that the effects of gravity are predictable because when we drop stuff it always goes down". The point is that as long as we have information on the values of parameters, then human behavior is predictable. Pointing out situations where parameters are unknown does not mean human behavior is unpredictable.
Then "human behaviour is predictable" doesn't apply to life in general. Yes it does since we know that human behavior is predictable.
Scientists don't need to add "in controlled environments" because that's necessarily the case.
No it isn't necessarily the case We can imagine Foundation style wide range prediction. (Un)predictability due to large numbers of variable is a contingent issue: it depends on how much computation you throw at it, as in weather forecasting.
Nothing, absolutely nothing, is predictable in uncontrolled environments.
Not even the examples of real life prediction of human behaviour you mentioned? Not even the positions of the planets in the solar system?
So if you're saying that human behavior is unpredictable because it can't be predicted in uncontrolled environments, then you've simply defined human behavior (and everything) as being unpredictable. How did you describe this kind of argument? "And 11 fingered people have 11 fingers"?
Not analogous: an uncontrolled environment is not a special environment that is designed to force unpredictable behaviour. It is a general environment that is not designed for anything.
Your analogy is a misrepresentation. Behavioral scientists saying human behavior is predictable is akin to physicists saying that the movement of a falling object is predictable.
Behavioral scientists saying human behavior is predictable is akin to physicists saying physics is predictable. Physicsts saying that the movement of a falling object is predictable.is akin to behavioural scientists saying the behaviour of road users or game players is predictable.
The fact that physicists can only predict the motion of falling bodies when they know the mass of the object, the force of gravity, etc, does not mean that they have to say, "Falling bodies are predictable in controlled e environments, but they are unpredictable in the real world".
"falling objects" are predictable because they are falling--to fall is to be under the control of one force.
Or some other reason.
There cannot be any other reason.
Yes there can. Physical indeterminism that effects humans is logically possible.
So it's just a coincidence that every "free range" behavior which has been tested happens to be predictable?
If it's not predictable in the free range, that doesn't mean much. Or, rather, it doens't mean what it seems to mean.
You think the movement of billiard balls are unpredictable because of "quantum mechanics"?... You do understand that indeterminism and probabilism do not preclude predictability, right?
For some value of "predictability". Weaker claims are easier to defend, but they mean less.
There is no other option. [than lack of knowledge of variables]
Indeterminism means even Laplace's Demon can't predict. That's definitional
No. Knowing the variables in an environment does not mean you get what you're looking for.
That you don't look for the unpredictable means you get what you look for.
There is an almost infinite number of ways in which the variables could be combined to reach different conclusions and predictions. If we come up with a law that uses specific parameters that give us an accurate prediction, then that means the phenomenon we're observing is predictable.
I don't understand why you think controlled environments (i.e. environments where the values of parameters are known) automatically produces some behavior or outcome. That's nonsensical.
I don't think that. I think that if you asked someone to write a story with rewards for originality. you would get unpredictable results. What I object to is the sweeping, uncontextualised nature of "behaviour is predictable"
"Human behavior is predictable" means that human behavior can be predicted.
That's ambiguous too. Some of the time?All the time?
The point is that as long as we have information on the values of parameters, then human behavior is predictable.
And all the other variable are being held constant. Which they never are in "free range" situations. In a sense, there are no causes in free range situations, as there are in controlled environments, because the "other variables held constant" clause doesn't apply. It is a mistake to think that you can sum one bit of controlled-environment causality against another and get even more causality. .
It ipredicts where it predicts and doesn't where it doesn't. If you are going to ask whether something is predictable without adding any riders about to what extent,and under what circumstances , the quesiton would reasonably be taken to apply in the raw, to "free range" behaviour. I would not be taken to mean "under controlled circumsrtances"
All science only makes predictions within controlled circumstances. If you booby-trapped a billiards table, so there were unknown valleys and crests on the surface of the table, you wouldn't disprove physics because suddenly a physicist can't predict the motion of a billiard ball.
In uncontrolled circumstances our predictions become less accurate because there are literally millions of unknown variables. But, of course, since humans are so predictable, we can make decent enough predictions - for example, we can predict how much time, and to whom, a person will dedicate talking to at a dinner table. We can also predict, with reasonable certainty, when a basketball player will take a 2-point shot over a 3-point shot, or what play a football coach will play at any given time. So whilst our predictions are imperfect, they are still accurate enough.
And this isn't even taking into account applied settings, like cognitive behavioral therapy, and applied behavior analysis - both of which are accurate enough in "free range" settings in order to treat and cure a number of conditions like anxiety, depression, autism, etc.
Of course controlled behaviour is predictable, that is what "controlled" means. And 11 fingered people have 11 fingers.
If I had said "controlled behavior" then you'd have a point. But I didn't, so your comment here is redundant.
You don't know that. To know it. you would have to exclude basic physical indeterminism, and the jury is still out on that.
Physical indeterminism is irrelevant since we're talking about the macro world. If we have to wonder whether human behavior is unpredictable due to some quantum mechanic weirdness, then we have to equally wonder whether billiard balls are unpredictable due to some quantum mechanic weirdness as well. The point is that we know human behavior is perfectly predictable in controlled experimental conditions, and less predictable in situations where some variables are unknown - this necessarily means that the myth of people being unpredictable is a result of ignorance of variables.
You get what you are looking for. Ask them to write a story or paint a picture, you do not know what you are going to get..
Once we can control the variables, of course we do. We can make them write a story or paint a picture of whatever we like.
No it doesn't. It predicts the behaviour of controlled individuals. You have no idea what the people around you in the office or street are going to do next.
Not "controlled individuals", you mean "controlled environments". And yes, of course people in the street are less predictable because we don't have access to relevant variables.
Out of interest, I take it you apply your criticisms of behavioral science to all other sciences? Physics is not successful at predicting the movement of objects because it cannot give me the exact time that a rock balanced on top of some mountain in the Northern Hemisphere will topple over.
All science only makes predictions within controlled circumstances.
Then "human behaviour is predictable" doesn't apply to life in general.
If you booby-trapped a billiards table, so there were unknown valleys and crests on the surface of the table, you wouldn't disprove physics because suddenly a physicist can't predict the motion of a billiard ball.
Predictability in controlled experiments isn't taken by physicists to prove a sweeping statement like "the universe is predictable". Some physical system are well known to be unpredictable.
In uncontrolled circumstances our predictions become less accurate because there are literally millions of unknown variables.
Or some other reason.
But, of course, since humans are so predictable, we can make decent enough predictions - for example, we can predict how much time, and to whom, a person will dedicate talking to at a dinner table. We can also predict, with reasonable certainty, when a basketball player will take a 2-point shot over a 3-point shot, or what play a football coach will play at any given time. So whilst our predictions are imperfect, they are still accurate enough.
Which is to say that some real situation have straightforward rules and rewards, allowing predictability.
Physical indeterminism is irrelevant since we're talking about the macro world. If we have to wonder whether human behavior is unpredictable due to some quantum mechanic weirdness, then we have to equally wonder whether billiard balls are unpredictable due to some quantum mechanic weirdness as well.
Oh we know that, They are.
The point is that we know human behavior is perfectly predictable in controlled experimental conditions, and less predictable in situations where some variables are unknown - this necessarily means that the myth of people being unpredictable is a result of ignorance of variables.
No, it doesn't necessarily mean that.
You get what you are looking for. Ask them to write a story or paint a picture, you do not know what you are going to get..
Once we can control the variables, of course we do. We can make them write a story or paint a picture of whatever we like.
That, again, is getting what you are looking for.
Physics is not successful at predicting the movement of objects because it cannot give me the exact time that a rock balanced on top of some mountain in the Northern Hemisphere will topple over.
No physicist would say physics is successful in predicting without specifying a system. What does "human behaviour is predictable" mean? We already knew you could predict behaviour in some situations, so that isnt a discovery. And we don't know that it is predictable by and large, because it isn't.
I think the formal similarities of some aspects of arguments about qualia on the one hand and rationality on the other, are the extent of the similarities. I haven't followed all the recent discussions on qualia, so I'm not sure where you stand, but personally, I cannot make sense of the concept of qualia. Rationality-involving concepts (among them beliefs and desires), though, are absolutely indispensable. So I don't think the rationality issue resolves into one about qualia.
I appreciated your first July 07 comment about the details as to how norms can be naturalized and started to respond, then noticed the sound of a broken record. Going round one more time, to me it boils down to what Hume took to be obvious:
What you ought to do is distinct from what you will do.
Natural science can tell you at best what you will do.
Natural science can't tell you what you ought to do.
It is surprising to me there is so much resistance (I mean, from many people, not just yourself) to this train of thought. When you say in that earlier comment 'You have a set of goals...', you have already, in my view, crossed out of natural science. What natural science sees is just what it is your propensity to do, and that is not the same thing as a goal.
I think the formal similarities of some aspects of arguments about qualia on the one hand and rationality on the other, are the extent of the similarities. I haven't followed all the recent discussions on qualia, so I'm not sure where you stand, but personally, I cannot make sense of the concept of qualia. Rationality-involving concepts (among them beliefs and desires), though, are absolutely indispensable. So I don't think the rationality issue resolves into one about qualia.
Rationality uncontroversially involves rules and goals, both of which are naturalisable. You have said there is an extra ingredient of "caring", which sound qualia-like.
What you ought to do is distinct from what you will do.
Not in all cases surely? What would an is/ought gap be when behaviour matched the ideal
Natural science can tell you at best what you will do. Natural science can't tell you what you ought to do.
That depends on what you mean by 'can'. All the information about the intentions and consequences of your actions is encoded in a total physical picture of the universe. Where else would it be? OTOH, natural science, in practice,cannot produce that answer.
It is surprising to me there is so much resistance (I mean, from many people, not just yourself) to this train of thought. When you say in that earlier comment 'You have a set of goals...', you have already, in my view, crossed out of natural science. What natural science sees is just what it is your propensity to do, and that is not the same thing as a goal.
Natural science is not limited to behaviour: it can peak inside a black box and see that a certain goal is encoded into it.even it it is not being achieved.
The world is full of people who may want to edit my values ever-so-slightly while I'm not looking, in order to further their own agenda. lso my values may drift, and most drift is harmful from the perspective of my current values. A good recipe for countering this insidious deterioration of values is to consciously pull them back toward their original source, as long as it's something unchanging, like a book.
The argument assumes change is necessarily for the worse. People can aquire new values whilst seeing them as an improvement. If it is possible to meta-evaluate values this way, then you should seek to improve your values any way you can. if it is not possible to meta-evaluate values, then you don't know that your existing values are optimal or any good at all. Keeping them out of sheer conservatism is not rational. Although one could make a half hearted wisdom-of-the-crowds argument.
Your example is a bit absurd - why would the prediction of human behavior necessarily entail the prediction of behavior in a completely uncontrolled environment, with near-to-zero information on any relevant variables?
Your question is comparable to asking: If physics was so good at predicting the movement of physical bodies, then why can't it predict earthquakes? If it can't predict when an earthquake will occur, then it is not successful at predicting the movement of physical bodies.
The point is that we know that humans are incredibly predictable. The reason why humans appear to be unpredictable is simply a product of the vast number of unknown variables acting upon us at any given time. When we remove these variables, and place a person in a controlled experimental environment, the result is highly predictable human behavior. As I pointed out above, we are very good at predicting how people will respond in choice situations, and self-control situations, etc.
The great thing about behaviorism is that not only does it point out that human behavior has causes, but it identifies these causes and quantifies them in simple laws that accurately predict the behavior of individuals. In other words, there's a reason why behavioral science (underpinned by behaviorism) is considered a natural science.
Your question is comparable to asking: If physics was so good at predicting the movement of physical bodies, then why can't it predict earthquakes? If it can't predict when an earthquake will occur, then it is not successful at predicting the movement of physical bodies.
It ipredicts where it predicts and doesn't where it doesn't. If you are going to ask whether something is predictable without adding any riders about to what extent,and under what circumstances , the quesiton would reasonably be taken to apply in the raw, to "free range" behaviour. I would not be taken to mean "under controlled circumsrtances",Of course controlled behaviour is predictable, that is what "controlled" means. And 11 fingered people have 11 fingers.
The reason why humans appear to be unpredictable is simply a product of the vast number of unknown variables acting upon us at any given time.
You don't know that. To know it. you would have to exclude basic physical indeterminism, and the jury is still out on that.
When we remove these variables, and place a person in a controlled experimental environment, the result is highly predictable human behavior.
You get what you are looking for. Ask them to write a story or paint a picture, you do not know what you are going to get..
but it identifies these causes and quantifies them in simple laws that accurately predict the behavior of individuals.
No it doesn't. It predicts the behaviour of controlled individuals. You have no idea what the people around you in the office or street are going to do next.
I think your question again gets right to the nub of the matter. I have no snappy answer to the challenge -here is my long-winded response.
The zombie analogy is a good one. I understand it's meant just as an analogy -the intent is not to fall into the qualia quagmire. The thought is that from a purely naturalistic perspective, people can only properly be seen as, as you put it, preference- or rationality-zombies.
The issue here is the validity of identity claims of the form,
My answer is to compare them to the fate of identity claims relating to sensations (qualia again), such as
Suppose being in pain is found empirically always to correlate to being in brain state DEF, and the identity is proposed. Qualiaphiles will object, saying that this identity misses what's crucial to pain, viz, how it feels. The qualiaphile's thought can be defended by considering the logic of identity claims generally (this adapted from Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity).
Scientific identity claims are necessary - if water = H2O in this world, then water = H2O in all possible worlds. That is, because water is a natural kind, whatever it is, it couldn't have been anything else. It is possible for water to present itself to us in a different phenomenal aspect ('ice9'!), but this is OK because what's essential to water is its underlying structure, not its phenomenal properties. The situation is different for pain - what's essential to pain is its phenomenal properties. Because pain essentially feels like this (so the story goes), it's correlation with being in brain state DEF can only be contingent. Since identities of this kind, if true, are by their natures necessary, the identity is false.
There is a further step (lots of steps, I admit) to rationality. The thought is that our access to people's rationality is 'direct' in the way our access to pain is. The unmediated judgement of rationality would, if push were to come to shove, trump the scientifically informed, indirect inference from brain states. Defending this proposition would take some doing, but the idea is that we need to understand each other as rational agents before we can get as far as dissecting ourselves to understand ourselves as mere objects.
It is still not clear whether you think rationality is analogous to qualia or is a quale.
Why do you say that behaviorism has not been successful at predicting human behavior? Its most popular models of choice behavior consistently account for around 95% of the variance in experimental settings (e.g. the matching law, or the contingency discriminability model). Behaviorist accounts have disproved naive conceptualisations of the "rational agent", and have developed models of self control which not only accurately predict at what point an individual will choose the smaller-sooner reward over the larger-delayed reward, but they also predicted a previously unnoticed behavioral phenomenon (i.e. preference reversal).
I'm aware of no other area of psychology which has been as successful at predicting human (and animal) behavior as behaviorist theories. The success of behaviorist accounts to not only predict, but also to control, human behavior is one of the features why behaviorism is considered one of the most useful approaches to psychology.
Why do you say that behaviorism has not been successful at predicting human behavior?
No form of psychology has been successful at predicting human behaviour. Where are the predictions of election outcomes, or which product will be successful ion the market place?
If morality is totally non-predictive then it shouldn't be in our model of the world. It's like the sort of "consciousness" where in the non-conscious zombie universe, philosophers write the exact same papers about consciousness despite not being conscious. If morality is non-predictive, then even if we act morally, it's for reasons totally divorced from morality! If morality is non-predictive, then when we try to act morally we might as well just flip a coin, because no causal process can access "morality"! That's why morality has to predict things, and that's why it has to be inside peoples' heads. Because if it ain't in peoples' heads to start with, there's no magical process that puts it there.
</rant>
If morality is totally non-predictive then it shouldn't be in our model of the world.
The point of morality is to change the world, not model it.
If morality is non-predictive, then even if we act morally, it's for reasons totally divorced from morality!
If we act morally, the morality we are acting on predicts our actions. Your beef seems to be with the idea that morality is not some universal causal law -- that you have to choose it. There will be a causal explanation of behaviour at the neuronal level, but that doesn't exclude an explanation at the level of moral reasoning,any more than an explanation of a computers operation at the level of electrons excludes a software level explanation.
If morality is non-predictive, then when we try to act morally we might as well just flip a coin, because no causal process can access "morality"!
A causal process can implement moral reasoning just as it can implement mathematical reasoning. Your objection is a category error. like saying a software is an immaterial abstraction that doesn't cause a computer to do anything.
That's why morality has to predict things, and that's why it has to be inside peoples' heads.
Morality is inside people's heads since it is a form of reasoning. Where did I say otherwise?
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If anyone can bear more of this, Poppers argument against induction using Bayes is being discussed here