I've been thinking... How is it that we can meaningfully even think about full semantics second order logic of physics is computable?
What I mean is... if we think we're talking about or thinking about full semantics? That is, if no explicit rule following computable thingy can encode rules/etc that pin down full semantics uniquely, what are our brains doing when we think we mean something when we mean "every" subset?
I'm worried that it might be one of those things that feels/seems meaningful, but isn't. That our brains cannot explicitly "pin down" that model. So... what are we actually thinking we're thinking about when we're thinking we're thinking about full semantics/"every possible subset"?
(Does what I'm asking make sense to anyone? And if so... any answers?)
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Speaking as someone with an academic background in physics, I don't think the group as a whole as anti-MWI as you seem to imply. It was taught at my university as part of the standard quantum sequence, and many of my professors were many-worlders... What isn't taught and what should be taught is how MWI is in fact the simpler theory, requiring fewer assumptions, and not just an interesting-to-consider alternative interpretation. But yes, as others have mentioned physicists as a whole are waiting until we have the technology to test which theory is correct. We're a very empirical bunch.
I don't think I was implying physicists to be anti-MWI, but merely not as a whole considering it to be slam dunk already settled.