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We're still on for whoever can make it. I was out driving today and roads seemed a little better.
Cool! In that case, as of now at least, I'm still planning on showing up.
I think we're good, as long as some people don't mind sitting on the floor.
Well, I could bring a few extra chairs if wanted. (Although are we even still on for tomorrow given how the roads are? (Admittedly, sunday will probably be worse...))
Like last time, I'll bring around six chairs & stools and some "my name is" stickers.
Well, as I said, anything else needed? (more chairs? other stuff?)
In response to
Meetup : Southeast Michigan
As of now, I'm planning on coming.
Anything I should be bringing? (ie, extra chairs, whatever?)
Why not go a step further and say that 1 copy is the same as 0, if you think there's a non-moral fact of the matter? The abstract computation doesn't notice whether it's instantiated or not. (I'm not saying this isn't itself really confused - it seems like it worsens and doesn't dissolve the question of why I observe an orderly universe - but it does seem to be where the GAZP points.)
Hrm... The whole exist vs non exist thing is odd and confusing in and of itself. But so far it seems to me that an algorithm can meaningfully note "there exists an algorithm doing/perceiving X", where X represents whatever it itself is doing/perceiving/thinking/etc. But there doesn't seem there'd be any difference between 1 and N of them as far as that.
There's no brief answer. I've been slowly gravitating towards, but am not yet convinced, by the suspicion that making a computer out of twice as much material causes there to be twice as much person inside. Reason: No exact point where splitting a flat computer in half becomes a separate causal process, similarity to behavior of Born probabilities. But that's not an update to the anthropic trilemma per se.
That seems to be seriously GAZP violating. Trying to figure out how to put my thoughts on this into words but... There doesn't seem to be anywhere that the data is stored that could "notice" the difference. The actual program that is being the person doesn't contain a "realness counter". There's nowhere in the data that could "notice" the fact that there's, well, more of the person. (Whatever it even means for there to be "more of a person")
Personally, I'm inclined in the opposite direction, that even N separate copies of the same person is the same as 1 copy of the same person until they diverge, and how much difference between is, well, how separate they are.
(Though, of course, those funky Born stats confuse me even further. But I'm fairly inclined toward the "extra copies of the exact same mind don't add more person-ness. But as they diverge from each other, there may be more person-ness. (Though perhaps it may be meaningful to talk about additional fractions of personness rather than just one then suddenly two hole persons. I'm less sure on that.)
Speaking as someone with an academic background in physics, I don't think the group as a whole as anti-MWI as you seem to imply. It was taught at my university as part of the standard quantum sequence, and many of my professors were many-worlders... What isn't taught and what should be taught is how MWI is in fact the simpler theory, requiring fewer assumptions, and not just an interesting-to-consider alternative interpretation. But yes, as others have mentioned physicists as a whole are waiting until we have the technology to test which theory is correct. We're a very empirical bunch.
I don't think I was implying physicists to be anti-MWI, but merely not as a whole considering it to be slam dunk already settled.
I've been thinking... How is it that we can meaningfully even think about full semantics second order logic of physics is computable?
What I mean is... if we think we're talking about or thinking about full semantics? That is, if no explicit rule following computable thingy can encode rules/etc that pin down full semantics uniquely, what are our brains doing when we think we mean something when we mean "every" subset?
I'm worried that it might be one of those things that feels/seems meaningful, but isn't. That our brains cannot explicitly "pin down" that model. So... what are we actually thinking we're thinking about when we're thinking we're thinking about full semantics/"every possible subset"?
(Does what I'm asking make sense to anyone? And if so... any answers?)
I am left-handed and suffer from depression and anxiety. Perhaps this is due in my case to the dominance of the right hemisphere, which processes more negative emotions, instead of the usual left side, which seems to process positive ones. As odd as it sounds, when I apply ice water to my right ear my symptoms are temporarily alleviated and I feel a positive mood lift.
Odd indeed, but if it works for you, that's good. (How long does the effect last?)
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We're still on for whoever can make it. I was out driving today and roads seemed a little better.
Running a bit late, but still coming, just about to head out.