In response to comment by Randaly on The best 15 words
Comment author: EHeller 09 October 2013 01:52:25AM 1 point [-]

Economic determinism refers specifically to the economic structure.

You missed roughly half of my sentence, and half of Multiheaded's. The other half was historical materialism- below is a quote from the wikipedia article

[Historical materialism] is a theory of socioeconomic development according to which changes in material conditions (technology and productive capacity) are the primary influence on how society and the economy are organised.

In response to comment by EHeller on The best 15 words
Comment author: Randaly 09 October 2013 07:20:04AM 0 points [-]

Nah, I was deliberately ignoring the other half. The fact that one part of Multiheaded's comment was correct (though, AFAICT, irrelevant to the above discussion) doesn't mean that the other part (regarding economic determinism) is too.

In response to comment by Randaly on The best 15 words
Comment author: EHeller 09 October 2013 12:07:28AM *  2 points [-]

Your comment's style was suboptimal, technological determinism is different from economic determinism

I cannot see how it is different then a mix of historical materialism and economic determinism. Please elaborate.

and the neo-reactionary position is neither

Near as I can tell, the point is that Yvain and others (Ishaan specifically) are arguing that the reactionary position is wrong by asserting some form of historical materialism/economic determinism.

i.e. reactionaries cannot reverse the trend of history because the structures of governments are largely an adaptation to the technological world we live in. The reactionaries want to divorce the government/culture from technological progress and assert they can move independently.

The argument against them seems to be that government/culture may well be a response to the technological climate, and as such as technology changes so will the culture and government.

In response to comment by EHeller on The best 15 words
Comment author: Randaly 09 October 2013 01:34:24AM *  2 points [-]

I cannot see how it is different then a mix of historical materialism and economic determinism. Please elaborate.

Economic determinism refers specifically to the economic structure. The basic outlines of the US's economic structure have not changed since at least the 1930's, and arguably even earlier. The development of TV, the internet, or for that matter the printing press, are all changes in technology, not changes in a society's economic structure. Marx, for example, was not a technological determinist; Yvain et. al. are not economic determinists. Changing an economic structure is significantly easier than destroying all technology and preventing new developments.

Other stuff

In that case, I switch this critique to 'sub-optimal style'- i.e. it was difficult for me to tell who Multiheaded was addressing and how his point was relevant.

Comment author: Multiheaded 08 October 2013 10:10:26PM *  0 points [-]

Would anyone care to dispute the object-level claim I made, or are people just spree-downvoting?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_materialism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_determinism

Wikipedia seems to be pretty unambiguious about Marx being the first notable theorist here. It's not about "neutrality", there just isn't any evidence that this claim is mistaken.

Comment author: Randaly 08 October 2013 11:27:50PM 5 points [-]

Neither of the above. Your comment's style was suboptimal, technological determinism is different from economic determinism, and the neo-reactionary position is neither. (This is obvious from the fact that they think that they can reverse the left-ward trend of history, but that it will take a concentrated effort.)

(I did not downvote.)

Comment author: hairyfigment 28 September 2013 10:10:46PM 0 points [-]

How so? Someone involved with CFAR allegedly converted to Catholicism due to an argument-from-morality. Also, I know looking at the Biblical order to kill Isaac, and a general call to murder that I wasn't following, helped me to realize I didn't believe in God as such.

Comment author: Randaly 28 September 2013 10:21:59PM 0 points [-]

This is evidence that arguments-from-morality do persuade people, not that they should.

Comment author: Randaly 27 September 2013 07:33:17AM 1 point [-]

please consider converting your blog into a forum-blog in the style of LW.

This strikes me as somewhat technically difficult: AFAIK, there's no equivalent of Wordpress for Reddit's source code.

Comment author: Coscott 24 September 2013 04:09:14AM *  0 points [-]

Disagree with simulatarians about whether or not we are simulated?

Comment author: Randaly 24 September 2013 04:15:41AM 0 points [-]

Disagree with theists that people have ontologically basic souls; further disagree with the claim that the 'ontologically basic' / 'supernatural' aspect of a god is unimportant to its definition.

(What theists think is not relevant to a question about the beliefs of people who not self-identify as theists.)

Comment author: Coscott 24 September 2013 03:51:05AM 1 point [-]

Hmm, that is a distinction that is pretty clear cut. However most people who believe in god believe that all people have ontologically basic souls. Therefore, since they think ontologically basic is nothing particularly special, I do not think that they would consider that a particularly important part of the definition of a god.

Comment author: Randaly 24 September 2013 04:03:59AM 0 points [-]

Yes. I disagree with them.

(Eliminating the supernatural aspect explains the human mind, and explains away God.)

Comment author: ChristianKl 19 September 2013 09:59:48PM 0 points [-]

Possibly government spy agencies- almost everything is non-public, but they're known to have had some notable non-classified successes (e.g. RSA)
[...]
The US Navy has a perfect record of safety on its nuclear reactors (the USSR had 14 known accidents on a smaller fleet; there were also numerous civilian meltdowns)

First you acknowledge that there classification and then you say that the lack of public knowledge about US Navy reactor safety issues means that there weren't any?

Comment author: Randaly 20 September 2013 03:01:12AM 2 points [-]
  • NSA stuff is classified because its release would alert others to the US's capabilities; the fact of an accident would not
  • One would expect the USSR to be equally eager to classify their mistakes, and to have greater success; they are believed to have failed utterly
  • Any argument in favor of classifying nuclear accidents would apply equally to the Thresher, Scorpion, Guitarro, San Francisco, and Miami, for which no serious attempt was made at classification
  • Nuclear accidents, judging by the USSR's experience, almost always involve the loss of an entire ship, and many fatalities. It is not possibly for the Navy to just "lose" a ship or a dozen sailors. (No submarine certified under the navy's safety plan, SUBSAFE, has ever been lost, for any reason.) It is even less possible for them to evacuate an aircraft carrier and then rely on tugs to move it to a dock for repair..
Comment author: RobbBB 18 September 2013 10:44:19PM *  7 points [-]

My biggest concern with the label 'Bayesianism' isn't that it's named after the Reverend, nor that it's too mainstream. It's that it's really ambiguous.

For example, when Yvain speaks of philosophical Bayesianism, he means something extremely modest -- the idea that we can successfully model the world without certainty. This view he contrasts, not with frequentism, but with Aristotelianism ('we need certainty to successfully model the world, but luckily we have certainty') and Anton-Wilsonism ('we need certainty to successfully model the world, but we lack certainty'). Frequentism isn't this view's foil, and this philosophical Bayesianism doesn't have any respectable rivals, though it certainly sees plenty of assaults from confused philosophers, anthropologists, and poets.

If frequentism and Bayesianism are just two ways of defining a word, then there's no substantive disagreement between them. Likewise, if they're just two different ways of doing statistics, then it's not clear that any philosophical disagreement is at work; I might not do Bayesian statistics because I lack skill with R, or because I've never heard about it, or because it's not the norm in my department.

There's a substantive disagreement if Bayesianism means 'it would be useful to use more Bayesian statistics in science', and if frequentism means 'no it wouldn't!'. But this methodological Bayesianism is distinct from Yvain's philosophical Bayesianism, and both of those are distinct from what we might call 'Bayesian rationalism', the suite of mantras, heuristics, and exercises rationalists use to improve their probabilistic reasoning. (Or the community that deems such practices useful.) Viewing the latter as an ideology or philosophy is probably a bad idea, since the question of which of these tricks are useful should be relatively easy to answer empirically.

Comment author: Randaly 18 September 2013 11:53:54PM *  5 points [-]

Frequentism isn't this view's foil

Err, actually, yes it is. The frequentist interpretation of probability makes the claim that probability theory can only be used in situations involving large numbers of repeatable trials, or selection from a large population. William Feller:

There is no place in our system for speculations concerning the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow. Before speaking of it we should have to agree on an (idealized) model which would presumably run along the lines "out of infinitely many worlds one is selected at random..." Little imagination is required to construct such a model, but it appears both uninteresting and meaningless.

Or to quote from the essay coined the term frequentist:

The essential distinction between the frequentists and the [Bayesians] is, I think, that the former, in an effort to avoid anything savouring of matters of opinion, seek to define probability in terms of the objective properties of a population, real or hypothetical, whereas the latter do not.

Frequentism is only relevant to epistemological debates in a negative sense: unlike Aristotelianism and Anton-Wilsonism, which both present their own theories of epistemology, frequentism's relevance is almost only in claiming that Bayesianism is wrong. (Frequentism separately presents much more complicated and less obviously wrong claims within statistics and probability; these are not relevant, given that frequentism's sole relevance to epistemology is its claim that no theory of statistics and probability could be a suitable basis for an epistemology, since there are many events they simply don't apply to.)

(I agree that it would be useful to separate out the three versions of Bayesianism, whose claims, while related, do not need to all be true or false at the same time. However, all three are substantively opposed to one or both of the views labelled frequentist.)

Comment author: wedrifid 18 September 2013 05:39:45PM *  0 points [-]

For which government are you counting that as an achievement?

Apparently the governments of "every other nation on earth". Which is odd, because I don't think my country achieved that. I can only assume countries which never had slavery are excluded.

Comment author: Randaly 18 September 2013 10:01:12PM 4 points [-]

Australia had slavery. It was entirely unregulated until 1868. The practice mostly ended when Australia decided on a mass deportation of all Pacific Islanders in 1901, for racial reasons.

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