Isn't the "Do I live in a simulation?" question practically indistinguishable from the question "does God exist?", for a sufficiently flexible definition for "God"?
For the latter, there are plenty of ethical frameworks, as well as incentives for altruism, developed during the history of mankind.
On the grounds that those ethical frameworks rested on highly in-flexible definitions for God, I am skeptical of their applicability. Moreover, why would we look at a different question where we redefine it to be the first question all over again?
I think the basic income is an interesting proposal for a difficult problem, but I downvoted this post.
This is naked political advocacy. Moreover, the comment is hyperbole and speculation. A better way to address this subject would be to try and tackle it from an EA perspective - how efficient is giving cash compared to giving services? How close could we come if we wanted to try it as charity?
The article is garbage. Techcrunch is not a good source for anything, even entertainment in my opinion. The article is also hyperbolic and speculative, while being littered with Straw Man, Ad Hominem, and The Worst Argument In the World. If you are interested in the topic, a much better place to go look would be the sidebar of the subreddit dedicated to basic income.
Bad arguments for a bad purpose with no data doesn't make for quality discussion.
We cannot qualitatively distinguish between ontologies, except through the other qualities we were already examining.
If that is supposed to mean that every ontology comes with its own isolated, tailor-made criteria, and that there are no others ... then I dont think the situation is quite that bad: it;'s partly true, but there are also criteria that span ontologies, like parsimony.
We don't have a way of searching for new ontologies.
The point is that we don't have a mechanical, algorithmic way of searching for new ontologies. (It's a very lesswronging piece of thinking to suppose that means there is no way at all). Clearly , we come up with new ontologies from time to time. In the absence of an algorithm for constructing ontologies, doing so is more of a createive process, and in the absence of algorithmic criteria for evaluating them, doing so is more like an aesthetic process.
My overall points are that
1) Philosophy is genuinely difficult..its failure to churn out results rapidly isn't due to a boneheaded refusal to adopt some one-size-fits all algorithm such as Bayes...
2) ... because there is currently no algorithm that covers everything you would want to do.
So it looks like all we have done is go from best possible explanation to best available explanation where some superior explanation occupies a space of almost-zero in our probability distribution.
it's a one word difference, but it's very significant difference in terms of implications. For instance, we can;t quantify how far the best available explanation is from the best possible explanation. That can mean that the use of probablistic reasoning does't go far enough.
If that is supposed to mean that every ontology comes with its own isolated, tailor-made criteria, and that there are no others
I mean to say we are not ontologically motivated. The examples OP gave aren't ontological questions, only questions with ontological implications, which makes the ontology descriptive rather than prescriptive. That the implications carry forward only makes the description consistent.
In the scholastic case, my sense of the process of moving beyond Aristotle is that it relied on things happening that disagreed with Aristotle, which weren't motivated by testing Aristotle. Architecture and siege engines did for falling objects, for example.
I agree with your points. I am now experiencing some disquiet about how slippery the notion of 'best' is. I wonder how one would distinguish whether it was undefinable or not.
Without having a way of ranging across ontologyspace, how can we distinguish the merits of different ontologies? But we don't have such a way. In its absence, we can pursue an ontology to the point of breakdown, whereupon we have no clear path onwards. It can also be a slow of process ... it took centuries for scholastic philosophers to reach that point with the Aristotelian framework.
Alternatively, if an ontology works, that is no proof that it ia the best possible ontology, or the final answer...again because of the impossibility of crawling across ontologyspace.
This sounds strongly like we have no grounds for considering ontology at all when determining what the best possible explanation.
So it looks like all we have done is go from best possible explanation to best available explanation where some superior explanation occupies a space of almost-zero in our probability distribution.
Question: why don't the ontological implications of our method of analysis constrain us to observing explanations with similar ontological implications?
Maybe they can[*], but it is not exactly a good thing...if you stick to one method of analysis, you will be in an echo chamber.
[*}An example might be the way reality looks mathematical to physics, which some people are willing to take fairly literally.
Echo chamber implies getting the same information back.
It would be more accurate to say we will inevitably reach a local maxima. Awareness of the ontological implications should be a useful tool in helping us recognize when we are there and which way to go next.
Without pursuing the analysis to its maximal conclusions, how can we distinguish the merits of different ontologies?
If the artificial intelligence from emulation is accomplished through tweaking an emulation and/or piling on computational resources, why couldn't it be accomplished before we start emulating humans?
Other primates, for example. Particularly in the case of the destructive-read and ethics-of-algorithmic-tweaks, animal testing will surely precede human testing. To the extent a human brain is just a primate brain with more computing power, another primate with better memory and clock speed should serve almost as effectively.
What about other mammals with culture and communication, like a whales or dolphins?
Something not a mammal at all, like Great Tits?
Is anyone in a position to offer some criticism (or endorsement) of the work produced at Gerwin Schalk's lab?
I attended a talk given by Dr. Schalk in April 2015, where he described a new method of imaging the brain, which appeared to be a better-resolution fMRI (the image in the talk was a more precise image of motor control of the arm, showing the path of neural activity over time). I was reminded of it because Dr. Schalk spent quite a bit of time emphasizing doing the probability correctly and optimizing the code, which seemed relevant when the recent criticism of fMRI software was published.
Very valid and good point(added). I briefly touched on it before too, but mostly had individual practitioners in mind than organized hospitals with administration and support. (India is moving towards a lot more of the organized hospitals model, but IT is non-existent, administration is most seat-in-the-ass jobs)
This is enough of a problem for small medical practices in the US that it outweighs a good bedside manner and confidence in the doctor's medical ability.
I am confident that this has a large effect on the success of an individual practice; it may fall under the general heading of business advice for the individual practitioner. Even for a single-doctor office, a good secretary and record system will be key to success.
This information comes chiefly from experience of and interviews with specialists (dermatology and gynaecology) in the US.
I know this is banal, but ensure excellent administration.
Medical expertise is only relevant once you see the patient. Your ability to judge the evidence requires getting access to it; this means you need to be able to correctly send requests, get the data back, and keep all this attached to the correct patient.
Scheduling, filing and communication. Lacking these, medical expertise is meaningless. So get the best damn admin and IT you can possibly afford.
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It's possible I'm getting to confused with the language here but I've struggled to apply this advice in my own life. I'll decide that I'm not going to snack at work anymore and then find myself snacking anyway once the time comes. It seems to reflect a naivete in regards to how willpower and habits work.
It sounds good and I've listened to 4 episodes now and Jocko doesn't seem to elaborate on how exactly this process is supposed to work. What is the difference between deciding and truly deciding? What is the habit of 'discipline is freedom' and how does one adopt it as their reality?
I come away from the podcast inspired for a few hours but with no lasting change.
Here is a method I use to good effect:
1) Take a detailed look at the pros and cons of what you want to change. This is sometimes sufficient by itself - more than once I have realized I simply get nothing out what I'm doing, and the desire goes away by itself.
2) Find a substitution for those pros.
Alternatively, think about an example of when you decided to do something and then actually did it, and try to port the methods over. Personal example: I recently had a low-grade freakout over deciding to do a particular paperwork process that is famously slow and awful, and brings up many deeply negative feelings for me. Then I was cleaning my dutch oven, and reflected on getting a warranty replacement actually took about three months and several phone calls, which is frustrating but perfectly manageable. This gives me confidence that monitoring a slow administrative process is achievable, and I am more likely to complete it now.